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PREFACE 
ver the last four years, the Centre for European Policy Studies has 
been deeply engaged as the coordinator of a major research project 
funded by the European Commission called NEUJOBS. Our 
objective has been to analyse possible future developments in European 
labour market(s) under the main assumption that European societies are 
now facing or preparing to face profound transitions, or what we call 
‘megatrends’, that will have a major impact on employment. These natural 
and societal megatrends will reshape the global conditions for Europe, 
posing numerous challenges to societies and policy-makers in the area of 
labour.  
A first volume of papers, produced in the first half of the project, 
attempted to explain what the findings from various social sciences mean 
for the future of labour in Europe.  This second volume concentrates on 
employment in specific sectors, such as transport, energy and housing, and 
for specific groups in the labour force, notably women, elderly and 
migrants. Our findings are addressed not only to policy-makers, business 
persons, fellow academics and journalists, but to any concerned individual 
who is interested in the shape, size and character of the labour markets of 
tomorrow and beyond.  
The editors would like to thank the entire network of the NEUJOBS 
project for the strong commitment shown throughout the project as well as 
in the preparation of this book. They are particularly grateful to Elisa 
Martellucci for the enormous assistance in the dissemination of this volume 
and the project in general. They would also like to thank Anil Shamdasani 
and Anne Harrington for patiently improving the text and Els Van den 
Broeck and John Hate for improving its appearance. In his capacity as the 
project’s Scientific Officer, Marc Goffart provided invaluable support to 
both the project as a whole, and also to this book. 
Miroslav Beblavý, Ilaria Maselli & Marcela Veselková 
Brussels,  February 2015 
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1. GREEN, PINK & SILVER? 
THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ, SILVIA HUDÁČKOVÁ, 
DOMINIK WIEDENHOFER, WILLI HAAS AND 
MARINA FISCHER-KOWALSKI* 
uropean societies face profound global changes over the coming 
decades that will alter the nature of work and employment and 
require pro-active and anticipatory policy responses. These global 
changes are driven by the socio-ecological transition (SET), described and 
analysed in detail in Volume 1. In this second volume, we map the impact 
of these changes on specific sectors of the European economy that are most 
sensitive to this transition and on groups, such as women, elderly, migrants 
and Roma, that form the key labour market reservoir of the future. In that 
sense, we ask whether the future of labour is indeed not just green, but also 
driven by colours pink (women) and silver (elderly). 
The socio-ecological transition consists of complex non-linear 
processes whose exact unfolding is difficult to foresee. The drivers of these 
transitions for Europe have been described as ‘global megatrends’ that will 
have substantial and potentially adverse impacts on European societies and 
labour and will invoke European policy responses to both limit these 
adverse effects and make use of opportunities. 
                                                   
* Miroslav Beblavý: Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Member of the Slovak 
Parliament; Silvia Hudáčkováis: Slovak Governance Institute; Dominik 
Wiedenhofer: Researcher at the Institute of Social Ecology, Alpen Adria University, 
Klagenfurt; Willi Haas: Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Institute of Social 
Ecology, Alpen Adria University, Klagenfurt; and Marina Fischer-Kowalski: 
Founder and long-term director of the Institute of Social Ecology, Alpen Adria 
University, Klagenfurt.  
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‘Societal megatrends’ include demographic dynamics, ongoing shifts 
of the global economic and political centres of gravity and the growing use 
of information and communication technologies, which facilitate new 
forms of knowledge-sharing. ‘Natural megatrends’ are the onset of climate 
change and frequently more extreme weather events, increasing pressure 
on fossil fuels from rising global demand and stagnating to declining 
supply, and rising challenges to resource security, in particular due to 
increasing volatility of supply and prices. These six megatrends can be 
expected to have far-reaching implications for production and 
consumption patterns, and therefore also employment, in European 
societies. 
To take into account the uncertainty concerning the severity and 
speed of these changes, we distinguish between equally likely ‘friendly’ 
and ‘tough’ variants of each megatrend for two distinct time frames: by 
2025 and by 2050. The combined outcomes of each global future for Europe 
are then modelled to understand the consequences of these trends. In the 
previous volume, we sketched out two potential strategies for European 
policy-makers to cope with changing global conditions and to actively 
shape the future of labour in Europe. Beyond a ‘business-as-usual’ 
approach, more pro-active strategies of ‘ecological modernisation’ and an 
even more ambitious ‘sustainability transformation’ were explored. While 
the specifics of how the global megatrends actually materialise in the future 
are important, future jobs and therefore prosperity and welfare in Europe 
rely on the success of these strategies in pro-actively seeking appropriate 
policies to achieve desired outcomes.  
Most European countries will see their working-age population 
shrink due to ageing and reduced fertility. Even under the assumptions of 
the ‘friendly’ scenario (higher fertility, extended life expectancy and 
increased immigration), most EU countries cannot escape the prospect of a 
declining working-age population, while improvements in life expectancy 
will have only a minor impact. Even though migration can bring about 
immediate changes in European population growth, it is unlikely to fully 
compensate for the decline in the working-age population, although 
opportunities to increase the labour supply differ from one country to 
another. 
The decrease in labour supply, combined with the gradual upgrading 
of skills (or ‘upskilling’) of the population, should lead to wage increases 
for the highly skilled, while the ongoing polarisation of the labour market 
could negatively affect low- and medium-skilled jobs. Projections of trends 
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under both the ‘friendly’ and the ‘tough’ global scenarios suggest that 
higher wages will provide relief for public finances and partially 
compensate for the increase in pension and healthcare bills. However, 
research from this project also suggests potentially strong divergences and 
polarisation of skill levels in the labour-supply projections for Europe. The 
supply of low-skilled labour is similar in both scenarios, and the main 
differences arise from the supply of high-skilled labour. The potential 
quantity of high-skilled workers reaches almost 105 million in 2030 in the 
‘friendly’ scenario, and only 83 million in the ‘tough’ scenario (20% lower). 
This decrease of the labour force in terms of both quantity and in the 
‘tough’ scenario, also in terms of skills, reduces long-term potential 
economic growth, makes rebalancing European public finances more 
difficult, and impedes Europe’s adaptation to a fundamentally changing 
world. 
Overall demand for employees will also be determined by 
macroeconomic conditions, structural change and the potential for job 
creation even with low economic growth. Net job creation varies from no 
rise in employment in the ‘tough’ global scenario to an annual creation of 
1.5 million jobs in the ‘friendly’ future. High-skilled employment in the 
non-tradable sectors is growing fast and is the major contributor to 
employment creation in both scenarios. At the same time, a lasting 
destruction of low-skilled employment in the tradable sectors can be 
expected. In the non-tradable sectors, low-skilled employment is better 
protected, but the projections are still pessimistic compared to past trends. 
In the ‘friendly’ global scenario, employment growth in Europe is 
mainly driven by the creation of an additional 15 million jobs in the 
private-services sector between 2010 and 2030. The construction sector also 
exhibits non-negligible job creation, with 3.9 million additional jobs over 
the same period. In the ‘tough’ scenario, the fall in employment is large in 
the non-market services, with 3.1 million fewer jobs in 2030 compared to 
2010. In the private-services sector, employment creation of only 3.5 million 
jobs is estimated, which is much lower than in the more optimistic scenario. 
In both scenarios, most jobs are destroyed in agriculture and industry 
sectors. 
From a European perspective, the specific potential for policy 
interventions to alleviate the negative impacts and enhance the positive 
developments for Europe and the labour market is therefore of paramount 
interest. The NEUJOBS project aimed to offer qualified answers, which will 
be explored below and in the following chapters.  
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1.1 Limits of power: Energy, growth and employment 
The energy system is at the heart of the SET away from fossil fuels. The 
current EU energy mix is still dominated by fossil fuels, with more than 
three-quarters of EU energy consumption being based on oil, gas or coal, 
which the energy sector transforms into useful energy such as fuel, 
electricity or heating and then delivers to industry, households and 
transport. Therefore, the energy sector is highly relevant for greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Its importance for employment is much smaller: the 
total number of direct jobs provided by the EU energy supply sector in 
2011 is estimated at between 1.5 million and 2.2 million, representing a 
share of 0.7-1% of the total employed workforce in that year.  
As shown in Chapter 2, renewable resources are playing a growing 
role in the European economy, having reached a share of 14% of final 
energy consumption and 23.5% of electricity produced. The production of 
renewable energy in the EU28 has increased by over 80% since 2000, albeit 
from a low base, and the share of renewables in final energy consumption 
is continuing to rise in almost all EU member states. Energy efficiency is 
also improving in energy-intensive manufacturing industries and in service 
sectors.  
Even though energy is at the centre of the socio-ecological transition, 
net employment changes in the electricity generation sector are likely to be 
small because of the small share of this sector in overall employment, 
which is not expected to change dramatically. Employment in this sector 
usually moves together with the economy in the long run, but the SET may 
result in large shifts in labour productivity due to changes in the types of 
employment that are needed to support the economy. The sector could 
become significantly more labour intensive if there is a change in the 
composition of the energy mix. For example, employment in the energy 
sector could increase by more than 3 million in 2050 if a rapid shift to 
renewable energy sources were to occur. If the RES share were to increase 
at a slower pace, there would still be more than one million extra jobs 
created in the sector. 
The renewables sector is subject to rapid technological progress and 
cost reductions. When looking at the jobs that can currently be classified as 
‘green’ in the European economy, we see that most of the dark green jobs 
are in the research and development of solar and wind technologies. More 
technological developments in the renewables sector will likely result in 
even more cost-efficient production, also spurring green employment.  
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1.2 Biking to work? Transport policy, sustainability and 
employment 
The transport sector directly employed more than 10 million people in 
2009, accounting for 4.5% of total employment in the European Union. 
Around 55% of these people worked in land transport, 2% in sea transport, 
4% in air transport, 22% in warehousing and supporting transport activities 
(cargo handling, storage and warehousing), and the remaining 17% in 
postal and courier activities. Transportation was responsible for 29% of all 
EU28 GHG emissions in 2010 and while the slight decline observed 
recently is partly attributable to the crisis, much more substantial 
reductions are required to achieve EU climate goals.  
We distinguish two broad paths for structural change in the transport 
sector. The first is to make significant changes to the propulsion technology 
used and the relative carbon intensity of transport (through the 
electrification of road transport, biomassification using 2nd or 3rd 
generation biofuels, or an efficiency revolution that would involve 
lightweight solutions for vehicles and/or downsizing to vehicles such as 1- 
or 2-litre engine cars). A second path for structural change is to focus on 
behavioural change. Many of the technological options presented above 
tend to increase the cost of acquiring a car, but reduce the actual cost of 
driving. Without any correction to the demand for transport services, 
technological options will therefore not be sufficient to reduce overall 
transport emissions. Adjusting the tax system to better reflect the damage 
that transport inflicts on the environment and on public health (i.e. the 
internalisation of external cost), stimulating the use of public (collective) 
transport and reducing the need for ‘physical interaction’ (by use of 
information technology) are essential steps to achieve structural change. 
In Chapter 3, we try to discover whether there are policies that can 
reduce our carbon emissions and at the same time create jobs. We identify 
six key factors that are expected to shape the sector and project them in 
friendly and tough scenarios. Changes in transport policy are collapsed into 
‘status quo’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘sustainability’ scenarios. We find that a 
combination of the latter two approaches to policy can reduce structural 
emissions of greenhouse gases and related pollutants by 1-8% compared 
with the status quo, with small net benefits in terms of employment. The 
impact of each policy is similar under different background conditions 
(tough or friendly), even when the impacts of the tough and friendly 
scenarios on the EU economy overall are substantially different.  
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No single transport-related policy could match the effectiveness of a 
general improvement in energy-efficiency standards while stimulating the 
labour market. For instance, the introduction of electric vehicles leads to 
environmental benefits, but has only a modest impact on job creation. Fuel-
efficiency standards give a small boost to the labour market in some 
countries, but we did not find universal evidence of a labour market 
stimulus. 
Policies oriented to behavioural changes, such as changing the tax 
base to discourage private motor vehicle use, lead to slightly positive 
labour market outcomes because they lead to greater employment in the 
public-transport sector. Improvements in transport efficiency lead to more 
positive labour market outcomes, but have less impact on pollution and 
emissions. These savings lead to an important net increase in economy-
wide employment. 
To allow cities more control over urban traffic, we advise the 
establishment of road-charging zones, or alternatively Low Emission 
Zones. The policies that are most likely to contribute to sustainability, while 
at the same time stimulating employment, are those that boost cycling, 
encourage use of public transit and promote energy efficiency. Investments 
in public infrastructure, increased transport efficiency and improvements 
in energy efficiency have the largest impact on employment per million 
euros spent, especially in eastern and southern European countries.  
1.3 Demand and supply of labour in the housing sector 
There are currently around 230 million dwellings in the European Union 
and, in terms of floor space, they account for 75% of the total building 
stock. Homes constitute the largest single land use in the built environment 
and were responsible for some 40% of direct energy usage and 25% of CO2 
emissions in 2010. Homes are generally the largest single item of 
expenditure in household budgets, and the largest form of household 
wealth for the majority of the working population. Therefore, housing can 
be expected to have an impact on employment in the context of the socio-
ecological transition.  
Chapter 4 focuses on three specific linkages of the housing sector 
with employment: energy renovation of housing stock, direct employment 
on mortgage markets, and the extent to which the tenure structure of 
member states influences the willingness and ability of households to be 
active in labour markets, as well as the nature of their activity. 
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The building stock is important for energy-efficiency targets. Across 
the member states there are many existing programmes to bring existing 
dwellings up to acceptable energy standards.  Looking to 2020, estimates of 
the total number of jobs created by energy renovations vary from 0.28 
million to 1.40 million. Policy-makers should act to ascertain that efforts to 
reach the targets are intensified in the coming years. This will require 
increased levels of investment, which will depend on the financial capacity 
of private owners; access to appropriate forms of loan finance will need to 
be developed. One way in which this could be achieved is through the use 
of housing finance markets, which would effectively allow owners to use 
existing housing equity either directly or as collateral.  
The emphasis of mortgage markets is being switched from growth in 
new lending to stability and safety. This will mean more information, 
verification and monitoring, and these functions offer considerable capacity 
for further growth of employment in the field of mortgage markets affected 
by the crisis. 
To create a flexible market that allows households to invest in 
housing, policy should support forward mortgages and also put an 
emphasis on reverse mortgages that allow households to dis-invest when 
needed. Another direction of expansion for housing finance markets is in 
supporting energy-reduction activity, i.e. expanding the opportunities for 
households to do this by taking out loans against the collateral of their 
homes. 
The potential impacts of housing tenure on labour supply are 
complex. The size of the home-ownership sectors, rates of house price 
inflation and levels of housing debt are all important. A widely held view is 
that labour mobility is lower for homeowners due to the higher transaction 
costs leading to a disincentive to relocate for a new job. As a consequence, 
the housing market could be responsible for a mismatch between vacancies 
and the unemployed within a country, and also between nations. Our 
investigations indicate that although there is some evidence of this, the 
main influence of the housing market appears to relate to the stock of 
outstanding mortgages. Homeowners with mortgages may be less able to 
respond to changing employment circumstances. 
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1.4 Ageing and job growth in healthcare and long-term care 
services 
Health and social work are important and highly dynamic sectors of the 
economy; in all European countries the healthcare workforce even 
increased during the economic crisis. In Chapter 5 we examine how 
population ageing and societal change will affect the health and long-term 
care workforce. The numbers regarding healthcare workers differ across 
the countries studied, but a common feature is that the health and social 
work workforce is characterised by high shares of women, the elderly and 
those in part-time employment. Taking into account health workers aged 
50-54 years (3.2 million workers), it can be expected that more than 6 
million employees will exit the health and social care market by 2025. The 
high share of the elderly in the health workforce is a challenge in all 
countries studied. 
We identify the following influences on the demand of health 
workforce: changes in morbidity, medical technological innovations, 
changes in treatment methods and changes in the organisation of care 
services. Our data show that population size and population ageing have a 
significant influence on the demand for health services, and an increase in 
demand for hospital activities and ambulatory health care services can be 
expected. However, we observe considerable variation across treatments. A 
strong age-demand relationship can be observed for hospital treatments, 
while the increase in the ambulatory healthcare workforce is lower. In the 
tough scenario a decline in the ambulatory health workforce is even 
estimated in Germany and Poland due to the shrinking population. For 
primary care, mostly provided by general practitioners, the relationship is 
not as strong as for hospital care. The results of the tough scenario indicate 
that the demand for health services will exceed the health workforce 
supply in all countries except for Poland. 
The gap in the formal long-term care market is expected to widen 
until 2025. In the tough scenario, the number of residents in nursing homes 
and recipients of home-care services will increase, and in the friendly 
scenario (which assumes higher economic growth, higher employment, 
higher shares of highly educated people and higher population growth 
compared to the tough scenario) the increase in the number of formal-care 
recipients is even higher, both in institutional care and in home care.  
What can be done to reduce the gap? We discuss three measures 
aimed at meeting the future care demand. The first is for governments to 
adopt measures to increase the informal care potential, for example, care 
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leave, financial support to family carers, training, counselling, flexible 
working-time arrangements for carers, ICT to reduce the caregiving 
burden, and support from professional caregivers. The second option is to 
recruit long-term care workers from abroad, whose relative merits we 
discuss in detail in Chapter 12. Finally, the domestic long-term care 
workforce can be supported by more favourable working conditions. 
Relevant measures include an increase in wages, an increase in flexible 
working-time arrangements, an increase in the standing of the nursing and 
caring professions, changes in the amount of vocational training required, 
an increase in competences, a reorganisation of caring tasks and a reduction 
in formal documentation tasks. 
The long-term care workforce also consists of informal caregivers, 
and their future numbers will be influenced by two trends: i) changes in 
living arrangements, with more people in the middle-age groups living 
alone, and ii) an increase in the very oldest living together due to the 
increase in life expectancy. At the same time, the increase in female labour-
force participation is reducing the capacity to provide intensive informal 
care to elderly relatives, while the number of informal caregivers aged over 
50 increases significantly in both demographic scenarios in all countries 
studied. 
1.5 Two faces of ageing: Older workers and older consumers 
Population ageing in European countries is an inevitable process. Eurostat 
demographic projections show that the number of people between the ages 
of 50 and 74 as a share of the population aged 20-74 will increase in the 
EU27 countries from the current 40% to 47% by 2050. As a result, older 
people represent an increasing share of the employed.  
In Chapter 6, we show that particular circumstances and policies 
anticipating this process could actually boost employment and innovation 
within EU member states. The first part of the chapter is dedicated to the 
possibilities for labour market adaptation to the ageing process, especially 
the possibilities for workers to stay economically active and productive for 
longer. Recent public system pension reforms have increased retirement 
ages, but this approach requires more than just a simple adjustment of 
social security schemes related to older workers and retirees.  
What efficient policy measures could discourage people from taking 
retirement too early, thereby decreasing the costs of the pension system 
and the risk of poverty at old age? Preventing skill obsolescence at older 
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ages requires more investment in lifelong learning. Attitudes of employers 
are usually an important determinant for the demand for older workers, 
and safety-at-work measures and support for families with care duties can 
influence the activity of certain groups of employees. Research also 
indicated that flexible working time would be an advantage. As health 
status and disability are important in all countries, public support should 
be used to address the social and physical health issues of older persons 
and promote preventative healthcare and healthy lifestyles at younger 
ages. 
Keeping the elderly in the labour market not only has a positive effect 
in decreasing the burden on the pension systems, in countries where the 
employment rate of older ages is high, the level of engagement in social life 
of older people is also higher. Moreover, higher economic activity is found 
in countries where people claim to be happiest. 
Working in a typical ‘green’ job, which is often physically 
demanding, decreases the likelihood of wanting to stay employed longer in 
countries that have high employment rates at older ages but short average 
professional careers. In more intellectually demanding occupations (ISCO 
1-4), wages increase until retirement, while in more manual occupations 
(ISCO 5-9) they start decreasing even as early as at the age of 46. This 
creates an incentive for people engaged in non-manual tasks to work for 
longer. Moving from physically demanding to intellectually demanding 
work environments could lead people to remain active in the labour market 
for longer periods of time in the future.  
The second part of Chapter 6 is dedicated to the influence of ageing 
on the structure of consumption and its effect on employment in particular 
economic sectors. Changes in the level of household consumption and in 
the structure of consumption should both be the driving forces of what is 
often referred to as the ‘silver economy’. This refers to the set of economic 
activities linked to the production of goods and services targeting the 
elderly, and the segment is expected to grow significantly. Ageing therefore 
provides an opportunity to enhance the competitiveness of the European 
economy.  
The complexity of the ‘silver economy’ lies in the fact that the elderly 
in the various member states in Europe do not have identical consumption 
habits. There are many economic, social and cultural factors that influence 
consumption patterns. Aggregate demand of households divided by age 
groups is determined by several factors, and most important is the number 
of households and their wealth. Therefore, silver demand is rather strictly 
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divided between western and central and eastern Europe. The number of 
households with a head of household aged over 60 in 2030 will 
significantly increase in both scenarios.  According to the results of 
estimations, we can expect an increased share of ‘silver demand’ in future. 
The sectors with the highest growth potential are those producing or 
providing food and beverages, housing and utilities, restaurants and hotel 
services, privately financed health, and social and long-term care. In both 
scenarios, the highest increase in total private demand is expected to target 
healthcare services for two reasons. The first is the fact that there will be 
more elderly citizens demanding care services, and the second is the fact 
that there will also be a large group of aware younger-age cohorts 
demanding preventive healthcare. The net effect of the ‘silver economy’ 
will be a loss of 1.9 million jobs in the tough scenario and a gain of 3.9 
million jobs in the friendly scenario. 
1.6 Women as workers – in the middle of a marathon 
The previous two decades were a period of further important changes in 
the position of women in European labour markets. Women constitute an 
increasingly large share of the total workforce, and this trend will continue. 
Women in the older age groups (45-64 years) experienced the most notable 
employment improvements, but significant positive employment changes 
were also observed among prime-aged women. Conversely, employment 
rates among younger women (under 25 years of age) decreased in most EU 
countries, mainly due to increasing female enrolment in tertiary education. 
However, despite a considerable improvement, the labour potential of 
women is far from being fully utilised. Chapter 7 summarises the main 
components of the necessary policy mix, describing the challenges and the 
potentially best solutions in the fields of education, maternity, retirement, 
lifelong learning, care choices, flexible employment contracts and wages. 
Most of the policy recommendations proposed and discussed are not 
new, and are already at the top of the agenda in EU countries. However, 
what is required is constant revision of the policy solutions to take account 
of changing needs and labour market settings. No one-size-fits-all set of 
policies is possible, and not just because of diversity in the labour market 
institutions across EU countries – the structure of the labour demand also 
matters.  
The most important recommendation for the components of the 
policy mix relates to the institutional setting helping to reconcile jobs with 
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family life. Here, flexible employment arrangements and improved access 
to childcare facilities are crucial – such facilities should be widely accessible 
and also affordable. Greater involvement of men in family life would be of 
considerable importance to increasing female employment, and this should 
be supported by legal changes, such as more parental leave targeted at 
fathers.  
Another set of policies affecting female employment concerns the 
redesigning of pension systems in order to lower disincentives to withdraw 
from the labour market – at an older age, but also during child-related 
career breaks – without penalising people for taking maternity leave. 
Well-educated women have higher employment rates, so the 
increasing share of women graduating from tertiary education positively 
stimulates total employment rates. Finding a first job is harder for women 
despite the fact that they are, on average, more educated than men. School-
to-work transitions are easier in countries where studying is frequently 
combined with work; hence this educational model should be supported by 
public policies (for example, by the introduction of apprenticeship 
programmes). 
Even though lifelong learning improves employability, women are 
less likely to participate in formal further education. However, they 
outnumber men in non-formal training. Women might therefore benefit 
from the recognition of informal learning (for example, their care 
competences could be formally recognised). Flexible job provisions would 
be helpful for women who wish to increase or update their qualifications, 
and would also help parents to cope with childcare. However, flexible 
employment forms appear to be a mixed blessing from a wage perspective.  
Gender pay gaps remain a challenge, in particular among older 
workers. The ongoing demographic changes, in particular the increasing 
share of women employed aged 50 and over, will probably lead to a 
deepening of the gender pay gaps, especially in those countries where the 
female labour participation rates are low at the moment. 
1.7 A common labour immigration policy for the EU? 
Rethinking ‘attractiveness’ and socio-economic inclusion  
In 2012, an estimated 1.7 million immigrants came to the EU from countries 
outside, and an additional 1.7 million people previously residing in one EU 
member state migrated to another member state. While migration can bring 
about immediate changes in population growth, it is unlikely to be able to 
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fully compensate for the decline in the working-age population. And yet, 
labour immigration policies have been high on the agenda of policy-
makers, who have attempted to develop an ‘attractive’ labour immigration 
policy with the objective of encouraging foreign highly skilled workers to 
come to the EU.  
Chapter 8 analyses the determinants of and challenges for EU labour 
immigration policy. For this purpose, the chapter sketches the current EU 
framework for immigration law and policy and then highlights specific key 
aspects and debates surrounding the attractiveness and selectiveness of 
labour migration policies.  
There are a number of dilemmas and challenges associated with 
labour migration policies. First, to whom should the policies be attractive? 
It must be borne in mind that ‘attractiveness’ of migration policies is in the 
eye of the beholder. One might think that for migrant workers, 
‘attractiveness’ may well concern issues related to security of residence, 
non-discrimination, access to fundamental social rights and the compliance 
with international labour standards. This aspect is closely connected to the 
next point.  
How can an immigration policy be made ‘attractive’? Among the 
factors that make a particular immigration policy attractive, reference is 
often made to an improved set of rights and benefits conferred on foreign 
workers (the ease of the administrative procedures, unrestricted access to 
the labour market, provision of information/employer sponsorship, and so 
on).  
What kind of foreign worker is to be ‘attracted’ by an immigration 
policy? The paradigm of attractiveness often refers to a selection logic 
focusing on those individuals considered to be ‘the brightest’ as the ideal 
type of migrant workers to be recruited. But what criteria are used to 
categorise a worker as belonging to a specific skill group? Chapter 8 
challenges the assumption that exact methodologies exist to identify and 
locate preferable ‘skills’ and ‘needs’, and highlights that the underlying 
problem in any trade-off framework is legitimising inequality of treatment 
on the basis of dubious grounds related to ‘quotas’, ‘skills’ or ‘needs’, 
which are often hugely politicised and centred around short-term concerns. 
EU immigration policy is affected by fragmentation and dispersion 
dynamics, which leads to legal complexity and uncertainty. For the next 
generation of EU labour immigration policy, action must be taken to 
overcome fragmentation, legal uncertainty, discrimination and competing 
multi-layered migratory statuses. Another priority should be overcoming 
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current formal and informal obstacles to the recognition of qualifications 
and diplomas, as they constitute barriers to international mobility. Better 
enforcement of current EU standards should also be a priority. Enhancing 
and consolidating the dialogue with and inputs from social partners and 
civil society organisations are equally important. Finally, strategic 
partnerships with relevant actors, such as the Council of Europe, the UN 
and ILO, could be useful in this area.  
1.8 Policy puzzles with the employment of Roma 
There are several reasons why we devote a special chapter (Chapter 9) to 
the employment of the Roma population in this volume. The Roma 
population represents the EU's largest ethnic minority group, estimated at 6 
million EU citizens. Not only is it a transnational issue that needs to be 
looked at from a supranational perspective, but Roma also experience 
enduring and severe exclusion from the primary labour market, which 
forms an important constraint on some European societies in meeting the 
Europe 2020 target of an employment rate of 75%. According to a UNDP 
2012 survey that examined 11 EU member states, only one in three Roma 
aged 20-64 surveyed was in paid employment. Roma are a young 
population with relatively high fertility rates, and can be regarded as an 
important resource in ageing European societies. 
The intersection of several sectors must address the social and labour 
market exclusion of Roma. We focus on the policy implications with regard 
to labour market policies. Direct job creation is a key programme type in 
most countries. Such programmes have great potential, but they do not 
intervene in the roots of long-term unemployment. In Hungary, Slovakia 
and Bulgaria, public work schemes trap beneficiaries in a cycle of welfare 
support and public work. Inefficiency is also caused by additional labour 
market services not being offered.  
How should governments target active labour market policies in such 
a way that they reach out to vulnerable Roma? The dominant mode of 
targeting is mainstreaming, that is, defining characteristics of vulnerability 
and addressing these, irrespective of the ethnicity of the recipient. We 
believe that this approach necessarily leads to Roma being overlooked by 
these policies. Instead, we argue for the positive impact of affirmative 
action. Governments should apply measures such as employing Roma in 
public offices in charge of designing and implementing active labour 
market policies, giving preference to Roma applicants for jobs in public 
offices and promoting the active participation of Roma NGOs in the design 
GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE  15 
 
and monitoring of the implementation of those policies that target the 
disadvantaged long-term unemployed. The high level of informal 
employment among Roma is also due in great part to high wage costs, 
especially in Hungary and Slovakia. Wage subsidies have the potential to 
increase formal employment of the low skilled. 
An important prerequisite for improving the labour market inclusion 
of Roma is the services of employment offices (EOs). These need to provide 
high-quality, tailored services. Unemployed Roma view EOs as purely 
administrative units that do not provide meaningful support; this needs to 
change. Moreover, Roma unemployed describe experiences of open 
discrimination by EO staff in Romania and Bulgaria. This problem could be 
addressed by implementing awareness-raising and sensitivity-training for 
EO servants. To achieve better outreach to and understanding of 
marginalised Roma communities, the employment of staff from the Roma 
community in EOs is desirable. An additional barrier is the geographical 
distance of EOs. A suitable solution for bridging geographical distances 
was found in one Hungarian settlement, where the EO operated a mobile 
office. 
1.9 Social services as an option for sustainable employment 
growth 
The number of health and social services workers aged between 15 and 64 
was 22.8 million in 2013, which accounts for 10.7% of the total employment 
in the EU. Unlike in the overall economy, the number of workers in this 
sector has been steadily growing, with a net creation of 1.3 million jobs 
between 2009 and 2013.  
The high levels of unemployment in the overall economy may be 
partially corrected by the growth of employment in social services, since 
there are convincing arguments for further employment growth in this 
sector in the future. Chapter 10 focuses on health and social services, which 
is where the welfare state has the possibility to create jobs as part of a social 
investment strategy. We analyse the developments in this sector and 
identify key policies that would maximise the growth of employment. How 
much will the low-skilled groups affected by unemployment risks profit 
from this growth? In countries where social services are more developed, 
growing employment in health and social services brings not only jobs for 
high-skilled professionals, but also many jobs in cleaning and other similar 
tasks. 
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We look at the drivers of demand and supply that influence 
employment in this sector and consider possible future developments. On 
the demand side, employment growth in social services will be driven 
primarily by the changing roles of women – their growing labour market 
participation leads to increasing demand for care services. Surprisingly, the 
ageing of society did not prove to be significantly correlated with social-
service employment. Welfare state models and family models may imply 
alternative or informal caring options when public social services are 
insufficient.  
On the supply side, politics matters – a deliberate strategy to foster 
public sector employment with an emphasis on social services is important. 
Fiscal policies have been the most important factor in supporting the 
growth of the sector. However, it is hard to foresee increased public 
investment in social services in countries where this expenditure used to be 
low and that are facing increasing public deficits. In the long term, fiscal 
sustainability is the first prerequisite for expanding employment in social 
services. 
In most countries, mixing public and private sources will be 
necessary for sustainable public finance. This strategy may bring important 
employment gains if and when governance frameworks provide effective 
regulation of the use of the available resources: setting quality and 
professional standards and control systems; maximising choice of services 
for users (the state as direct service provider is diminishing its role, while 
the market and NGOs are becoming more important); and combining 
universal accessibility of services with targeted support to the users. 
In countries where the economic realities are less favourable for 
financing social services, an important issue is the ability of policy-makers 
to modernise the welfare state by redirecting expenditure from benefits 
towards social services. Innovations in welfare technologies can bring 
increases in employment and improvements in job quality, but they can 
also make (unskilled) work such as cleaning and other home help tasks 
redundant. 
1.10 Employment trends in childcare and social inclusion 
services  
Childcare and social inclusion services accounted for 6.1% of total EU27 
employment in 2011 (each accounting for 2.6% and 3.5%, respectively). In 
total, the sectors provided employment for more than 13 million people. 
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Women strongly dominate both sectors across the EU, making up 88.3% of 
those employed in childcare and 82.4% of those in social inclusion services.  
In Chapter 11, we aim to shed more light on employment patterns, 
development paths, changes in skills and employment conditions, but also 
to determine if this sector could offer new employment perspectives, 
especially for older workers. 
Despite the crisis-related budget cuts, the health and social work 
sector has been growing over the last ten years in the EU. The same is true 
for the childcare and social services sub-sector, which is a small but 
important part of this sector. Longer lifespans and the increasing autonomy 
of the elderly, as well as expected support for a work-life balance 
throughout life, result in increasing demand for such services. It appears 
that the numbers presented above will grow even further. 
Gender segregation is a general phenomenon of work in this sector 
and persists throughout Europe. Women dominate, with 5.6 women for 
every man employed in the sector in 2011. Investigating the age structure 
over time, we see that those employed in childcare and social inclusion 
services tend to be young or middle-aged workers. However, new 
positions currently seem to be mostly taken up by older women. 
Explanations might include the ageing of the (female) workforce, lower 
sectoral pay or low job stability, but also the possession of required skills, 
easy re-entry or the availability of (often flexible) part-time work in the 
sector. The sector seems to offer interesting opportunities for job-searchers 
with various skills and employment requests.  
We also observe generally increasing skill levels. Many employees in 
childcare and social inclusion services work part-time, but the direction of 
the causality remains unclear. Does the sector require more part-time work 
than other sectors, and women being willing to provide this leads to the 
sector becoming ‘female’? Or does the sector attract more women, who 
often prefer part-time contracts and thus increase the share of part-time 
work in the sector? 
While the share of female workers is high in all countries, the extent 
of part-time work varies. Although one would expect large gender income 
gaps in this labour market sector, the gaps are actually smaller than in the 
overall economy, although they have grown slightly over time. 
Despite initial fears that growth might be in low-skilled jobs only and 
thus result in a decrease in job quality or working conditions, this was not 
the case.  Countries follow different development paths depending on their 
initial situation in terms of sectoral size, age structure and welfare regime 
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orientation. Nevertheless, the overall trend is towards skill increases, an 
increase of part-time jobs and an even stronger feminisation of the sector. 
Families that use such services should expect a growing share of older but 
well-educated service providers. 
1.11 Low-skilled migration: Immigrant workers in European 
domestic care 
According to the ILO, domestic work was a source of employment for at 
least 2.5 million workers in Europe in 2013, most of who were female 
migrants. Concerning future prospects, we forecast a significant increase in 
care demand by 2025 in EU member countries of 15-22% in the tough 
scenario and 28-39% in the friendly scenario. The care workforce supply, 
however, will not be able to meet the growing care demand without 
significant migrant labour inflows. These trends raise a number of policy-
related questions in the areas of migration, care and employment, which 
we address in Chapter 12.  
Why have certain countries proved to be particularly attractive to 
immigrant care workers? The role of migrants in the provision of care is 
fairly uneven across Europe. Several factors matter in this respect, which 
result from the specific features of national welfare and care regimes: 
institutional provision of care (kindergartens, social workers, retirement 
homes, etc.), policies on work-life balance and monetary subsidies for care 
provision (e.g. welfare payments or tax relief). By imposing certain 
migration regimes or occupational quotas for domestic workers, states can 
create indirect incentives for a rising market of private-care workers of 
immigrant origin. Concerning the inclusion of immigrant populations, at 
least two dimensions matter: i) legal, formal access to citizenship and ii) the 
multicultural policy framework shaping the socio-political inclusion of 
immigrant populations. 
How do the different European welfare and care regimes, and state 
and market policy mixes, shape the inflow of low-skilled migrants into the 
care sector? Family-centred care policy patterns provide incentives for 
informal care use not only in several Mediterranean countries, but also in 
post-socialist countries. 
The demand for migrant care workers is typically a demand for work 
under substandard conditions. Without permission to work, immigrants 
with irregular status become particularly vulnerable to abusive working 
conditions. Decent employment of migrant and native domestic-care 
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workers requires strong state regulatory and monitoring capacities and an 
advanced gender-equality policy. The issue of immigrant care labour 
should be addressed in a complex way. Cross-national welfare and social 
security provisions should be a priority in establishing legal and fair 
working conditions for both native and immigrant care workers. 
If informality dominates labour transactions in the care sector and the 
state regulatory and monitoring capacities are weak while the structural 
pull factors of immigration remain, strict migration regimes in themselves 
will not block irregular migration into the domestic-care sector.   On the 
contrary, they will reinforce the vulnerability of migrant care workers.  
The under-development of formal institutional care in central and 
east European countries implies that informal care is becoming the 
dominant option. This provides another incentive for the recruitment of 
migrant domestic-care workers. CEE countries function both as sending 
and receiving entities of low-skilled care workers, and thus are themselves 
in the process of building migration-policy regimes. In addition, in the 
predominantly sending countries, the massive outflow of female care 
workers aggravates welfare, care and family-policy tensions, in particular 
due to the particularly low level of fertility and the general withdrawal of 
publicly provided welfare and care services over the last two decades. 
1.12 The future of labour in Europe: Key messages for policy-
makers 
Chapter 13 summarises the key implications and messages for both EU and 
national policy-makers and elaborates on the findings presented in the 
previous chapters.  
One of the key current European employment issues is insufficient 
demand for labour. It is clear that the policy choices and the availability of 
funding will have a pronounced impact on a number of key sectors and 
that there will be multiple channels through which policy decisions 
influence the net creation of new jobs. Jobs in health and long-term care, the 
demand from older consumers and the outlook for demand for labour 
derived from energy policies are considered here. 
The second policy theme focuses on the shrinking labour supply due 
to ageing. Two principal solutions to ensure a sufficient labour supply in an 
ageing society are discussed: activating a higher proportion of the 
population (including those outside standard working-age groups) and 
boosting the labour supply with immigrants. 
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The concluding section challenges the orientation and governance of 
EU policies. Europe today is different from the Europe of the pre-crisis 
years in many respects. Attention to sustainability is likely to be renewed as 
a (or even the) defining norm for the European policy responses to the 
socio-ecological transition, which would highlight the importance of the 
knowledge generated within the NEUJOBS project. The section offers some 
novel perspectives to the reader by widening the scope for new thinking on 
some of the principal mechanisms through which EU-level action can be 
influential. 
The NEUJOBS project’s mission was to map the future of 
employment in Europe under the new conditions of the socio-ecological 
transition. Together, the two volumes of The Future of Labour in Europe offer 
a concise version of the very detailed cartographic documents produced in 
more than 100 research papers.  
Although no one can foresee the future with any certainty, estimates 
based on evidence are highly relevant politically. As Harry Truman once 
said, “[y]ou can always amend a big plan, but you can never expand a little 
one. I don't believe in little plans. I believe in plans big enough to meet a 
situation which we can't possibly foresee now.” This is the motto to which 
the NEUJOBS project adhered and on which we urge policy-makers to 
reflect in the current environment.  
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2. LIMITS OF POWER: ENERGY, GROWTH 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
BERT COLIJN AND ARNO BEHRENS* 
nergy use is a vital part of our economic system. The impact of 
energy on economic growth has increased dramatically since the 
1800s, but concerns about depletion and pollution of the 
environment have emerged during the last 50 years. Even though it often 
seems that a turnaround is far away, there are signs that the shift towards a 
decarbonised and resource-neutral economy has already started. 
Particularly in Europe, renewable resources are playing a growing role in 
the economy, having reached a share of 14% of final energy consumption 
and 23.5% of electricity produced, with positive effects on greenhouse gas 
emissions. These are first signs of a socio-ecological transition (SET), which 
we define as “a transition between two different societal energy regimes 
(sources and dominant conversion technologies of energy)”.1  
In this chapter, the broad relationship between energy, economic 
growth and employment is examined. We start from the assumption that 
economic growth is the product of the increase in jobs and the rise in the 
productivity of those jobs. Energy has been an important catalyst of 
economic growth by increasing productivity through the use of machinery 
and equipment powered by fossil fuels. While mechanisation has 
sometimes been seen as a job-killer, in the longer term there is 
overwhelming evidence that productivity growth and job creation go hand 
in hand.  
We begin our discussion with a review of how the current trends fit 
in with the concept of the SET through increased energy efficiency and the 
                                                   
* Bert Colijn: Senior Economist at The Conference Board; Arno Behrens: Research 
Fellow and Head of the Energy unit at CEPS. 
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shift towards renewables. We then focus on how energy regimes have 
changed and what impact this has had on economic growth and 
productivity. Finally, we examine the impact of all these developments on 
employment, with a focus on the energy sector. 
2.1 The energy system lies at the heart of the socio-ecological 
transition  
Sieferle et al. (2006) describe two great socio-economic regime changes in 
human history. The first was the Neolithic Revolution some 4,500-10,500 
years ago, which transformed hunter-gatherers into agrarian societies.2 The 
second was the Industrial Revolution, which led to the transition of 
agrarian societies into industrial societies with a strong dependence on 
fossil fuels. While in many parts of the world this transition into fossil fuels 
is ongoing, the EU is dedicated to substantial greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions reductions in the long term, and therefore also to a new 
transition away from fossil fuels. This chapter is thus concerned with an 
SET “away from fossil fuels, towards solar and other low-carbon energy 
sources”.3 If the EU is to meet its long-term objective of reducing GHG 
emissions by at least 80% compared with 1990 levels by 2050, the share of 
fossil fuels in the energy mix will need to decrease from over 75% in 2011 to 
around 70% by 2020, and to 40-50% by 2050. 
The energy system lies at the heart of the SET away from fossil fuels. 
However, the current EU energy mix is still dominated by fossil fuels, with 
more than three-quarters of EU energy consumption being based on oil, gas 
and coal.4 It is thus evident that the new transition will require substantial 
technological and political efforts in the EU in order for its energy sector to 
radically change in favour of low-carbon technologies. However, as with 
previous transitions, the availability of new technologies will not be 
sufficient to start the transformation process. Fundamental change will take 
place only if technology is able to achieve positive feedback with 
complementing technical, cultural, economic and social developments.5 
Not all parts of the energy system will be decarbonised to the same 
extent, owing to large differences between sectors. Whereas many scenarios 
exist under which power generation can be largely carbon-free by 2050, 
there may still be significant GHG emissions far beyond this date. 
Transport currently relies almost exclusively on oil and other fossil fuels, 
while carbon-free generation capacity in the power sector already exists 
(renewables and nuclear). The energy transition(s) are also likely to differ 
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The impact of energy on growth is 
limited compared to other inputs, 
as changes in energy input only 
resulted in a change of just over 
0.25% in economic growth. 
While the number of ‘green jobs’ 
in low-carbon technologies will 
expand, other sectors, such as 
the oil and refining industries, 
will see decreasing employment. 
considerably across European regions, inter alia because the potential for 
renewables varies, but also because of differences in GDP per capita, which 
affects ability and willingness to pay. It is 
clear that the energy transition will have 
an impact on the EU labour market. 
While the number of ‘green jobs’ will 
expand in conjunction with a growing 
number of jobs in low-carbon 
technologies, other sectors, such as the oil 
and refining industries, will see decreasing employment. The net effect of 
these two developments is of relevance in assessing the employment 
impact of the decarbonisation in the energy sector.  
2.2 The importance of energy for economic growth is limited 
Over the past centuries, energy use has increased dramatically, which has 
resulted in rapid resource depletion and pollution of our environment.6 
From the point of view of the socio-ecological transition, it is important to 
understand the relationship between energy use and economic growth, as 
this determines whether we are able to sustain higher wealth levels per 
energy input over time. Energy is one of the key inputs for economic 
output, and lower energy inputs could therefore also result in lower 
production. If, ceteris paribus, less energy is used, that means there is less 
output being produced. Because of this, energy input reductions have a 
negative effect on economic growth. To understand the impact of energy-
input reductions on economic growth, we have decomposed growth in 
economic output into the five largest input categories – labour, capital, 
energy, material and services – and have looked at which factors make the 
largest contributions to economic growth.  
For this purpose, the EUKLEMS database7 has been extended and 
updated with energy inputs for the six countries examined.8 In Figure 2.1, 
the contributions to economic growth from the various inputs over time 
can be seen for the EU6. The impact of 
energy on growth is limited compared 
to the other inputs, as changes in energy 
input only resulted in a change of just 
over 0.25% in economic growth. In fact, 
only labour composition contributes 
less to growth than energy, and when 
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the contributions of the labour components are taken together, it shows 
that out of all the inputs, energy makes the smallest contribution to growth.  
Figure 2.1 Absolute contribution of various inputs to gross economic output for 
EU6,* 1995-2009 
 
* EU6 = Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. 
Note: IT stands for information technology and TFP for total factor productivity.  
Source: Colijn and Van Ark (2014). 
Across countries, however, there are large differences in the growth 
contributions from energy. Spain has seen large contributions of energy to 
economic growth, but the country was also experiencing a construction 
boom in the time period that we have studied, which can explain some of 
this high impact. Germany and the UK saw negative contributions from 
energy to economic growth of -0.02% and -0.01%, respectively, between 
1995 and 2009. This shows that the direct impact of decarbonisation on 
economic growth is negative, but marginal compared to the impact of other 
inputs. 
It is important to note that there is a difference between energy and 
materials. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the input of materials is much more 
important to economic growth than that of energy (in the range of 0.8% 
compared to 0.2%). In Spain, the annual contribution to economic growth 
0.18% 0.24%
0.25% 0.30%
0.47%
0.82% 0.83%
1.18%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
bs
ol
ut
e 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s t
o 
gr
os
s 
ou
tp
ut
LIMITS OF POWER: ENERGY, GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT  25 
 
Efficiency gains in energy and 
technological change are positively 
related. This emphasises the (indirect) 
importance of innovation in energy for 
economic growth in the years ahead. 
from materials was 1 percentage point, which accounts for roughly a third 
of total economic growth. Of course, the Spanish construction bubble had 
an important impact on this, but Germany and Finland also saw sizable 
contributions from materials to economic growth. This shows that reducing 
material input into production will likely have more negative consequences 
for economic growth than decarbonising. From the perspective of the socio-
ecological transition, it is just as important to reduce the amount of finite 
materials used as it is to reduce the amount of energy, so this is something 
that clearly poses a concern moving forward. 
Figure 2.1 indicates that the reduction in economic growth due to the 
direct effect of decarbonisation is limited, as can be seen from the small 
impact of energy inputs, but it is still a reduction. There are also indirect 
effects that are important in assessing the impact of energy on the 
economy. Energy is usually necessary for machinery to operate, which 
means that capital is influenced by energy inputs. This is also the case for 
materials, as they usually require energy to be extracted or to be used as an 
input for production. Among the indirect effects, one should count 
technological progress, which is at the same time one of the less tangible 
but also one of the most important factors for future economic growth, as 
production systems move towards clean sources.  
We used a random effects generalised least squares model to analyse 
the effects of energy on other inputs in the production process,9 and found 
that energy has a significant impact on the input of capital and materials. 
We did not find a significant effect of energy on services, which is likely 
due to the lower dependence of services on energy inputs than the other 
two. The lagged impact of energy (we used a lag of one year) was not 
significant for any of the other economic inputs, so the causal effect of a 
reduction in energy on production a year later seems to be rather marginal. 
To assess the technology component, we also added R&D 
investments to the model to see how this interacts with economic inputs as 
it correlates negatively with energy 
intensity.10 Here we find significant 
relationships with all variables, and 
the lagged effect on capital stock is 
also significant. The significant 
relationship between energy and 
R&D intensity suggests that there is 
a positive spillover effect of energy on economic growth through total 
factor productivity (TFP). Total factor productivity is the improvement in 
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output that is not attributable to increases in any of the inputs, and is often 
used as a proxy for technological progress. When adding TFP to our model, 
we do indeed find a negative relationship between energy use and TFP 
growth, meaning that a decline in energy use in one year leads to an 
increase in TFP in the year after. This confirms the notion that efficiency 
gains in energy and technological change are positively related, and 
emphasises the importance of innovation in energy for economic growth in 
the years ahead.  
Overall, the effects of decarbonisation on economic growth are 
ambiguous and minor. The direct effects from reducing energy inputs have 
a negative impact on growth, albeit minor (the smallest impact out of all 
the economic inputs). It has to be noted here, however, that the direct 
impact alone is not the most important and that a shock in energy supply 
can have far-reaching negative implications for the economy; think of the 
oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, when many advanced economies 
contracted due to energy input shocks. This follows from the cost-share 
theorem, which argues that the price effects from one factor of production 
will have negative effects on other inputs, thus increasing the effect on 
economic growth.11 
The impact of energy reductions on technological change is positive, 
and this in turn has a positive impact on economic growth. Once again, the 
impact is not large, but it is encouraging to see an established positive 
indirect link between energy input reductions and economic growth 
through technological progress. It therefore seems clear that innovation 
that spills over from better energy use will help maintain economic growth 
while transitioning to a more sustainable economy. 
The production process has become significantly more energy efficient over 
time. 
When looking at the behaviour of energy inputs and economic 
output, we find that energy efficiency increased in four out of the six 
countries over the period 1995-2009: Germany, the UK, Finland and the 
Netherlands.12 Only Spain and Italy saw declines of overall energy 
efficiency over the period, which is in line with the slow labour 
productivity growth that these countries experienced. Overall, efficiency 
gains were made, which is a sign that the socio-ecological transition is 
occurring, as less energy input (in monetary terms) is used to create 
economic output. The question is whether this is because of less energy 
actually being used, or other factors that are at play. Stern explains the four 
factors that can influence the relationship between energy inputs and 
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Production is becoming cleaner, 
especially in manufacturing –
economic output per tonne of 
CO2 emitted increased over the 
period 1995-2009. 
output: substitution with other inputs (such as materials or labour), 
technological change, changes in the composition of energy inputs and 
changes in the composition of outputs.13 
Some of the above-mentioned factors may not actually indicate that a 
transition towards a more sustainable economy is taking place. It could be 
that a change in the composition of energy inputs from expensive, but 
clean, fuel to cheaper fossils – for example, from renewable energy sources 
(RES) to coal – is taking place. Similarly, if the nature of output were to 
change towards less energy-intensive production – of services, for example, 
as we see across advanced economies – then declines in energy inputs may 
be the result of this phenomenon rather than due to more sustainable 
manufacturing production. To address these effects, we looked at the 
breakdown of the total economy between 
services and manufacturing and found 
that, even though economic output has 
increasingly moved towards services over 
time, in both sectors there have been 
improvements in energy efficiency. To see 
whether the greater efficiency is due to 
less energy used, rather than to changes in input composition from 
expensive and cleaner to cheaper fossil-fuel sources, we also investigated 
‘emissions productivity’, i.e. the amount of output produced in euros per 
tonne of CO2 emitted. Here we also confirm that production is becoming 
cleaner, especially in manufacturing – economic output per tonne of CO2 
emitted increased over the period 1995-2009.  
Cleveland et al. argue that most emissions reductions come from a 
change in the fuel mix, as more energy production is becoming renewable 
in Europe.14 The shift towards renewable energy partly explains the decline 
in CO2 emissions per unit of output produced. Improvements in the 
efficiency of energy use are also identified in previous studies. Mulder and 
De Groot, for example, find improvements in energy efficiency and also 
convergence between European countries,15 i.e. a catch-up is happening 
between countries in terms of efficient use of energy, which makes sense as 
technological advancements will at some point become more widely 
accessible. They also find that the price element is important in this regard. 
Energy-efficiency gains are positively correlated with price increases. This 
means that businesses invest more in energy efficiency when prices are 
higher to reduce the burden of the higher costs. 
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Decarbonisation of the EU 
economy is possible using 
currently known technologies. 
It has to be noted that over this same period, a lot of manufacturing 
activity was outsourced to other parts of the world, most notably to the 
Asia-Pacific region. This is a global composition effect that could 
favourably impact the European results, as more energy-intensive 
production shifts elsewhere. Even though this is definitely a factor in the 
decline in energy intensity of production in Europe, Weisz suggests that the 
effects of outsourcing on energy-efficiency improvements have been 
relatively small and that actual improvements in industries are the main 
cause of the declines.16 
2.3 Decarbonisation of the EU economy is possible 
Having established the relationship between energy and economic growth 
by looking at the previous decades, it is also interesting to see how 
decarbonisation through energy efficiency and changes in the energy mix 
could continue in the future. We take into account a broad range of 
scenarios – from international institutions (European Commission, 
International Energy Agency, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis), European research projects (AMPERE, SECURE), NGOs 
(European Climate Foundation, Greenpeace) and industry (Eurelectric) – 
all of which depict a decarbonisation of the EU energy sector in line with 
the projected EU contribution to limiting global warming to 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. 
Behrens et al. conclude that decarbonisation of the EU economy is 
possible using currently known technologies.17 Regarding energy demand, 
the authors show that demand would need 
to decrease by some 2-6% by 2020, and by 
20-30% by 2050 (compared with 2010). It is 
worth noting that these reductions in 
demand will need to be achieved within the 
context of a growing EU economy, thus requiring an absolute decoupling 
of economic growth from energy demand.18 Energy efficiency plays a 
crucial role in achieving demand reductions, and high energy-efficiency 
assumptions lead to higher reductions in energy demand. The share of RES 
(renewable energy sources) increases from around 10% in 2011 to around 
20% in 2020, and to somewhat above 40% by 2050. Fossil fuels will continue 
to play an important role, but their share in the energy mix may decrease 
from more than three-quarters in 2011 to around 70% in 2020, and to 40-
50% in 2050. 
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The rising share of variable RES, such as 
wind and solar PV, will require an increase 
in installed electricity capacity that is larger 
than the increase in power output. This will 
require significantly more manpower than 
traditional energy production. 
The power sector is likely to be the main enabler of decarbonisation, 
and many scenarios assume a decarbonisation in the sector of up to 95% by 
2050 (compared with 1990). These savings will need to be achieved in the 
face of growing electricity demand. In fact, all decarbonisation scenarios 
project growing electricity generation, mainly driven by increasing demand 
in transport and heating/cooling. By 2020, electricity demand could grow 
by about 5-10%, and the increase may be in the range of 30-50% by 2050 
(both compared with 2010). Energy efficiency and the upscaling of RES are 
the two key strategies to decarbonise the power sector. Regarding RES, 
their share in power generation is generally projected to increase from 
about 20% in 2010 to 35% by 2020 and to 60-85% by 2050. Wind and hydro 
will be the most important RES in power generation in 2020. By 2050, 
biomass and solar PV (photovoltaic) will also contribute significantly to the 
electricity mix. There is a large degree of uncertainty about the future 
importance of nuclear and carbon capture and storage (CCS) in power 
generation. 
It is important to note that the rising share of variable RES, such as 
wind and solar PV, will require an increase in installed electric capacity 
that is larger than the increase in power output. In order to have sufficient 
levels of back-up capacity (and 
provided that there is no 
change in power market 
design), electrical capacity is 
projected to increase by about 
20-30% by 2020, and by 80-
100% by 2050 (both compared 
with 2010). This is due to lower 
capacity factors – i.e. a lower ratio of actual full load hours to total number 
of hours per year (8,760) – associated with intermittent RES. In fact, the 
average capacity factor over the whole European electricity system is 
projected to decrease from roughly 42-45% in 2010 to 37-40% in 2020 and to 
25-33% in 2050, depending on the scenario. However, the flexibility of the 
electricity system needed to maintain the supply-demand balance with 
high levels of renewable generation will not only be achieved through 
additional generation capacity, but also through better interconnection of 
transmission lines, more flexible distribution, demand-side response and 
management, and storage. 
The expansion of renewables will require significantly more 
manpower than traditional energy production. This means that the 
productivity of the energy sector is likely to decrease as the socio-ecological 
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transition unfolds, which could be an issue from an economic 
competitiveness perspective. The costs for European businesses to use 
energy would likely increase, making the decision to import less clean 
energy from outside or to move production to other parts of the world 
more attractive. This scenario shows the importance of improving labour 
productivity in these sectors.  
2.4 The macro effects of energy efficiency improvements on 
the labour market seem to be ambiguous 
The next question is what effect the decarbonisation of the economy will 
have on employment in Europe. We have seen in the previous part of this 
chapter that the economy is indeed using energy more productively, 
reducing both costs and greenhouse gas emissions. Besides that, we also 
see that the effect on economic growth is relatively small. We will now look 
at the effects of the socio-ecological transition on employment. First we will 
look at the macroeconomic effects, and then zoom in on the employment 
effects in the energy sector itself. 
When looking at the macro economy, complementarity between 
energy use and the growth of labour, both skilled and unskilled, exists.19 
This means that reductions in energy use are usually met by reductions in 
employment, making the direct effect of declines in energy demand on 
employment negative. This is partly because of labour-capital substitution, 
but also because both are positively related to overall economic output. 
From a labour market perspective, this means that the socio-ecological 
transition may have a negative impact on the availability of jobs in Europe, 
which is an observation that raises concern given the current employment 
situation and the sluggish job-market outlook for the years ahead.  
In terms of the impact of innovation on the distribution of jobs, recent 
work by Maselli and Massari et al. describes the impact of information and 
communications technology (ICT) on polarisation in the labour market.20 
They find that ICT has resulted in a ‘hollowing out’ of jobs in the middle 
range of the skill spectrum. This is because of the demand for service tasks 
that can be found in the lower tail of the wage distribution and the demand 
for abstract tasks found at the higher end of the spectrum. Offshoring of 
middle-skilled tasks is one of the reasons why the share of income of the 
middle classes in advanced societies has declined. Ketteni et al. come to a 
parallel conclusion that the mismatch between skill demand and skill 
supply can be attributed to the adoption of ICT capital, as it is a substitute 
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The total number of direct jobs 
provided by the EU energy supply 
sector in 2011 is estimated at 
between 1.5 million and 2.2 million. 
for unskilled labour and a complement to high-skilled labour.21 Trends in 
ICT adoption are therefore important in order to gauge the trend in skill 
demand on a macro level in the European economy. 
As the long-term effects of the SET on macroeconomic growth are 
ambiguous, this is also the case for employment. In the long run, 
employment and economic growth are strongly correlated and this means 
that unless drastic productivity changes occur due to the socio-ecological 
transition, no large changes in labour demand can be expected. This last 
point is important, as the labour productivity of certain types of energy 
production can be dramatically different from others. Current fossil energy 
sources, in particular, require low amounts of labour, as they use mostly 
capital to produce. Renewable energy sources are different in this regard, 
as they still require a lot of human input (the second part of this chapter 
will offer more detailed insights into this). This can result in more 
significant employment improvements, but also in losses of global 
competitiveness as productivity declines. Whether this will be the case or 
not is discussed in greater detail below. 
2.5 Fewer than 1 in 100 employees in Europe work in the 
energy sector 
When zooming in on the specific changes in employment in the energy 
sector, we will first look at the employment level, employment structure 
and labour intensity of today’s energy sector.22 As earlier in the chapter, we 
focus exclusively on energy supply, and in particular on activities linked to 
primary (fossil) energy carriers as well as on the power sector.23  
The total number of direct jobs provided by the EU energy supply 
sector in 2011 is estimated at between 1.5 million (European Commission 
DG Energy) and 2.2 million (Eurostat Labour Force Survey), representing a 
share of 0.7-1% of the total employed workforce in that year. To put this 
into perspective, the energy sector employs fewer people than, for example, 
the agriculture, forestry and fishing 
sector (5.2%) or the information and 
communications sector (2.8%) 
(Eurostat, 2013c). DG Energy 
estimates and Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data provide the low and high 
ends of the range, respectively, of employment levels summarised in Table 
2.1. DG Energy and LFS data are roughly confirmed by estimates of 
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Around 10% of the labour force 
employed in the energy sector in 
2012 were low qualified 
workers, around 50% were 
medium qualified, and around 
40% were highly qualified. 
industry associations. Table 2.1 shows that electric power generation, 
transmission and distribution (summarised in the category “electricity”) is 
by far the largest employer, providing roughly 55-60% of all direct jobs in 
the energy sector. The extraction of primary fossil fuels employs less than a 
quarter of all direct jobs, while other oil and gas activities (including oil 
refining, manufacture and distribution of gas) provide less than 20%. 
Table 2.1 Direct employment in the energy sector, 2011 
Activity Range DG Energy LFS Industry 
Mining of coal and lignite 229,000 – 345,000 229,401 345,000 238,20024 
Oil and gas extraction25 113,000 – 187,000 113,171 186,939 91,76526 
Oil and gas other 
activities27 
269,000 – 410,000 269,236 410,477 564,98528 
Electricity 888,000 – 1,221,000 888,358 1,221,148 1,100,00029 
Other30 21,000 – 27,000 20,593 26,669 n.a. 
Total 1,500,000 – 2,200,000 1,520,759 2,190,233 1,994,950 
Sources: European Commission (2013), Eurostat (2013a and 2013b) and industry associations.  
As regards the employment structure of the energy system, the 
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) 
reports that in general around 10% of the labour force employed in the 
energy sector in 2012 were low-qualified workers, around 50-60% were 
medium qualified, and around 40% were highly qualified.31 Oil and gas 
extraction and the manufacture of fuels 
have the highest share of highly qualified 
workers (around 43%), while coal and 
lignite mining activities employ by far the 
lowest share of highly qualified workers 
(some 15%). All of the studies surveyed 
by Behrens et al. indicate that that the 
share of highly qualified workers 
employed in the renewable energy sector is substantially higher than in 
coal mining (33-75% in the renewables sector compared with 15% in coal 
and lignite mining activities).32 In a scenario in which fossil fuel-based 
power generation would be mainly replaced by electricity from renewable 
energy sources (RES-E) after 2020, low- and medium-qualified jobs in coal 
mining are likely to be replaced by highly qualified jobs in RES. 
Regarding the labour intensity of primary energy activities 
(expressed in jobs per ktoe, or kilotonnes of oil equivalent), mining of coal 
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and lignite is the most labour-intensive activity (1.37-2.06 jobs per ktoe). 
Compared to coal, the extraction of oil and gas is about 66% less labour 
intensive per unit of energy extracted (0.49-0.81 jobs per ktoe). Downstream 
activities (refining, manufacturing and distribution of fuels) are the least 
labour-intensive activities, with a labour intensity of about 0.27-0.41 jobs 
per ktoe. Turning to the power sector, where labour intensity is expressed 
in jobs per MW installed capacity, the analysis presented in Behrens et al. 
shows that some renewables, in particular biomass (8.22 jobs per MW) and 
to a lesser extent solar PV (2.35), are more labour intensive than fossil fuel-
based power generation (1.21-2.11).33 Wind power (1.45) is in the same 
range, while small hydropower (1.08) is slightly less labour intensive. The 
labour intensities presented in this paragraph are equivalent to the 
employment factors referred to in the next section for calculating future 
employment in the energy sector. 
2.6 A positive net effect: Jobs destroyed in primary energy 
activities may be overcompensated by job creation in the 
power sector 
In order to estimate changes in the employment level, Behrens et al. (2014b) 
developed a simple but robust methodology based on employment factors. 
It allows employment impacts to be calculated by multiplying (future) 
energy units (in ktoe for primary fuels and MW for the power sector) by 
technology-specific employment factors. These employment factors are 
equivalent to labour-intensity ratios expressed in jobs per ktoe or jobs per 
MW (see above). They are calculated on the basis of current energy sector 
figures and then used to calculate the number of jobs linked to the 
projected future volumes of primary energy and levels of installed electric 
capacity in the years 2020, 2030 and 2050.  
Regarding the results, three things should be noted. First, and as 
observed above, the methodology is applied only to direct employment in 
the energy-supply sector, i.e. to primary energy activities linked to fossil 
fuels and to the power sector. Second, the results below will be presented 
in a lower range and in an upper range. This results from the fact that the 
job figures (current direct employment levels) for primary fuels and the 
power sector are derived from different sources, thus showing some 
variance (see above). In order to account for this variance, we utilise the 
minimum and maximum employment levels linked to a fuel. Therefore, 
there is a lower and an upper range for the employment factors in fossil 
fuels, leading to a lower and upper range of results for the projected 
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Decarbonisation will lead 
to job losses in the 
primary fuels sector. 
employment levels for each scenario. Third, projections are based on the 
reference scenario and two decarbonisation scenarios (Diversified Supply 
Technologies and High-RES) of the European Commission’s Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011a). 
The reference scenario (Ref) is based on the continuation of current 
economic and demographic trends. The ‘20-20-20’ targets regarding GHG 
emissions reductions and RES deployment are achieved, but no future 
objectives are set beyond 2020, and investment decisions thereafter are 
largely driven by market forces. It is not a decarbonisation scenario, and 
therefore is not in line with the new SET away from fossil fuels. However, it 
serves as a baseline for the evaluation of the two decarbonisation scenarios. 
In contrast to the reference scenario, the decarbonisation scenarios both 
allow for a decrease in domestic EU GHG emissions by at least 80% 
compared to 1990. The diversified supply technologies scenario (DST) is 
neutral from a technological perspective. Decarbonisation is achieved by 
means of carbon pricing (i.e. an undefined proxy for policy measures that 
bring about emission reductions), which is applied to all sectors (ETS and 
non-ETS). The scenario assumes societal support (of member states, 
investors and citizens) for nuclear energy (except for declared ‘nuclear 
sceptics’ such as Germany), CCS and renewables facilitation policies. This 
scenario is interesting to assess, as it encompasses the application of a wide 
range of low-carbon technologies without preference for a specific type of 
technology. The high renewable energy sources scenario (High-RES) 
focuses on achieving a very high share of renewables (97% of electricity 
consumption by 2050). Technologies deployed include wind (both on- and 
offshore), solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP) and storage, 
increased uptake of heat pumps, and so on. Given the key role of 
renewables in achieving an effective reduction of CO2 emissions, 
scrutinising this decarbonisation scenario seems particularly important.   
Taking into account all uncertainties related to the methodology and 
the available data, there is clear evidence that decarbonisation will lead to 
job losses in the primary fuels sector (see Table 2.2). Based on current 
employment levels of between 611,000 (lower 
range of labour intensities) and 943,000 (upper 
range of labour intensities), decarbonisation 
may destroy between 96,000 and 153,000 jobs by 
2020, between 213,000 and 350,000 jobs by 2030, 
and between 380,000 and 686,000 jobs by 2050, depending on the 
decarbonisation scenario and the range chosen. Total employment in 
primary fuels may thus decrease to some 512,000-794,000 in 2020, 385,000-
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613,000 in 2030, and 170,000-347,000 in 2050. Generally, employment in 
primary fuels in the decarbonisation scenarios seems to be lower than in 
the reference scenario, pointing to the possibility of higher job losses in 
primary activities as the energy sector decarbonises. 
Table 2.2 Direct employment in primary fuels in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 
(million jobs) 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES 
Lower 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Upper 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Source: Behrens et al. (2014a). 
In contrast to primary fuels, Table 2.3 shows that the power sector is 
likely to create jobs. Based on current employment levels of between 0.9 
million (lower range of labour intensities) and 1.2 million (upper range of 
labour intensities), decarbonisation may create between 800,000 and 
900,000 additional jobs by 2020, between 900,000 and 1.6 million additional 
jobs by 2030, and between 2.2 and 4.1 million additional jobs by 2050, 
depending on the decarbonisation scenario and range chosen. The total 
number of jobs in the power sector could thus increase to between 1.8 and 2 
million in 2020, between 2 and 2.5 million in 2030, and between 3.2 and 5.2 
million in 2050, depending on the decarbonisation scenario. Compared 
with the reference scenario, this means additional jobs in the ranges of 
32,000 to 55,000 in 2020, 138,000 to 669,000 in 2030 and 800,000 to 2.6 million 
in 2050.  
The increase in employment in the power sector is driven by jobs in 
construction, installation and manufacturing (CIM) and by jobs in 
operation and maintenance (O&M), and the share of each in total jobs 
(about 60% for CIM and about 40% for O&M) remains roughly constant 
over the entire period until 2050. 
Table 2.3 Direct employment in the power sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 
(millions of jobs) 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES 
Lower 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.2 5.0 
Upper 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.6 3.4 5.2 
Source: Behrens et al. (2014b). 
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Decarbonisation will have 
substantial employment 
effects in primary fuels and 
in the power sector. 
The increase of renewables may 
actually increase the demand for 
highly qualified workers. 
2.7 Projected future employment increases in the power 
sector are mainly due to the higher labour intensity of 
renewables 
Aggregating the employment effects in primary fuels and in the power 
sector reveals that decarbonisation in the context of a new SET may lead to 
substantial employment creation, particularly in the long term. As shown 
in Table 2.4, compared with current 
employment levels of about 1.5-2.2 million, 
decarbonisation may create up to 800,000 
additional jobs in the energy system by 2020, 
up to 1.3 million additional jobs by 2030 and 
up to 3.7 million additional jobs by 2050, 
depending on the decarbonisation scenario and range chosen. The results 
also show that more jobs are created in the High-RES scenario than in any 
other scenario. While the results of the two decarbonisation scenarios are 
similar to those of the reference scenario until 2020, differences begin to 
materialise by 2030, and in particular by 2050. However, the results for 2050 
are subject to high uncertainty, as described below. 
Table 2.4 Direct employment in the energy sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 
(millions of jobs) 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES 
Lower 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.5 5.2 
Upper 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.7 5.4 
Source: Behrens et al. (2014b). 
Apart from changes in the quantity of direct jobs associated with the 
energy transition, Behrens et al. also analyse how required qualification 
levels may change.34 They do this by applying the current distribution of 
low, medium and highly qualified jobs in various energy technologies to 
the changed mix of primary (fossil) fuels and of power sources in the 
future. 
In all three scenarios, the amount of 
jobs created in the RES sector is more 
significant than the number of jobs lost in 
primary fuels. RES may not only maintain 
the distribution of qualification levels, but 
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may actually increase the demand for highly qualified workers. 
Considering that the renewable energy sector has a higher share of highly 
qualified workers (33-75%) than most activities in primary fuels (see 
above), this results in a net increase of highly qualified workers.  
With the level of qualifications in the energy sector going up, there 
may be a risk of skills shortages. Indeed, as the share of highly qualified 
workers in the general labour market increases,35 the energy sector could be 
in competition with other sectors for the recruitment of a highly qualified 
workforce. In particular, shortages of engineers and technicians are 
common in the renewable energy sector.36 The problem can be traced back 
upstream, with a lack of qualified trainers for renewable technologies.37 
Fortunately, dynamics recently at play in the labour market are easing the 
risk of skill shortages. First, an increase in the supply of highly skilled 
workforce is observed in Europe. The growth in the supply of medium and 
highly skilled workers is even expected to outpace the growth in demand 
for highly skilled workers.38 Second, the economic crisis has had a positive 
effect on skills shortages by facilitating the filling of vacancies in some 
occupations.39 Finally, certain existing skills are transferable to the 
renewable energy sector, either with or without the need for retraining. 
Examples of portable skills include welding, surface treatment and 
outfitting skills in the oil and gas industry that are applicable in the wind 
turbine sector.40 Examples of areas of upskilling include skills in the 
assembly and installation of parts for industrial operators and industry 
electricians to work as wind turbine operators, and training on solar PV for 
electricians and roofers to work as solar PV installers and designers.41  
2.8 The key to the impact of the SET on employment lies in 
the labour productivity of renewable energy sources 
Even though the EU can hardly be considered a decarbonised economy, the 
process is slowly underway. The production of renewable energy in 
Europe has increased by over 80% since 2000, and the share of renewables 
in final energy consumption is continuing to increase in almost all 
European countries. Energy efficiency is also improving in most countries 
in Europe, whether in energy-intensive manufacturing industries or in 
service sectors. The impact of this on economic growth has been relatively 
small.  
When looking at all economic inputs, energy had the smallest 
cumulative impact on economic growth in the six large European 
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to the success of the SET 
in a growing economy. 
economies studied, which means that reductions in energy inputs are 
unlikely to have a large direct impact on economic growth. However, when 
taking the indirect effects into account, we find that energy reductions also 
impact material use and capital. More importantly, we find that energy 
efficiency gains improve technological progress and, with that, economic 
growth. With currently known technologies, society is already advanced 
enough to decarbonise. The overall effects of the SET on the macro-
economy have therefore been minor and are unlikely to be enormous in the 
future, if the process moves gradually.  
This is also the case for employment, which usually moves together 
with the economy in the long run, unless the SET results in large shifts in 
labour productivity due to changes in the types of employment that are 
needed to support the economy. When the energy sector becomes much 
more labour intensive, the productivity of the sector declines and therefore 
more employment is needed for the same energy production. This could be 
the case for Europe, as changes in the composition of the energy mix due to 
the SET are likely to result in significantly higher employment in the 
energy sector. At current employment factors, employment in the energy 
sector could increase by more than three million in 2050 if a rapid shift to 
renewable energy sources were to occur. If the share of renewables were to 
increase at a slower pace, more than a million extra jobs would still be 
created in the sector. 
Even though this is great news from a job-creation perspective, there 
are also downsides. The resulting decline in labour productivity would 
have an impact on prices, assuming that other economies would not go 
through a similar radical change, which would make importing energy or 
outsourcing more attractive. Therefore, efficiency gains are key to the 
success of the SET in a growing economy. 
Without such gains, alternatives for the more 
expensive energy solutions would likely be 
sought. Technological progress is also taking 
place rapidly in the renewables sector. When 
looking at the jobs that can currently be classified as ‘green’ in the 
European economy, we see that most of the green jobs are in research and 
development of solar and wind technologies.42  
Technological developments in the renewables sector will likely 
result in more cost-efficient production, especially from the employment 
side as productivity is likely to improve. This will be necessary for the SET 
to succeed and would still generate more employment in the energy sector, 
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albeit at a slightly lower level than current employment factors would 
suggest. Overall, it seems likely that the improvements coming from the 
SET through decarbonisation will not come at the cost of a large effect on 
Europe’s economic growth projections, but instead that the technological 
advancement in the energy sector is likely to impact the economy 
positively. This in turn will have its effects on overall macroeconomic 
employment growth, but these will also likely remain small. When 
focusing on the energy sector itself, it seems that large net employment 
opportunities will arise. These opportunities will likely decrease when the 
necessary efficiency gains in RES are made, which in turn will increase the 
chances for success of the socio-ecological transition in Europe. 
  
40  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
Bibliography 
Behrens, A. and C. Coulie (2015), “Options to Address Labour Market 
Issues During the Transition to a European Low-Carbon Economy”, 
NEUJOBS Policy Brief No. D11.3, NEUJOBS Project 
(www.neujobs.eu). 
Behrens, A., C. Coulie and J. Teusch (2014a), “The potential evolution of the 
European energy system until 2020 and 2050”, CEPS Working 
Document No. 392, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
Behrens, A., C. Coulie, F. Genoese, M. Alessi, J. Wieczorkiewicz and C. 
Egenhofer (2014b), “Impact of the Decarbonisation of the Energy 
System on Employment in Europe”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 
D11.2, NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
Bukowski, M. (2014), “On the endogenous directed technological change in 
multi sector DSGE model: the case of energy and emission e-ciency”, 
NEUJOBS Working Paper No. D3.8, NEUJOBS Project 
(www.neujobs.eu). 
Burton, A. and K.H. den Haan (2013), “European downstream oil industry 
safety performance: Statistical summary of reported incidents – 
2012”, Report No. 5/13, CONCAWE, Brussels, August. 
Cedefop (2010a), “Skills for green jobs”, Briefing note, European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg, July. 
____ (2010b), “Skills for Green Jobs. European Synthesis Report”, European 
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
_____ (2011), “Labour market polarisation and elementary occupations in 
Europe. Blip or long-term trend?”, Research Paper No. 9, European 
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
_____ (2012), “Green skills and environmental awareness in vocational 
education and training”, Research Paper No. 24, European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg. 
_____ (2013), “Skills Forecasts”, European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training (www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/about-
cedefop/projects/forecasting-skill-demand-and-supply/skills-
forecasts.aspx). 
LIMITS OF POWER: ENERGY, GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT  41 
 
Cleveland, C.J., R. Costanza, C.A.S. Hall and R. Kaufmann (1984), “Energy 
and the U.S. Economy: A Biophysical Perspective”, Science, Vol. 225, 
No. 4665, pp. 890-897. 
Colijn, B. (2014), “Green Jobs in Europe and the Increasing Demand for 
Technical Skills”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.2, NEUJOBS 
Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
Colijn, B. and B. van Ark (2014), “Energy Productivity and Economic 
Growth in Six European Countries”, NEUJOBS Working Paper, 
NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
Colijn, B., K. Jaeger and B. Van Ark (2013), “The Conference Board EU 
KLEMS Update for NEUJOBS”, NEUJOBS methodological note, 
NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
Corrado, C., C. Hulten and D. Sichel (2005), “Measuring Capital and 
Technology: An Expanded Framework”, in C. Corrado, J. 
Haltiwanger, and D. Sichel (eds), Measuring Capital in the New 
Economy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 11-41. 
Diamond, J. and P. Bellwood (2003), “Farmers and Their Languages: The 
First Expansions“, Science, Vol. 300, pp. 597-603. 
Euracoal (2013), “Manpower in 2010 and 2012”, Brussels. 
Eurelectric (2012), “Power Statistics and Trends 2012”, Brussels, December. 
Eurogas (2012), “Statistical Report 2012”, Brussels, December. 
European Commission (2011a), “Energy Roadmap 2050. Impact 
Assessment. Part 1”, SEC(2011) 1565 final, Brussels. 
_____ (2011b), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012”, 
DG Employment. 
_____ (2013), “EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2013”, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
Eurostat (2013a), Labour Force Survey. 
_____ (2013b), Structural Business Statistics. 
_____ (2013c), National accounts. 
Fischer-Kowalski, M., W. Haas, D. Wiedenhofer, U. Weisz, I. Pallua, N. 
Possanner, A. Behrens, G. Serio, M. Alessi and E. Weis (2012), “Socio-
ecological transitions: definition, dynamics and related global 
scenarios”, NEUJOBS State of the Art Report No. 6/D1.1 and 
Working Paper D1.2, NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
42  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
Hao, J.X. and B. Van Ark (2013), “Intangible Investment and the Intensity of 
Energy Use by Industry”, NEUJOBS Working Paper, NEUJOBS 
Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
ILO and EU (2011), “Skills and Occupational Needs in Renewable Energy”, 
International Labour Organization, Geneva.  
Jorgenson, D.W. (1984), “The role of Energy in Productivity Growth”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 22-30.  
Ketteni, E., T. Manumeas and P. Pashardes (2012), “ICT and Energy Use: 
Patterns of Substitutability and Complementarity in Production”, 
NEUJOBS Working Paper D3.5, NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu).  
Kümmel, R. (2011), The Second Law of Economics: Energy, Entropy and the 
Origins of Wealth, New York, NY: Springer.  
Maselli, I. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the 
Labour Market”, Intereconomics, January. 
Massari, R., P. Naticchioni and G. Ragusa (2013), “Unconditional and 
Conditional Wage Polarization in Europe”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 
No. D3.6, NEUJOBS Project (www.neujobs.eu). 
Mulder, P. and H. de Groot (2007), “Sectoral energy- and labour-
productivity convergence”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 
Vol. 36, pp. 85-112. 
_____ (2011), “Energy Intensity across Sectors and Countries: Empirical 
Evidence 1980-2005”, CPB Discussion Paper No. 171, The Hague. 
NEUJOBS (2013), “Summary info about the project”, NEUJOBS Project 
(www.neujobs.eu). 
Poupard, J.-F. and D. Tarren (2011), “Towards a low carbon electricity 
industry: employment effects and opportunities for the social 
partners”, EPSU/Eurelectric/EMCEF, Brussels. 
Sieferle, R.P., F. Krausmann, H. Schandl and V. Winiwarter (2006), Das Ende 
der Fläche – Zum gesellschaftlichten Stoffwechsel der Industrialiserung, 
Cologne: Böhlau. 
Stern, D.I. (2003), “Energy and economic growth in the USA: A multivariate 
approach”, Energy Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 137–150. 
Weisz, H. (2006), “Accounting for raw material equivalents of traded 
goods: A comparison of input-output approaches in physical, 
monetary, and mixed units”, Social Ecology Working Paper No. 87, 
Institute of Social Ecology, Vienna. 
 
LIMITS OF POWER: ENERGY, GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT  43 
 
                                                   
1 Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012). 
2 Diamond and Bellwood (2003). 
3 Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012). 
4 European Commission (2013). 
5 Sieferle et al. (2006). 
6 This section is based on Behrens et al. (2014a).  
7 A database that comprises historical data of economic inputs and output for a 
large number of sectors and countries: www.euklems.net.  
8 Colijn et al. (2013). 
9 Colijn and Van Ark (2014). 
10 Hao and Van Ark (2013). 
11 Kümmel (2011); Ketteni et al. (2012). 
12 Colijn and Van Ark (2013). 
13 Stern (2003). 
14 Cleveland et al. (1984). 
15 Mulder and De Groot (2007). 
16 Weitz et al. (2006). 
17 Behrens et al. (2014a). 
18 ‘Absolute decoupling’ refers to a situation in which energy demand declines in 
absolute terms while the economy grows. In contrast, relative decoupling refers to 
a situation in which energy demand may increase, but at a lower rate than 
economic growth. 
19 Ketteni et al. (2012). 
20 Maselli (2012) and Massari et al. (2013). 
21 Ketteni et al. (2012). 
22 See Behrens et al. (2014b). 
23 For activities linked to primary energy carriers, only fossil fuels are considered 
because RES such as wind, solar and hydropower do not require combustibles. 
Therefore, there is no fuel that needs to be extracted and/or processed. Regarding 
biomass and nuclear, no separate job figures are available for primary activities. 
Jobs related to RES are accounted for in the power sector/electricity statistics. 
24 For 2012 (Euracoal, 2013). 
25 Oil and gas are aggregated to reflect the nature of the production fields, which 
most of the time produce both oil and gas. Figures from DG Energy and LFS 
include jobs in extraction and activities in support of extraction. 
 
44  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
                                                                                                                                 
26 Derived from unpublished data obtained during an interview with an OGP 
expert in 2013. 
27 Other activities in oil include refining and marketing, and other activities in gas 
include manufacture of gas, distribution of gas, and trade of gas through mains. 
28 285,256 jobs in oil, derived from 534 million hours worked in the downstream oil 
sector in 2012 (Burton and den Haan, 2013), assuming that people worked 36 hours 
per week; 279,729 jobs in gas (Eurogas, 2012).  
29 Estimation based on Eurelectric data (Eurelectric, 2012). The estimate includes 
people employed in all power generation sources; it may double-count workers 
that are already included in figures for employment in fossil fuels. 
30 Manufacture of coke oven products, and extraction of peat. 
31 Cedefop (2013). 
32 Behrens et al. (2014b). 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.   
35 Cedefop (2011). 
36 ILO and EU (2011) 
37 Ibid. 
38 European Commission (2011b). 
39 Cedefop (2012). 
40 Cedefop (2010a). 
41 Cedefop (2010b). 
42 Colijn (2014). 
 45 
 
 
3. BIKING TO WORK? TRANSPORT POLICY, 
SUSTAINABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT 
CHRISTOPHE HEYNDRICKX, RODRIC 
FREDERIX AND JOKO PURWANTO* 
he transport sector consumes 32% of the total energy and three 
quarters of all petroleum products in the EU.1 In 2012, the transport 
sector was responsible for 20% of EU28 greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (a total of 0.893 Mt CO2 eq.), which is around 20% more than in 
1990 and up from a share of around 16% of total emissions.2 Whereas other 
economic sectors achieved reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of up to 
20%, emissions from the transport sector only started to follow a decreasing 
trend in 2007. Looking at the developments within the sector, it is obvious 
that road transport is the major culprit – with a share of over 70%, it 
generated by far the largest quantity of GHG emissions within the 
transport sector in 2012. Navigation and civil aviation, both including 
international bunker fuels,3 generated about 16% and 15%, respectively.  
The rather sluggish reduction of overall transport emissions is 
difficult to reconcile with the EU climate policy, which aims to reduce GHG 
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, or 30% in case of a joint global 
agreement similar to the Kyoto Protocol. The 2011 European Commission 
Communication “Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon 
economy in 2050” suggests that by 2050, the EU should cut its emissions to 
80% below 1990 levels through domestic reductions alone. To reach this 
target, emissions from the transport sector by 2030 should be reduced by at 
least 30% compared to 2010.4 However, significant reductions of GHG 
emissions over the next four decades will have important consequences for 
                                                   
* Christophe Heyndrickx, Rodric Frederix and Joko Purwanto: Transport & 
Mobility Leuven.  
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both private households (i.e. the labour supply) and the transportation 
sector (i.e. the labour demand). The question we try to answer in this 
chapter is therefore: Are there policies that can reduce our carbon footprint 
and, at the same time, create jobs? 
3.1 The transport sector accounts for 4.5% of employment in 
the EU  
In several European countries, the production of motor vehicles and other 
forms of transport equipment has long been a crucial part of the industrial 
economy, generating both income and employment. There is also an 
extensive range of jobs associated with transport, covering those employed 
in airlines and other forms of public transport, as well as a range of 
maintenance and associated services.  
The transport sector directly employs more than 10 million people, 
accounting for 4.5% of total employment in the EU. Around 55% of these 
people work in land transport, 2% in sea transport, 4% in air transport, and 
22% in warehousing and supporting transport activities (cargo handling, 
storage and warehousing), with the remaining 17% in postal and courier 
activities. With around €533 billion in gross value added (GVA) at basic 
prices, the transport and storage services sector – including postal and 
courier activities – accounted for about 5.1% of total GVA in the EU27 in 
2009 and represents 4.6% of EU gross domestic product (GDP). 
Manufacture of transportation equipment provides an additional 1.7% of 
GDP and 1.5% of employment.  
Beyond its role as a direct employer, a well-functioning transport 
sector is necessary for logistics and distribution, as well as allowing 
employees to commute to their workplaces. In 2010, private households in 
Europe spent €904 billion, or roughly 13% of their total consumption, on 
transport-related items. More specifically, 30% of this sum (around €260 
billion) was spent on vehicle purchase, slightly more than 50% (€477 
billion) on the operation of personal transport equipment, and the rest 
(€168 billion) on transport services (e.g. bus, plane or train tickets). 
3.2 The transition away from fossil fuels will impact the 
transport sector  
The socio-ecological transition away from fossil fuels will have important 
consequences for the transport sector as an employer. The changes in the 
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transport sector will be the result of a number of drivers, including climate 
policy, fossil fuel scarcity, the introduction of new propulsion technologies 
and changes in logistics chains. The number of drivers, as well as the 
complexity of the expected changes, is such that it is unclear how fast and 
how radical the transition will be. The background scenarios discussed in 
the Introduction therefore differentiate between ‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ 
future global scenarios. The former is characterised by a slow rate of 
change that is less challenging for Europe, whereas the latter is 
characterised by a more radical and rapid rate of change. With regards to 
the transport sector, the tough scenario assumes greater resource scarcity, 
higher prices of resources and slower economic growth compared with the 
friendly scenario. The three possible policy responses to the socio-
ecological transition differ in the rate of change that is induced by the 
response strategy – low (‘status quo’), medium (‘modernisation’), or high 
(‘sustainability’). The combination of the two background global conditions 
with the three policy response strategies enables us to define six separate 
scenarios, which we classify into two broad groups: 1) policies aimed at 
using energy more efficiently in transport; and 2) policies oriented towards 
behavioural change (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Policy strategies and scenarios combined  
 Friendly Tough 
Strategy 1: No policy 
changes 
‘Careless and globalised 
world’ 
‘Constrained and 
ignorant world’ 
Strategy 2: Ecological 
modernisation and eco-
efficiency 
‘Ecologically aware and 
globalised world’ 
‘Restricted, but 
ecologically aware 
world’ 
Strategy 3: Sustainability 
transformation 
‘Sustainable and 
globalised’ 
‘Challenged and 
sustainable world’ 
 
The first set of policies aims to make significant changes to 
propulsion technology and the relative carbon intensity of transport, and a 
number of technological options are available to accomplish this. The first 
option relates to any kind of electrification of road transport, be it plug-in 
hybrid vehicles, battery electric vehicles or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The 
second option is the increased use of biomass (biomassification), although 
this requires that the biomass be grown in a sustainable manner and does 
not compete with food. Examples are second-generation biofuels (e.g. 
Fischer-Tropsch fuels5 from full energy plants or plant residues) and third-
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generation biofuels (e.g. algae). The third technological option (the 
efficiency revolution) would involve lightweight solutions for vehicles 
and/or downsizing of vehicles such that 1-litre or 2-litre cars become more 
prevalent. 
A second path for structural change focuses on behavioural change. 
This is absolutely essential, as many of the technological options presented 
above tend to increase the cost of acquiring a car, but reduce the actual cost 
of driving. Without any correction to the demand for transport services, 
technological options will not be sufficient to reduce overall transport 
emissions. Adjusting the tax system to better reflect the damage that 
transport inflicts on the environment (i.e. the internalisation of external 
cost), stimulating the use of public (collective) transport and reducing the 
need for ‘physical interaction’ (by use of information technology) are 
essential steps to achieve this goal. 
3.3 The socio-ecological transition will lead to GHG 
reductions and job creation 
Using the ‘status quo’ scenario as a reference, we analyse the extent to 
which the implied scenarios allow reductions in GHG emissions at the level 
of the transport sector and the full economy, given friendly or tough 
background conditions, in eight European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Poland and Spain. At the same time, 
we study the impact of these scenarios on the job market.6 
We start by showing the aggregate impact on total GHG emissions 
(the total for the eight countries under study) for 2030, compared to 2010, 
for all six scenarios. We distinguish the background (‘no policy’) impact, 
the ‘status quo’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘sustainability’ impacts and the 
relative contribution of each scenario to total emissions reduction. 
Disaggregating the impact of each scenario and taking into account the 
impact of background scenario, we find that a considerable decrease in 
transport sector emissions is already realised in the reference scenario,7 
especially in the ‘tough’ scenario. The ‘modernisation’ and ‘sustainability’ 
scenarios reduce overall emissions from households (‘private transport’), 
which fall by almost 55% in the tough scenario of 2030. With respect to the 
total economy, total economy-wide emissions fall by 12% in the friendly 
and 16% in the tough scenario.  
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For every job lost in 
manufacturing, about 2 are 
created in transport services 
Figure 3.1 Impact of different scenarios on transport and total GHG emissions in 
eight countries 
   
Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013a). 
We distinguish the job gains and losses for the entire economy and 
the shifts within the job market for the transport sector itself. The general 
impact is a shift from employment in transport manufacturing industries 
towards jobs in transport services. The proposed policy scenarios are 
mildly stimulating for the job market, independent of friendly or tough 
background conditions, and more so for the ‘sustainability’ scenario than 
for the more moderate ‘modernisation’ scenario. On average, for each job 
lost in manufacturing, around two jobs are generated in the service sector. 
This is based on the assumption that policy shifts from fuel-based to 
driving-based taxation, cutting demand for 
private vehicles. At the same time, 
increased urbanisation leads to a further 
realignment in preferences toward public 
transit solutions. This change is only 
partially counteracted by a reduction in the variable cost of driving 
attributable to the electrification of transport and increased fuel efficiency. 
As a result, fewer people are driving or employed in making cars, but more 
are engaged as drivers or operators of transport systems in the more 
sustainable society.  
The result is a net increase in employment of around 400,000 jobs in 
the ‘sustainability’ scenario and just under 200,000 jobs in the 
‘modernisation’ scenario in the eight countries under study. This represents 
a decrease in unemployment of 4.4% and 2.4%, respectively. Extrapolation 
of this result to the whole of Europe leads to a net job creation of around 1 
million full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the ‘sustainability’ scenario and just 
below 500,000 in the ‘modernisation’ scenario. To put things into 
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perspective, this is a quarter to a half of the current employment in car 
manufacturing.  
Figure 3.2 Net yearly job creation (in FTEs) compared with the reference scenario 
(ΔMO = change in modernisation and ΔSU= change in sustainability) in all 
countries, 2010 versus 2030  
 
Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013a). 
The net positive impact on job creation is interesting, as the proposed 
‘modernisation’ and ‘sustainability’ scenarios show significant reductions 
in emissions above the reference (‘status quo’) scenario (Figure 3.1). This is 
hardly surprising, since almost all transport policies directly aim to 
decrease energy and fuel consumption. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the 
relative contribution of various policy sub-scenarios to employment and 
GHG emissions.8 These transport policy sub-scenarios include: 
 an increase in energy efficiency (a reduction in the total energy use 
per unit of value due to technological policy and government 
stimulation); 
 an increase in fuel efficiency (autonomous gains in productivity and a 
larger gain in fuel efficiency due to active government intervention in 
the ‘modernisation’ and ‘sustainability’ scenarios); 
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 electrification of transport (an increase in the use of electrified 
transport for households from approximately zero in most European 
countries up to 10% in the ‘modernisation’ and 20% in the 
‘sustainability’ scenario); 
 the internalisation of external costs of transport (through fuel taxes or 
smart charging on all roads); 
 reduced use of own transport (a shift in preferences towards public 
transport as a result of increased urbanisation, car-sharing, measures 
to discourage car transport or improvements in quality and 
coordination of public transport services); and 
 a reduction in administrative inputs for freight transport (following 
the e-Freight initiative of the EU). 
Figure 3.3 Relative impact of each policy sub-scenario on job creation (in terms of 
the percentage of the final result) for the friendly ‘modernisation’ (left) and 
‘sustainability’ (right) scenarios 
       
Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013a). 
Figure 3.3 suggests that the policies with the largest impact on 
employment are the ‘energy efficiency’, ‘reduced use of private transport’ 
and ‘transport efficiency’ sub-scenarios. Gains in fuel efficiency for freight 
transport have a much more positive impact on employment than fuel 
efficiency for passenger transport. This is because lower costs for fuel lead 
to substitution to labour. By far the most effective strategy for net job 
creation was related not directly to transport but to increased energy 
efficiency in the economy as a whole. Energy-efficiency improvements and 
transport subsidies deliver about three times more jobs in the eastern 
European countries (Group 2) than in the other countries. We shows that 
there is a big difference between jobs created within the richer and more 
developed western and northern EU countries (Belgium, Germany, France, 
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Job losses induced by labour-
efficient technologies are 
compensated by employment 
gains in other sectors. 
Finland, Denmark, etc.), the southern EU countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, 
etc.) and the eastern EU countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, etc.).9 
We are not the first to note this difference in the relative impact of 
improvements in energy efficiency – both the Green Jobs Initiative10 and 
the Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum11 found similar differences when 
studying the impact of a number of renovation projects across the EU and 
the US. This runs parallel to the relative labour intensity of the economy, 
wage rates and current unemployment rates. This would imply that job 
creation is quite different in the developing EU economies. 
No such differences between countries become apparent in fuel 
economy and electrification. If there is any difference at all, the model 
implies a lower effectiveness of fuel economy standards and electrification 
on job creation than gains in energy efficiency in other sectors.  This is also 
reflected in lower and even negative impacts on GDP when moving 
towards less-polluting vehicles. The reason for these negative values is 
mainly explained through the interaction with government tax income.12 
Figure 3.4 Relative impact of each policy sub-scenario on GHG emissions (in terms 
of the percentage of the final result) for the friendly ‘modernisation’ (left) and 
‘sustainability’ (right) scenarios 
   
 Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013a). 
The modelled fuel efficiency measures had only a limited positive 
impact on job creation. The influence of electrification on employment is 
negative, for a number of reasons.13 First, electric vehicles require less in the 
way of maintenance services compared with 
the fixed cost of the car, and therefore have 
a dampening effect on service employment. 
Second, they reduce the variable cost of 
driving, but also the tax revenue from fuels. 
This is compensated by an increase of jobs 
BIKING TO WORK? TRANSPORT POLICY, SUSTAINABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT  53 
 
The impact of electrification 
on employment is negative, 
but it contributes positively 
to the environment. 
in the energy sector and car manufacturing. While some countries like 
Germany and the UK can potentially gain, the net effect is slightly negative 
or, in the best case, close to zero.  
Figure 3.5 Total impact on employment (measured in million euros) in the top four 
‘winning sectors’ and top four ‘losing sectors’ when moving towards electric 
mobility 
 
Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013b). 
This does not mean that moving 
towards electric propulsion for vehicles is 
necessarily a bad policy. Figure 3.4 shows 
that increased fuel efficiency and 
electrification can contribute significantly to 
making transport more environmentally 
friendly, even when the net consumption of electrical energy increases. 
However, it entails a trade-off between the environmental and the job 
creation goals.   
In contrast, behavioural changes and improvements in the 
administrative efficiency of transport are effective in creating new jobs. The 
administrative simplifications implied by e-Freight lead to job losses in 
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auxiliary transport services – for this reason, transport operators are often 
reluctant to promote labour-efficient technologies – but these are 
compensated by gains in other sectors. This finding runs parallel to the 
conclusion of the draft impact assessment of the new European Single Sky 
initiative14 for improvements in the auxiliary air transport sector. Further 
analysis of the cross-country differences showed that the relative size of the 
land and air transport sector (and water transport to a minor degree), the 
auxiliary transport sector and wholesale trade contributed to a more 
positive result in terms of job creation.15 The size of the machinery and 
basic metal sectors contributed negatively. By far the largest impact was 
caused by the size of the land transport sector and the auxiliary transport 
sector. This is not that surprising, as it reflects the dependence of the 
economy on transport services. Our results imply that if the auxiliary 
transport sector is relatively large, so are the potential gains from 
administrative efficiency.  
Measures to discourage private transport lead to a pickup in jobs for 
drivers and operators. We assume a relatively large shift towards public 
transit systems, which would reflect a behavioural change by consumers 
over the coming decades. This makes a notable difference to employment 
in transport services.  
3.4 Policies aimed at energy efficiency, cycling and public 
transit are most likely to boost both employment and 
sustainability 
The urban system provides an excellent case study for sustainable 
strategies and green job creation. Adaptive and better urban (transport) 
planning and the quest for innovative solutions could be a stimulus for 
green jobs. The size and growth of urban areas is an important aspect of the 
socio-ecological transition16 and is a main driver for changes in the 
transport system. By 2050, urban regions will have absorbed 3 billion new 
dwellers. The growth of urban regions is strongest in the developing 
countries, but is also far from over in the most developed countries. By 
2050, more than 85% of the European population will live in urban (or 
urbanised) regions.17 
The form, and in particular the density, of urban regions plays a 
decisive role in transport energy requirements and hence in a move 
towards sustainability. For example, an analysis of Dutch CO2 emissions by 
transport activity documented that average emissions were 47% lower in 
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the high urban density class, compared with the low urban density class.18 
In the US, a combination of avoiding a further reduction of urban density 
and a 1% annual improvement in energy efficiency could reduce urban 
automobile emissions by as much as 18 GT19 by 2054.20  One way to reduce 
material and energy flows in the city would be to reduce car dependence 
and the material and energy requirements for buildings.21 The rationale 
behind this is simple: suburban dwellers are much more dependent on 
automobiles.22 It is therefore possible to argue that urban sprawl in Europe 
is detrimental to sustainable development and deserves more attention 
within the EU.23   
Table 3.2 summarises a number of policies that are being 
implemented at the city level today and that may be drivers for a generally 
more sustainable transport system in Europe. For each policy, we assess its 
impact on seven important indicators: employment, size of city (sprawl), 
prices (transport and housing), pollution, traffic congestion and public 
finances. In the absence of hard quantitative evidence, we discuss the most 
likely direction of the effect of each policy on the chosen indicators.  
When the private cost of transport does not reflect the total social 
(external) cost of transport, the city density will be lower than optimal, 
congestion higher and the total commuting distance longer. The link 
between environmental costs and excess private transport is self-evident. 
However, the costs of commuting go well beyond the purely economic one. 
Long commuting distance is associated with psychological and health-
related illness24 and higher separation rates.25 Strategies to correct private 
incentives and achieve optimal city density, as well as to avoid excessive 
traffic congestion and pollution, are therefore of great importance.  
To limit city expansion, cities have predominantly used restrictive 
strategies such as urban growth boundaries. These are effective in 
restricting the growth of the city to certain areas and preserving green areas 
to some extent, but impose costs on the city population in terms of higher 
housing prices.26 Cost-benefit evaluations of urban growth boundaries in 
empirical situations are often negative, especially when development is 
easily relocated to uncontrolled regions and causes suburbanisation 
beyond the city borders.27 
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Table 3.2 City-level policy and estimated impacts on sprawl, price of housing and 
transport, pollution, congestion, municipal finances and employment 
Policy Urban 
spraw
l 
H
ousing 
prices 
Transport 
costs 
Pollution 
C
ongestion 
Public 
finances* 
Em
ploym
ent 
General energy 
efficiency standards 
0 + 0 - 0 + ++ 
Fuel efficiency 
standards 
≈ 0 ≈ - +  - + 
Electrification of 
transport  
≈ 0 ≈ - + - ≈ 
Low Emission Zones ≈ ≈ + - - + ≈ 
Road charging (tolls) - ≈ + - -- + - 
Access restrictions 
for freight** 
0 ≈ + ≈ ≈ 0 - 
Urban growth 
boundaries 
-- ++ 0 ≈ ≈ - - 
Parking policy 0 ≈ + - ≈ + ≈ 
Pro-Cycling policies 0 0 0 - - + + 
Investments in 
public transport 
+ ≈ 0 - - -- + 
Promoting public 
transport 
0 0 0 - - ≈ +  
Urban delivery 
centres 
0 0 ≈ ≈ ≈ - ≈ 
Dynamic transport 
management 
0 0 - ≈ - ≈ 0 
Investments in road 
infrastructure 
++ - - ++ ≈ -- + 
Work-at-home 
incentives 
+ - - ≈ - 0 + 
* A positive sign reflects an increase in public budget (public revenues). 
** This entails any type of regulation that limits the access of vans and other freight 
transport for deliveries in the city centre. In many cities this confines deliveries to either 
night-time or business hours. 
Notes: 0 = No discernible impact. ≈ = Questionable impact (either a positive or negative 
direction is possible). - = Reduction. -- = Strong reduction. + = Increase. ++ = Strong increase. 
Source: Heyndrickx et al. (2013b, p. 45). 
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Road charging positively impacts 
employment by increasing the 
efficiency of commuting and 
generating revenue for public 
investment and tax cuts. 
Road-charging zones or low 
emission zones would allow 
cities greater control over 
urban traffic. 
A form of road-charging provides incentives to alleviate congestion 
and increase the price of transport to better reflect the damage that 
transport imposes on the environment. In the long run, higher transport 
prices will increase urban density and house prices in the urban centres. 
Road-charging gives cities a flexible tool for redirecting traffic flows and 
provides cities with revenues that can be used for improving public transit 
or redistributed for other social needs. Furthermore, employment can be 
impacted positively when the revenue is recycled (partially) towards the 
reduction of labour taxes.28  
Plans to introduce road-charging have generally been met with 
considerable public opposition. Nevertheless, the idea of access restrictions 
and charges is slowly working its way into people’s minds. In the cities 
where road-charging, or a similar type of charge, has been introduced 
(London, Milan and Stockholm), public acceptance grew substantially after 
introduction.29 In the case of London, earmarking the taxes from the road 
charge has substantially helped to gain public acceptance for the scheme. It 
also creates a direct link between the revenues collected from road charges 
(and thus from congestion) and investments in public roads and public 
transport. In general, public acceptance for 
establishing low emission zones (LEZs) is 
higher, due to the focus on environmental 
benefits and the lower reach of the policy. 
The main difference is that in LEZs, 
decreasing congestion is generally a 
secondary goal, while it is the primary objective in the case of road-
charging. In their operation, however, LEZs are very similar to a road-
charging system.  
Parking charges can be a potential second-best strategy for road-
charging, especially when combined with advancements in parking 
technology to allow different rates to 
be charged for vehicles according to 
their arrival time and emission 
intensity.30 However, parking charges 
that are too stringent may reduce the 
efficiency of the policy and lead to 
extra cruising, causing additional 
traffic congestion in the city.31 The presence of private parking spots or 
parking at the workplace as an extra-legal benefit also reduces the 
effectiveness of this type of policy. 
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One of the more effective policies to combine sustainable 
development with growth is the promotion of cycling. Cycling is the fastest 
intra-urban transport mode and has strong health benefits. Commuting by 
bike is also associated with higher work productivity and fewer sick days.32 
Many cities have started subsidising bike programmes and improving the 
traffic infrastructure for cycling; Copenhagen is a forerunner in this aspect.  
Large (public) transport infrastructure works are generally proposed 
as means to stimulate the labour market, as well as providing better 
accessibility. While in some cases new road capacity may be necessary, this 
should be weighed against its negative impact on sustainability. 
Investments in road infrastructure are costly to the public budget, increase 
urban sprawl,33 the private use of cars and traffic pollution, and only have a 
transient effect on congestion, due to induced travel demand effects.34 
Investments in public transit may stimulate public transport use, but 
should be carefully planned and executed, and focused on demand. 
Dynamic transport management is an efficient way to improve traffic flows 
without creating new and costly infrastructure.35 However, it is unable to 
create any structural change to the urban environment.  
Promotion of public transit is a soft measure that has been shown to 
stimulate the use of public transit to some degree. Publicly funded training 
programmes may help to familiarise new users with public transit, but may 
not lead to any structural change towards public transit use. Other 
measures to promote public transport, such as establishing a unified 
ticketing system for public transit or improving and visualising transport 
schedules, are more likely to lead to long-term results. For example, the 
simplification of ticketing through the introduction of the Oyster card 
system in London has proved a very effective way to reduce waiting lines 
and the cost of taking public transit.36  
Teleworking is often cited as a potential ‘cure’ for excess commuting. 
Some experts are especially positive about this sort of incentive, pointing 
out that the reduced demand for office space would lead to lower energy 
consumption and lower land use in the city.37 The positive impact of the 
scheme is reduced when a large proportion of commuters are already 
taking public transit.38 Furthermore, teleworking can have negative 
consequences. The specific ‘Dutch’ practice of working at home during the 
morning and leaving for work later can balance traffic flows more evenly 
during the morning, but it may also affect the work-life balance and lead to 
congestion during evening hours.39 Hyok-Joo Rhee finds that work-at-
home incentives can lead to more urban sprawl.40 Finally, the presence of 
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rebound effects in energy use at home and the latent demand of non-
teleworkers make it questionable whether teleworking can really have any 
significant results on pollution. 
Freight transport within and between cities is a large consumer of 
energy, as well as a cause of congestion at the city level. Traditionally, there 
has not been so much attention on urban freight in transport planning; 
however, access of goods to business districts is an important part of the 
demand for travel in any city. Freight vehicles typically represent 15% of 
total traffic flow in urban areas, but when they park to make collections or 
deliveries outside designated parking spaces they can reduce road capacity 
and contribute to congestion.41 One idea, which has been popular in the last 
decade, is to increase the bundling of urban freight by creating urban 
consolidation centres (UCCs).42 The idea is that a central, publicly operated 
company collects urban freight outside the city centre. In a second stage, 
the packages can be transported by low-emission vehicles or by bike. 
Theoretically, this can increase bundling of freight and draw some of the 
heavy goods transport out of the city. This may also have some job effects, 
through employment connected to the centres. Many cities, particularly in 
Italy, have experimented with UCCs. The Italian experience reveals rather 
mixed results, as most of the centres were costly to public finances and had 
too little impact on city traffic to be effective.43 
Access restrictions for freight transport reduce the efficiency of 
deliveries within the city and will generally have an economic cost and 
reduce employment in the distribution sector. Imposed delivery windows 
in cities restrict freight to either daytime (London) or night-time (Paris) 
deliveries. These reflect city-level preferences for congestion avoidance 
during the day or noise avoidance at night for urban freight. Therefore, the 
impact on either congestion or noise avoidance is somewhat ambivalent 
and depends upon the type of scheme imposed.  
3.5 Behavioural policy is better suited to meet employment 
targets  
Sustainable transport policies can be classified into two broad groups: 1) 
policies aimed at using energy more efficiently in transport; and 2) policies 
oriented towards behavioural change. A combination of these policies 
reduces structural emissions of greenhouse gases and related pollutants by 
1%–8% by 2030, compared with the status quo. The proposed 
‘sustainability’ scenario reduces household emissions (private transport) by 
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The impact of 
teleworking on pollution 
is ambivalent at best. 
over 50% and total transport emissions (including freight) by over 30%; this 
is in line with the Roadmap 2050 goals for transport emissions in 2030.44 All 
eight countries analysed in our study showed net job creation under both 
the ‘modernisation’ scenario (an additional 
200,000 jobs) and the ‘sustainability’ scenario (an 
additional 400,000 jobs). Extrapolated to the 
whole of Europe, this reflects a gain of between 
500,000 and 1 million jobs, or about half of the 
current employment in car manufacturing. The impact of each policy is 
similar under both the friendly and tough background scenarios, even 
though the overall impact on the EU economy of these two background 
scenarios differs greatly. 
When analysing each policy option, we find that no single transport 
policy could match the effectiveness of a general improvement in energy 
efficiency standards while at the same time stimulating the labour market. 
For instance, fuel efficiency standards and the introduction of electric 
vehicles lead to environmental benefits but have only modest impacts on 
job creation. In the case of electric vehicles, the impact on employment may 
even be negative for many countries. 
Policies oriented towards behavioural changes, such as changing the 
tax base to discourage private motor vehicle use or improvements in 
transport efficiency, lead to more positive labour market outcomes but 
have less impact on pollution and emissions. Improving the efficiency of 
transport even has a noticeable positive impact on transport demand, 
which may increase emissions to some degree. However, this only partially 
reduces the environmental benefits of improved fuel efficiency. 
Investments in public infrastructure, increased transport efficiency and 
improvements in energy efficiency have the largest impact on employment 
per million euros spent, especially in eastern and southern European 
countries. A reduction of private car use leads to slightly positive labour 
market outcomes through increased employment in public transport.  
Overall, in moving towards a more sustainable economy, the relative 
importance of the transportation manufacturing sector in the EU 
diminishes in favour of transport services. Our society, as it becomes more 
environmentally conscious, has less need for privately owned vehicles but 
more need for transport and service operators. Increased efficiency (such as 
the introduction of measures to reduce the administrative burden in 
transport) leads to job losses in sectors providing auxiliary services to 
transport, but at the same time benefits employment in other sectors. 
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Notes 
1 See www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/final-energy-consumption-
by-sector-5/assessment. 
2 Extracted from Eurostat (based on EEA data) update 11 June 2014. 
3 Bunker fuels are a type of crude oil that is often used by vessels (maritime 
transport). 
4 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm - climate policies for 
2030. The text states a 43% reduction in ETS sectors and a 30% reduction in non-
ETS sectors compared to 2005. Note that the transport sector is not a part of the EU 
ETS sectors and transport emissions in 2010 are only 1% higher than in 2005.  
5 Fischer-Tropsch fuels refer to the process developed by Hans Fischer and Franz 
Tropsch that is used to convert carbon monoxide and hydrogen into hydrocarbons. 
It is commercially used to produce synthetic oils out of coal, natural gas and 
biomass.  
6 We base our results on a full-scale general equilibrium model called European 
Model for the Assessment of Income Distribution and Inequality Effects of 
Economic Policies (EDIP) (Heyndrickx et al., 2007). An analysis of the impact of the 
proposed transport policies was performed in two parts. The first part was a top-
down analysis using the NEUJOBS scenarios defined above and applied to eight 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Germany, Poland 
and Spain), which are presented in Heyndrickx et al. (2013a). The second part of 
the analysis is presented as a relative comparison of the effective contribution of 
small shocks in transport policy on larger set of European countries. Results from 
EDIP were thoroughly analysed and compared in an extensive literature review of 
the job market effects of sustainable transport strategies in Heyndrickx et al. 
(2013b). Then, country- and policy-specific multipliers were calculated to measure 
the relative impact of different policies on job creation (in FTE per million euros) 
and GDP. 
7 The reference scenario is defined as the sum of the background (‘no policy’) and 
the ‘status quo’ scenario. 
8 We show only the friendly scenario, as the conclusions from the tough scenario 
are similar. See Heyndrickx et al. (2013a) for other indicators and a more detailed 
analysis of the results.  
9 Heyndrickx et al. (2013b). 
10 ILO (2012). 
11 Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum (2012). 
12 See also Van Dender and Crist (2011). 
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13 See Heyndrickx et al. (2013b). 
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15 Heyndrickx et al. (2013b). 
16 Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012).  
17 United Nations (2012). 
18 Grazi et al. (2008). 
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20 Marshall (2008).  
21 Wiedenhofer et al. (2013). 
22 Van de Weghe and Kennedy (2007).  
23 Piorr et al. (2011). 
24 Novaco and Gonzalez (2009). 
25 Sandow (2013). 
26 Anas and Rhee (2006). 
27 Jun (2004). 
28 See Steininger et al. (2007); Heyndrickx et al. (2009). 
29 Nevertheless, in neither of these cases was the incumbent mayor authorising the 
scheme voted back into office after elections.  
30 Calthrop and Proost (2000).   
31 Arnott and Inci (2010). 
32 Rabl and de Nazelle (2012). 
33 Baum-Snow (2007). 
34 For example, see Litman (2013). 
35 Schoemaker et al. (2006). 
36 Santos (2008). 
37 Fuhr and Pociask (2011). 
38 Macharis et al. (2011). 
39 Rietveld (2011). A discussion on innovative practices at the workplace can be 
found in the first NEUJOBS book: Let’s Get to Work! The Future of Labour in Europe, 
Vol. 1. 
40 Rhee (2009). 
41 DG MOVE (2012b).  
42 Browne et al. (2007). 
43 Danielis et al. (2010). 
44 The range of the overall reduction in emissions per capita under the 
sustainability scenario. 
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4. DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF LABOUR IN 
THE HOUSING SECTOR 
KEES DOL, JOHN DOLING, MARJA ELSINGA, 
NICHOLAS HORSEWOOD, FRITS MEIJER AND 
HENK VISSCHER 
he housing sector is large and significant in all aspects of human life, 
making the task of the policy-maker especially complex. Homes 
constitute the largest single land use in the ‘built environment’, they 
are generally the largest single item of expenditure in household budgets 
and the largest form of household wealth, and they are instrumental in our 
social networks and our psychological wellbeing. The scale and extent of 
the connections have complex impacts on, and are impacted by, both the 
demand for and supply of labour and the socio-ecological transition. The 
ageing of European populations, for example, will continue to influence the 
demand for housing in terms of location, size and services, which in turn 
will create jobs in construction, raw material acquisition and delivery, 
infrastructure (ranging from roads to medical services) and transaction 
activities (such as legal services, new furniture and fittings). The link 
between the geographical location of the family residence and of the 
workplace will be altered by further developments of ICT and home 
working, influencing the impact of housing sectors on the direct supply of 
labour. 
Of the many possible linkages and considerations for policy-makers 
in relation to the housing sector, this chapter focuses on three specific 
aspects. Section 4.1 examines the likely impact of energy renovation of the 
                                                   
 Kees Dol, Marja Elsinga, Frits Meijer and Henk Visscher: Technische Universiteit 
Delft; John Doling and Nicholas Horsewood: University of Birmingham. 
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The building stock is 
responsible for some 40% of 
overall energy usage and 36% 
of CO2 emissions 
The renovation rate would 
have to triple to achieve set 
energy-efficiency goals. 
housing stock on jobs in the construction industry. Section 4.2 looks at 
possible developments in direct employment in mortgage markets. Section 
4.3 examines how home ownership shapes the supply of labour. The final 
section offers policy recommendations.   
4.1 Energy renovation is crucial to achieve energy-efficiency 
targets 
The building stock is important to energy-efficiency targets in Europe, 
being responsible for some 40% of overall energy usage and 36% of CO2 
emissions across the region.1 There are currently around 230 million 
dwellings in the EU and, measured in floor space, they account for 75% of 
the total building stock. In any one year, new house building typically adds 
no more than 1% to the existing stock. One 
consequence of this is that perhaps as much 
as 75% of the housing stock that will be in 
use in 2050 has already been built, and was 
built at a time when energy conservation 
was not an important objective. Therefore, it 
is the existing buildings, and not new buildings, that present the major 
challenge to achieving the energy-saving goals. The renovations necessary 
to achieve energy-efficiency goals covering a range of targets – including 
greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy and energy consumption – 
can lead to job creation in the housing sector. For every €1 million invested 
in upgrading the energy efficiency of the existing building stock, as many 
as 17 new direct jobs could be generated.2 
While there is general agreement that progress towards realising EU 
and member state energy-saving targets has been slower than was expected 
and hoped for, there is actually a lack of unambiguous data on almost all 
relevant parameters – about the physical characteristics of the European 
housing stock, the renovation rate, the extent of the measures being 
undertaken, the investment that has been made, the results of this 
investment in terms of energy efficiency and the impact on employment. 
Across the member states, there are 
many programmes of improvement and 
renovation to bring existing dwellings up to 
acceptable standards of energy efficiency. 
Estimates of the exact number of 
renovations vary, but it seems likely that they are being applied to 
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approximately 1% of the stock per year. In order to realise the energy goals 
that have been set, the renovation rate must be tripled, while the number 
and type of renovation measures should also be increased significantly. 
There are several reasons why the renovations expected (and needed) 
will most likely not materialise. First, there is evidence of market failures, 
including a poor reflection of environmental and social costs in energy 
market prices, as well as poor incentive structures and a general lack of 
adequate training and knowledge of many actors in the building sector. 
Second, there are financial barriers to the renovation of the housing stock. 
Given the high level of initial costs, housing investments must provide 
returns over a long period of time to be financially viable. Equally, the lack 
of awareness among lenders of the benefits of housing renovation limits 
households’ access to credit. Third, the regulatory frameworks in many 
member states are often inadequate to achieve the energy targets. In many 
countries, there is a lack of administrative capacity to develop effective 
energy-efficiency legislation, as well as a lack of enforcement. 
Looking to the future, our investigations indicate that the ageing of 
European populations may depress the demand for energy renovation, 
which is not necessarily intuitive as the elderly tend to feel the cold and 
suffer ill health through poor-quality housing.  Many studies find that 
older people – perhaps as a result of low income, but also perhaps due to 
having more limited time horizons than younger people – may be less 
responsive to the poor condition of their housing and more likely to make a 
calculation that investments will not generate a return for them.3 
A comprehensive review of national and EU-wide studies on energy 
renovation conducted by Meijer et al. offers insights into the number of jobs 
that may be created and the skills that will be demanded.4 Looking to 2020, 
estimates of the total number of jobs created by energy renovations in the 
housing stock vary from 0.28 million to 1.40 million. In part, the variation 
reflects the level of activity, with a continuation of the current rate of 
energy renovation being likely to create a number of jobs at the lower end 
of the range of the estimates. On average, 12 to 17 new jobs can be created 
per €1 million invested. Even at the bottom end of this range, however, job 
creation could be considered the main motivation for investing in energy 
efficiency, with energy saving itself being an important corollary effect. 
Additional benefits would be a reduction in spending on government 
subsidies for presently unemployed workers, and improved health of 
citizens because of the reduction in air pollution and a better indoor 
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climate, both of which would mean fewer hospitalisations and improved 
worker productivity. 
The jobs themselves would include those in industries that produce 
materials, components and products needed to improve the energy 
performance of buildings, those in the construction sector fitting new 
materials and products, energy auditors and certifiers, and inspectors of 
heating and air-conditioning services, for example. There could be others, 
such as those supplying financial packages enabling investments to be 
made. Against this, jobs could be lost in the energy sector because of the 
relative reduction in energy consumption, compared to what it would have 
been.  
With respect to the construction industry, there appears generally to 
be a shortage of skills, which has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. 
Qualitative skills mismatches are of particular importance: the introduction 
of advanced green technologies and practices makes previously demanded 
skill sets obsolete. Many workers will therefore have to undergo training to 
upgrade their skills. For example, renovation work is relatively labour-
intensive and more demanding in terms of craftsmanship than new 
construction. As a result, the skills of construction workers without 
previous experience in renovation work will have to be upgraded. This 
applies not only to manual operatives working on-site, but also to 
professional staff such as architects and engineers. There will also be a need 
for people to carry out ‘new’ jobs, such as energy-efficiency analysts or 
energy auditors.   
4.2 Employment in mortgage markets in 2025 will be the 
same as or lower than in 2007 
The importance of the housing market for the labour market goes beyond 
the construction/renovation sector. Given the increasing weight of the 
financial sector in advanced economies, especially up to 2007, employment 
in mortgage markets also needs to be considered for completeness. 
Moreover, the financial crisis demonstrated that mortgage markets can 
undermine economies. 
Although existing statistical sources do not allow the identification of 
the precise number and nature of the jobs generated by mortgage activities, 
it is clear that not only are the numbers large, but they are also skewed 
towards workers with higher levels of education and training and earning 
higher wages. For these reasons, the future of mortgage markets and 
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employment within them, particularly in the context of the post-2007 
reductions in the size of mortgage markets in most of the EU, are 
important. 
Analysis of the sector is limited not only by the limitations of existing 
statistical sources, but also by the paucity of studies of mortgage markets, 
and especially of the links between mortgage market activity and size on 
the one hand, and jobs on the other. Nevertheless, an examination of 
existing written sources, as well as interviews conducted with key 
informants in three countries with very distinctive mortgage markets (the 
Netherlands, Poland and the UK), provide insights into the key future 
developments in employment supported by mortgage market activity.5  
On the face of it, there is considerable capacity for further growth of 
mortgage activity, and with it employment. Across Europe, mortgage debt 
in the mid-2000s was equivalent to about 50% of total GDP, and in some 
countries it was as high as 100%. Whereas the latter figure may not be 
achievable in all countries, in many there may nevertheless be great growth 
potential. However, the willingness of households to take on such large 
debt has been affected by the financial crisis, at least in the short term.  
There is the general recognition that a high debt-to-income ratio is not 
sustainable in the long run and could have serious macroeconomic 
implications when faced by an adverse shock. Hence, it should not be 
assumed that levels of mortgage activity and employment will 
automatically grow to pre-crisis levels. Rather, the evidence from our 
investigations is that the future will be determined by a set of drivers, the 
first of which is the route out of the current economic crisis. Mortgage 
market activity in member states since 2007 has broadly matched changes 
in GDP; in other words, activity has declined where GDP has declined, and 
increased where GDP has increased. A key to the future, then, is how 
quickly and in what ways the present crisis is resolved. Given the economic 
turmoil in the eurozone, it seems unlikely that this will happen quickly; 
instead, a return to what might be called ‘normal’ market conditions and 
market growth – and normal levels of employment – might perhaps be 
delayed until the end of the current decade.   
The issue of what is meant by ‘normal’ and whether mortgage 
markets – and more generally, financial markets – will return to anything 
like their former nature is unknown. One element of this lies in the 
development of new regulatory regimes being drawn up by member states, 
the EU and international authorities. Although much is yet to be agreed on 
and put in place, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that financial 
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institutions will face a greater degree of regulation in future, with greater 
capital and liquidity requirements and less exposure to risk. Broadly, the 
emphasis of mortgage markets is being switched from growth in new 
lending towards stability and safety.   
For those involved in providing mortgages, this will mean more 
information, more verification and more monitoring, and all with greater 
responsibility placed on lenders to assure the accuracy of the evaluations. 
This suggests that more labour input will be required per unit of mortgage 
activity. It also seems likely that lending institutions will develop new 
operational models that might imply, for example, more or less use of 
outsourcing through intermediaries. In turn, this might lead to different 
configurations of skills. But while the overall increase in labour input will 
enhance total employment for a given level of lending activity, it will also 
increase costs which, passed onto customers, could lead to an overall 
reduction in demand. And so, on balance, new regulation seems likely to 
increase costs, but will not necessarily increase the numbers employed in 
mortgage industries significantly. It may be expected that these effects will 
be greater in those countries where regulation has previously been the 
loosest, for example in the liberal UK market as opposed to the more 
regulated German one.   
A further set of drivers relates to the development of new products 
serving different household needs. A large proportion of the personal net 
wealth of European households is held in the form of housing equity, net of 
mortgage debt. In certain member states, there is evidence that households 
previously accessed this net housing wealth to fund consumer expenditure.   
In a context in which governments are presented with challenges of 
meeting the costs of established welfare models and entitlements – 
challenges that are exacerbated by a combination of the present crisis and 
demographic ageing – one potential approach is to encourage households 
to draw on their own resources embedded in mass home ownership. In this 
way, a part of tax-based state expenditure may be replaced by schemes in 
which European households take greater responsibility for the costs of 
meeting their needs in later life. In doing so, there is the potential to extend 
what, in most European countries, has been an emphasis on forward 
mortgages that enable households to invest to an associated emphasis on 
reverse mortgages that allow households to dis-invest. The theoretical 
potential for the expansion of mortgage business, and therefore of 
employment, is considerable.  
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Increasing use of IT will 
reduce employment in 
mortgage markets and 
exacerbate job polarisation. 
Another direction of expansion for housing finance markets is 
supporting energy-reduction activity, i.e. expanding the opportunities for 
households to participate by taking loans against the collateral of their 
homes. As this is additional business rather than a diversion from lending 
to purchase housing (or indeed, lending to extract equity), it could mean an 
expansion of overall lending activity. 
Set against these possibilities for employment growth are 
productivity gains. In recent years, increasing use of the internet and ICT 
has reduced the number of employees needed to process each unit of 
mortgage activity. The extent of such developments clearly varies across 
the member states, but with continuing restrictions on the amount of 
lending, many lenders are trying to reduce 
costs further, and in so far as such systems 
continue to be developed, they will continue 
to depress the workforce across all 
European mortgage markets. Furthermore, 
ICT developments could lead to changes in 
the patterns of skills required in the industry, and perhaps to a reduction in 
skills, by replacing the discretion previously vested in frontline staff with 
more automated and centralised monitoring and decision systems. This in 
turn could lead to further job and remuneration polarisation within the 
industry, with an increasing divide between highly skilled and highly 
remunerated central office staff and lesser skilled, more modestly 
remunerated staff interacting with the public. 
The effect of these drivers in the member states, each of which has a 
different starting point, will be different. For example, based on six 
scenarios for the UK, with different levels of future mortgage activity, 
productivity increases and impacts of regulation, projections by Doling 
indicate that only in the case of the market quickly recovering to its 2007 
level and regulation imposing significant additional labour inputs would 
overall employment be likely to exceed its 2007 peak.6 A more general rule-
of-thumb estimate is that in 2025, activity in the mortgage market in each 
member state will be at a similar level to 2007, adjusted by the changes in 
the 2007-2010 period. Broadly speaking, activity, and therefore 
employment, could be at the same or a lower level compared to 2007 in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries (and also perhaps the 
Netherlands), and perhaps higher in Scandinavian and the northern 
mainland countries, with a mixed picture across the eastern countries.  
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4.3 Home ownership influences small business formation, 
unemployment and retirement 
A holistic approach to an analysis of the impact of the housing sector on the 
labour market requires a discussion of how home ownership influences the 
demand and the supply of labour. Over the decade leading up to 2007, the 
general pattern across the EU was one of home ownership sectors 
increasing in size, to the point at which about two-thirds of Europeans had 
become homeowners. The increases were generally supported by public 
policies that, for example, gave tax subsidies against interest payments and 
encouraged the sale of social housing to individual owners. The trends 
were also associated with expanding mortgage markets and increasing 
house prices. For households, this contributed to increasing levels of 
indebtedness – with housing costs, including loan repayments, frequently 
being the largest single item in the household budget – as well as wealth 
portfolios dominated by housing equity. 
Our investigations point to two important general issues. The first is 
whether home ownership will continue to grow, or if it will in fact decline. 
A trend-based projection for the UK, for example, suggests a 10 percentage-
point reduction by 2020.7 EU-wide, the impact of demographic ageing, 
international migration, insecure labour markets, fiscal pressures on 
governments leading to the withdrawal of tax breaks for homeowners, and 
depressed mortgage markets could all combine to result in decreasing 
home ownership. 
Second, as household finance correlates with home ownership, it 
influences the ability and willingness of European households to 
participate in labour markets. In this respect, the pattern of constraints and 
opportunities facing homeowners places them in a different position from 
those who rent their homes. There are many dimensions to this tenure 
divide, of which we considered three: small business formation, 
unemployment and retirement. 
i) Small business formation 
The European Commission has acknowledged entrepreneurship as an 
economic driver and actively supports small and medium-sized 
enterprises. But a persistent problem is that while many Europeans express 
an interest in doing so, in practice relatively few actually start a business, 
with one of the major constraints being access to finance. Here, it might be 
expected that housing equity would provide collateral, thus overcoming 
credit restrictions set by formal financial institutions. In this respect, having 
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High house prices divert 
funds away from industry 
and encourage speculation in 
the housing market. 
a house, whether owned outright or with a small outstanding mortgage 
debt, may be important. 
However, Horsewood and Dol argue that the relationship between 
home ownership and small business formation is more complex.8 While 
there is evidence that funds to support entrepreneurial initiatives may 
come from housing markets, via homeowners increasing the size of their 
mortgages, a statistically stronger effect is that high returns from home 
ownership appear to discourage households 
from starting a new business. Policies 
encouraging people to become homeowners 
and that lead to rises in house prices may 
have the effect of diverting enterprise and 
funds away from industry and instead 
encouraging speculation in the housing market. Furthermore, high levels of 
mortgage indebtedness also appear to discourage new business formation. 
This effect is not completely clear, since increases in loans may reflect at 
least some households taking on a mortgage, or increasing their current 
one, in order to finance their business objectives, but it could also be that 
high leverage in the housing market reduces the ability of people to borrow 
additional money to support those objectives. To sum up, employment 
should increase in those countries where home ownership fuels growth in 
small business formation, but the loss of employment in larger industries 
needs to be taken into consideration. The net effect will be positive, 
especially in the more dynamic economies. 
ii) Unemployment 
A widely held, but also widely contested view is that labour mobility is 
lower for homeowners than for renters, because homeowners’ higher 
transaction costs lead to a disincentive to relocate to areas where jobs are 
more abundant. As a consequence, the housing market could be 
responsible for a mismatch between vacancies and the unemployed within 
a country, and also across nations. This mismatch could therefore be larger 
in countries with higher rates of home ownership.  
The findings of Horsewood and Dol indicate that, although there is 
some evidence that an economy with a high proportion of homeowners 
will have a higher unemployment rate, the main influence of the housing 
market appears to be through the stock of outstanding mortgages.9 It 
appears that when families take on large mortgages to finance dwellings, 
they are less mobile and the locations of their employment opportunities 
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Development of ICT will 
break the relationship between 
home and work. 
Those who own their home 
outright are more likely to 
retire early. 
are effectively restricted. While this may not be a problem when adults are 
in continuous employment, difficulties may arise when a household needs 
to relocate for employment reasons. In effect, homeowners with mortgages 
may be less able to respond to changing circumstances. Thus, countries 
where home ownership (with a mortgage) is the dominant form of tenure 
appear to experience higher unemployment for a given demand shock.  
Insofar as this is the case, it is an effect that may be modified by 
future trends in ‘remote working’. The development of ICT, for example 
through use of the internet, has broken the previous relationship for many 
organisations and workers between home and work. Much productive 
activity, especially in the service industries, 
is now undertaken at the home of the 
worker, so that daily travel to the 
employer’s premises is no longer necessary. 
Clearly, the greater the extent of such 
developments in technology and work practices, the less the location of the 
home will impact on the ability of the worker to get a job. 
iii) Retirement 
Although all countries have formal retirement ages at which entitlement to 
pensions can be taken up, in reality approximately half of European 
workers retire either early (i.e. before the formal retirement age) or late 
(after the formal retirement age), although with a marked skew towards 
early retirement. In recent years, governments have tried to reverse this 
trend and prolong working life by increasing the formal retirement age and 
creating both disincentives for early retirement and incentives for later 
retirement.  
The housing circumstances of workers appear to impact on their 
ability to act independently of government objectives. Dol and Horsewood 
show that compared with households who rent or own with an 
outstanding housing loan, those who own their home outright are more 
likely to retire early.10 A credible 
explanation is that those who own their own 
homes can effectively live rent-free and thus 
get by on a lower income, as well as 
sometimes having the opportunity to release 
equity – perhaps by moving down market – to create an income. 
Households with outstanding housing loans, in contrast, need a higher 
income in order to maintain repayments. 
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Consistent with this, labour market participation rates for 55-59 year 
olds and for 65-70 year olds are highest in those countries where there has 
been a high growth of mortgage debt. It is not clear from the analysis 
whether mortgage debt ties people into labour market participation, or 
whether access to mortgage finance is predicated on a decision to retire late 
anyway. Nevertheless, it leads to the conclusion that the objective of 
increasing labour supply by extending working life is dependent in part on 
developments in mortgage markets. 
4.4 The complexity of the relationships between the housing 
sector and labour markets poses difficult policy 
challenges  
i) Energy renovation 
Overall, there seems to be agreement that progress in realising energy-
efficiency goals set by the EU and its member states is lagging behind 
expectations. Policy-makers should act to ensure that this progress 
improves in the coming years. This raises questions over the desirability of 
energy-renovation targets themselves, but wider economic considerations 
are also important. Given the present economic conditions of high 
unemployment and low (even negative) GDP growth, energy-renovation 
measures offer a relatively low-cost way of expanding the demand for 
labour. While directly contributing to higher employment and lower social 
security expenditures, other potential economic benefits from energy-
conservation measures include improved health (and lower healthcare 
expenditures) and improved productivity. 
In order to achieve such goals, policy-makers will need to recognise 
and overcome the barriers to the expansion of energy renovation activity. 
Important here is the fact that expansion will require increased levels of 
investment, which will in turn require consideration of the balance between 
public and private investment. Insofar as investment will depend on the 
financial capacity of private owners, access to appropriate forms of loan 
financing will need to be developed. One way in which this could be 
achieved is through using housing finance markets, which would 
effectively allow owners to use existing equity in housing either directly or 
as collateral. This will require consideration not only of the supply of 
finance, therefore including the role of financial institutions, but also the 
demand from households. Here, the position of the growing number of 
older home-owning households is particularly important. As older people 
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Housing equity could serve 
as collateral for loans to 
enable a higher level of 
energy-renovation activity. 
may be less willing to invest when the pay-back period is long, it may be 
appropriate for policies to emphasise the fact that, in addition to reductions 
in energy bills, energy-saving measures tend to enhance the comfort of the 
living environment.  
There should also be an assessment of the existing ability of the 
public sector to draw up adequate legislation, codes and procedures, 
including regulation and stricter enforcement. Additionally, it is important 
to recognise that any increase in the amount of energy-renovation activity 
will, in many countries, come up against skills shortages. In some cases, 
these will arise because existing workers will need to enhance their skills to 
meet the new challenges imposed by energy renovation technologies, but 
new skill sets will also be needed to enable the undertaking of different 
jobs. 
ii) Mortgage markets 
In thinking about mortgage markets, macroeconomic outcomes – such as 
the contribution of housing finance to finance sectors in general – as well as 
the desirable levels of household debt need to be taken into account. 
Further, there are considerations about meeting the needs of those who 
want to purchase their homes. As these considerations affect the size of the 
mortgage sectors (as defined by their levels of new lending and 
outstanding loans), they also affect the number and type of jobs. It seems 
likely that the sectors will continue to be important in requiring highly 
skilled and highly paid workers. 
However, the considerations of the extent to which housing equity 
should be utilised in order to fund household consumption and investment 
are much more complex.  The large amount of housing equity – held in 
particular by older households, many of whom have paid off forward 
mortgages – could be utilised in order to 
meet important EU and member state 
agendas. Housing equity could, for example, 
provide the foundation for loans to enable a 
higher level of energy-renovation activity. 
Furthermore, it could contribute to the 
challenge of the fiscal requirements of meeting present social provision 
entitlements (on pensions and long-term care, for example) as these 
increase with the growing number of older people. 
Such developments would require consideration of whether 
subsidies and regulations that apply to established forward mortgage 
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systems are appropriate for reverse mortgages or other types of lending 
based on housing. For example, should tax relief on interest payments also 
apply to energy-renovation loans? Further, in some countries where 
reverse mortgages are currently not allowed, legal frameworks would need 
to be amended, and other barriers overcome. 
Alongside such activity and the related employment growth 
scenarios are regulatory issues. In the continuing aftermath of the 2007 
financial crisis, new regulatory architecture and requirements are being set 
up and implemented. Reducing risks for individual borrowers and lenders, 
and also economies, will require additional labour inputs to evaluate and 
monitor lending decisions. But the greater the labour input, the higher the 
cost passed onto consumers in the form of more expensive products, and 
the lower the demand. The regulatory regimes themselves will therefore 
influence the size of the market and the number and type of jobs.  
iii) Home ownership and labour supply 
Since 2007, there has been a reversal of the previous long-lasting trend of 
increasing levels of new mortgage activity in most member states. As net 
mortgage indebtedness appears to have a positive impact on the 
unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment via its influence on 
labour mobility, a key consideration is the extent to which mortgage 
markets will return to their former trajectory. Insofar as they do, and 
insofar as this increases the levels of household indebtedness tied to 
housing, this suggests that in the future home ownership will impose an 
even greater barrier to labour mobility than in the past and thus to the 
optimum matching of workers with jobs. 
The physical separation between the location of a worker’s residence 
and workplace is critical here. The development of cheaper and quicker 
means of physical transport has enabled longer commuting distances, 
while IT developments have increasingly enabled remote working 
practices. Both of these developments reduce the importance of moving 
home in order to relocate the place of work. One issue for governments will 
be the extent to which they encourage further investment in transport and 
IT infrastructure. 
Housing debt also appears to be an important factor in decisions over 
the timing of retirement. Outright home ownership may provide 
households with an investment that enables them to resist policy moves to 
encourage longer working lives – essentially, to facilitate early exit 
pathways. If it were thought desirable to counteract this effect, broad 
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strategies could include encouraging tenure structures which are less 
skewed towards home ownership, encouraging longer repayment periods 
for housing loans or re-mortgaging possibilities, and imposing taxes on the 
capital value or imputed rent of homes so that owners do not live rent-free. 
Finally, housing debt is important to new business formation. While 
housing equity has the potential to contribute to the financial basis for new 
businesses, high levels of housing debt contribute to a downward shift in 
new business formation. This may suggest that governments should act to 
reduce incentives to expand mortgage lending. And, insofar as mortgage 
lending may be diverted into small business formation and expansion, it 
would suggest that the appropriate response would be to promote lending 
to entrepreneurs. 
These notions provide further support for the actions of member state 
governments and their regulatory bodies in monitoring the build-up of net 
residential debt and considering the imposition of limits in relation to 
income. Such actions may include reconsidering inducements for 
households to maximise their mortgage debt and phasing out incentives 
such as mortgage interest tax relief, which still exist in some EU countries.  
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5. AGEING AND JOB GROWTH IN 
HEALTHCARE AND LONG-TERM CARE 
SERVICES 
ERIKA SCHULZ AND JOHANNES GEYER* 
ealth and social work are important sectors of the economy in all 
European countries, and have been highly dynamic in the past. In 
2011, some 23 million persons were employed in health and social 
work in Europe, with approximately 5 million new jobs created between 
2000 and 2011.1 The healthcare workforce also increased during the 
economic crisis despite the overall trend of declining employment. In the 
future, however, the supply of the health and long-term care workforce will 
be affected by ageing and societal change. Demographic ageing is also 
likely to influence the demand for health and social work. Elderly people 
are more likely to be sick and to suffer from multiple diseases (‘multi-
morbidity’). Consequently, they have more frequent consultations with 
different types of doctors, they are more likely to be hospitalised, and on 
average they stay in hospitals for longer periods of time. Furthermore, in 
the oldest age groups functional impairments as well as mental illnesses are 
common, and these people depend on help and care from others. Thus, a 
significant growth in the demand for acute health as well as long-term care 
services is expected. Can the expected increase in demand be met by the 
labour supply? 
                                                   
* Erika Schulz and Johannes Geyer: German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW), Berlin.  This chapter is based on the contributors’ own work for Germany 
and Denmark and the work of Stanisława Golinowska, Eva Kocot and Agnieszka 
Sowa (CASE) for Poland, Flavia Coda Moscarola (CeRP-CCA and University of 
Turin) for Italy, Marek Radvanský, Gabriela Dováľová, Ivan Lichner (Institute of 
Economic Research, Slovak Academy of Sciences) for Slovakia in Work Package 12 
(Health and long-term care for an ageing population) of the NEUJOBS project. 
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More than a quarter of 
health and care professionals 
will retire by 2025. 
The development of employment also depends on the institutional 
design of health and care systems, as well as public spending on health and 
long-term care services. Furthermore, demographic developments are 
being accompanied by changes in household composition and increasing 
female employment, with both trends expected to have different effects on 
curative healthcare and long-term care. Employment in long-term care 
depends strongly on the division of care tasks between members of the 
family and professional caregivers. Changes in household composition and 
family structures, as well as increasing female employment, will all have a 
greater impact on long-term care than on curative health care. We therefore 
distinguish between curative healthcare and long-term care activities.  
Detailed analyses are carried out for five countries with different 
health and care systems: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland and Slovakia. 
To summarise the main focus of this chapter, our research question is: 
What is the impact of the demographic transitions and the framework 
conditions on the demand for and supply of health professionals and the 
long-term care workforce in these countries?  
5.1 Health workforce: High shares of female, elderly and 
part-time employment 
The share of health and social work in total employment shows marked 
differences across the countries studied. In the comprehensive welfare state 
of Denmark, one out of every five workers is engaged in health and social 
work. The sector’s share amounts to 12% in Germany, while in Italy, 
Slovakia and Poland, the shares are between 6% and 7%, which are well 
below the EU average.2  
The health and social work workforce is characterised by 
disproportionally high shares of female, elderly and part-time 
employment. On average in Europe, one out of every six female workers is 
engaged in health and social work. In 2011, the elderly health workforce 
(aged 55+) amounted to 3.9 million in 
Europe. Taking into account also the health 
workers aged 50-54 (3.2 million), over 6 
million employees can be expected to exit the 
health and social-care market by 2025. The 
high share of the elderly in the health workforce is a challenge for all the 
countries studied. It is doubtful that the retiring employees will be replaced 
by graduates, trainees or workers from abroad entering the health 
84  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
workforce. Additionally, all of the countries studied reported some kind of 
healthcare workforce shortage, leading to unmet needs and long waiting 
times. The expected higher share of retiring health professionals, in 
particular practising physicians, will worsen the situation.  
Figure 5.1 Share of health workforce in total employment in 2000 and 2011 
 
Data sources: Eurostat and LFS; calculations by DIW Berlin. 
The ‘human health and social work’ sector consists of three sub-
sectors: human health care, residential care and social work without 
accommodation. The majority of the health workforce is engaged in acute 
healthcare activities (13.2 million in Europe in 2011), while 4.5 million are 
engaged in residential care and 4.9 million in social work activities. In the 
countries studied, the share of the various sub-sectors is influenced by the 
level of publicly provided social care. Residential care and social work are 
uncommon in Poland and Italy: in both countries, less than 1% of total 
employment is engaged in these sub-sectors, which is less than half of the 
EU average. In contrast, Denmark is an example of a welfare state model 
that gives high priority to residential care and social work. Around 12% of 
total employment is concentrated in these activities and ‘only’ around 7% 
in human health. When comparing the situation across countries, we have 
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to keep in mind national differences in the share of part-time employment. 
Part-time employment is uncommon in Slovakia (4%) and Poland (8%), 
while in Denmark and Germany the share of part-time employment is 25%. 
In healthcare activities, the share is even higher at 40% due to the high 
share of female employees. The share of part-time employment in Italy lies 
somewhere in-between.  
Figure 5.2 Share of subsectors in human health and social work (sector Q), 2011 
 
Data sources: Eurostat, LFS; calculations by DIW Berlin. 
All of the studied countries provide universal coverage of defined 
sets of healthcare services financed either by taxes (Denmark and Italy) or 
mandatory public health insurance (Germany, Poland and Slovakia) with 
co-payments for some services. Thus, changes in the demand caused by 
demographic change have a direct influence on employment in the sub-
sector of human health activities. This strict relationship does not exist in 
social work activities, in particular in long-term care services, due to a high 
share of privately provided and organised care. Thus, the impact of ageing 
and societal change on (formal) employment is analysed separately for 
human health and long-term care.  
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There is a strong age-
demand relationship in 
hospital services, but not in 
dental care. 
5.2 Healthcare services show a significant increase with age 
Quantifying the effect of demographic change on employment in human 
healthcare is a methodological challenge. We apply two different methods 
in order to forecast demand and supply: a utilisation approach for the 
demand side, and a top-down approach for the supply side. The utilisation 
approach builds on age-specific utilisation rates of all kinds of medical 
activities, such as hospital stays and length of stay, contacts with general 
practitioners, specialists and dentists, use of therapeutic services and use of 
pharmaceuticals or medical aids. If we assume constant age-specific 
utilisation rates, changes in the size and age structure of the population 
lead to changes in the demand for health services and have a direct impact 
on the workforce needed to meet this demand. 
We collected utilisation data for all of the countries studied for the 
main healthcare areas (i.e. hospital care, ambulatory care by general 
practitioners, specialists care and dental care). The utilisation data show the 
expected increase in demand with age for 
hospital activities and ambulatory healthcare 
services. In addition, we observe considerable 
variation across different treatments. A 
strong age-demand relationship can be 
observed for hospital treatments. The 
hospitalisation rate, as well as the average length of stay, increases with age 
with the exception of persons aged 95+.  
For primary care, mostly provided by general practitioners, the 
relationship is not as strong as for hospital care. In the case of dental care, 
which is largely privately financed, the number of consultations per person 
increases up to the age of 60 and declines afterwards.  
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Figure 5.3 Hospital cases per 100 populations by age group, 2010 
 
Data sources: Eurostat, hospital statistics; Statistics Denmark, calculations by DIW Berlin. 
Figure 5.4 Length of hospital stays of inpatients, 2010 
 
Data sources: Eurostat, hospital statistics and Statistics Denmark; calculations by DIW Berlin. 
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5.3 Changes in population are relevant to demand 
projections for the health workforce in 2025 
Demographic projections are based on the ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’ scenarios 
described in the introductory Chapter 1 (see also Table 5.1 below). The 
friendly scenario assumes higher economic growth, higher employment, 
higher shares of highly educated people and higher population growth 
compared with the tough scenario. The differences in the projected size and 
the age structure of the population, as well as in economic development 
and employment in these alternative futures, will lead to differences in the 
projected employment in health and social care in European countries.  
Table 5.1 Demographic changes and changes in health workforce demand between 
2010 and 2025 
 Demographic changes Changes in the demand for 
health workforce in 
 Population size 
(%) 
Share of 65+ 
(%-points) 
Hospitals (%) Offices of 
physicians and 
dentists (%) 
Total (%) 
 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly 
Denmark* 2.2 5.3 3.3 4.0 9.5 15.1 5.0 8.8 8.2 13.4 
Germany -8.0 -2.1 3.3 3.7 1.5 9.9 -4.2 1.8 -1.3 5.7 
Italy** 1.4 8.0 2.9 3.1 9.1 16.7 1.5 7.8 8.5 15.8 
Poland -5.2 0.0 6.2 6.7 0.7 7.7 -1.7 3.7 -0.1 6.4 
Slovakia*** -1.2 3.6 5.3 5.8 20.0 23.2 5.2 11.9 14.6 19.2 
* Only GPs and dentists. 
** Personnel of hospitals and specialists in ambulatories (no extraction of hospital staff 
possible); Offices of physicians only GP and paediatricians. 
*** Including an increase of hospital employment of around 4,900 between 2010 and 2011. 
Sources: Schulz (2013b); Schulz (2013c); Coda Moscarola (2013a); Golinowska et al. (2013a); 
Radvanský and Dováľová (2013). 
The purely demographic effect on the demand for healthcare services 
and its workforce is shown using constant utilisation rates as well as 
constant ratios of treated persons to employees. Both population size and 
population ageing have a significant influence on the demand for health 
services and its workforce. In particular, the demand for hospital 
employment will increase significantly in Denmark, Italy and Slovakia 
under both demographic scenarios. For Poland and Germany, a moderate 
increase under the tough scenario and a significant increase under the 
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The healthcare labour-
market gap is expected to 
grow until 2025. 
friendly scenario can be observed. The ageing process also dominates this 
development in countries with a decline in population size (Germany in 
both scenarios; Poland and Slovakia in the tough scenario). 
The increase in the ambulatory healthcare workforce is lower than the 
increase in hospital employment. In fact, due to the shrinking population in 
the tough scenario, a decline in the ambulatory health workforce is 
estimated for Germany and Poland. For ambulatory care, the ageing 
process is less important. In view of the development in total health 
workforce demand, the analysed countries can be classified into two 
groups: a group with a relatively strong increase under both demographic 
scenarios (Denmark, Italy and Slovakia), and a group with a decline in 
demand under the tough scenario and a moderate increase under the 
friendly scenario (Germany and Poland). Despite the demographic 
development, the total effect depends on the different divisions of 
healthcare tasks between hospitals and ambulatory facilities across the 
countries. The share of hospital employment in Slovakia, for example, is 
well above the EU average. 
The crucial question is whether and how the increasing demand of 
the healthcare workforce can be accommodated.3 The results of the tough 
scenario indicate that the demand for health 
services exceeds the health workforce supply in 
all countries except Poland, with the expected 
gap between demand and supply particularly 
large in Italy. The gaps are considerably lower 
under the friendly scenario in Denmark, Germany and Slovakia, but the 
situation in Italy is still expected to worsen.  
Figure 5.5 Changes in healthcare workforce demand and supply between 2010 and 
2025 (%) 
   
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin based on the employment projections of the NEMESIS 
model and on the estimations of country-specific variations in the demand for health 
personnel by experts (Schulz et al., 2013). 
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5.4 The healthcare market is driven by a number of factors 
other than population 
In addition to demographic change, the demand for the health workforce is 
influenced by a number of other factors. The healthcare market is highly 
regulated in all European countries. Policy interventions influencing 
demand and supply in this market are very common and are driven in 
particular by concerns about the sustainability of public finances. Other 
factors relevant to healthcare demand include changes in morbidity, 
technological innovations in medicine, changes in treatment methods, and 
changes in the organisation of care services. The health status of the 
population and the demand for healthcare services may also be influenced 
by the framework conditions of the scenarios discussed in Chapter 1. A 
transition away from fossil fuels towards solar and other low-carbon 
energy sources is expected to have an impact on climate change in terms of 
global warming and weather extremes. A reduction in the otherwise 
expected increases in heat waves, floods, droughts, storms and air 
pollution would have a positive influence on public health. Thus, under the 
friendly scenario (ceteris paribus), the demand for health services may be 
lower than under the tough scenario. Although it is not possible to quantify 
this effect, studies show that technological innovations in medicine in 
particular have a significant influence on health expenditure.4 Furthermore, 
medical and pharmaceutical innovations allow the treatment of persons 
who could not be treated before, creating additional demand. Additionally, 
scientific progress may increase the possibility of detecting serious illnesses 
earlier and thus increase the chance of avoiding death. However, these 
effects could not be quantified either and cannot be taken into account. 
Moreover, studies show that nearness to death has a greater influence 
on healthcare expenditure than age.5 This can be partly traced back to the 
use of costly treatment methods in the last few months of life. Thus, the 
effect of nearness to death on demand is not as strong as for health 
expenditures. The increase in life expectancy may lead to a shift of health-
service demand to older persons, but no changes in age-specific morbidity 
are taken into account.  
5.5 Long-term elderly care is still predominantly provided 
by family members 
In contrast to the workforce in healthcare, the long-term care workforce 
consists of both formal employees and informal caregivers. Traditionally, 
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In Denmark, all people in need 
can receive formal long-term care, 
whereas publicly financed long-
term care services are virtually 
non-existent in Poland. 
elderly care has been predominantly a task for the family in almost all 
European countries. In particular, spouses, daughters, daughters-in-law 
and other family members take over 
care tasks. However, the increase in 
female labour force participation, as well 
as the changes in household 
composition with more people living 
alone, reduces the ability of families to 
provide a large amount of care. The 
increase in the number of elderly, in particular the very oldest, intensified 
the discussion about adequate (publicly financed) provision of formal care. 
Today, some kind of formal long-term care (LTC) is available in the 
majority of European countries, either in nursing homes or at home 
through home-care services. Additionally, some countries provide cash 
benefits to support informal care by family members (Germany and 
Slovakia) or to partly compensate for extra costs due to disability (Italy). 
The amount and type of LTC services provided depend on the LTC system, 
which differs markedly across countries. In some countries no LTC system 
exists, and the care tasks are divided between social assistance and 
healthcare services (Poland and Slovakia). Additionally, in some countries 
no strict separation between LTC and assistance for disabled persons exists, 
meaning a clear assignment of care personnel is not possible. Both the 
amount of formal care services provided and the division of tasks influence 
the size and occupational structure of the LTC workforce. 
The number of workers engaged in LTC can only be estimated. 
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), across the five studied 
countries around 0.7 million were employed in nursing homes in 2010 and 
0.5 million in social work activities without accommodation for the elderly 
and disabled. The majority of employees are nurses, nursing assistants or 
personal care workers (social-care workers). This is only a raw indicator of 
employment in services for the elderly, because not all persons engaged in 
social work activities for the elderly are employed in LTC activities, and 
other social work activities can utilise LTC personnel as well. Based on 
information from national statistics from 2010-11, it is estimated that 
around 1.5 million employees were engaged in LTC activities in the five 
studied countries: 952,000 in Germany, 334,000 in Italy, 140,000 in 
Denmark, 72,000 in Poland and 25,000 in Slovakia.  
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Table 5.2 Dependent people and informal and formal care  
  Share of formal care 
recipients 
Share of persons relying on 
 Number of 
dependent 
persons 
At 
home 
 In 
institutions 
Informal, 
private 
financed 
or no care 
Informal 
care 
 No care or 
private 
financed 
help 
 2010 2010  2010 2010 2006  2010 
 In 1,000s In %  In % In % In %  In % 
Denmarka 371 34.6  11.9 (53.5) 5.0  (48.5) 
Germany 7847 21.4  9.6 69.0 41.5  27.5 
Italy 3143 19.0  12.3 68.7 128.4 ** 0.0 
Poland 2490 0.1 * 3.5 96.4 48.8  47.6 
Slovakia 475 17.6  7.0 75.4 12.0 *** 63.4 
Total 14326 17.4  9.1 73.5 59.9  26.7 
a Formal care recipients are persons receiving elderly care and care for the handicapped, 
while the dependent include also young persons, thus formal care is underestimated. 
* 2006; ** 2003; *** 2010. 
Sources: Eurostat, EU SILC; OECD Health Data; calculations by DIW Berlin. 
Apart from in Slovakia, information on the number of informal 
caregivers is rare. According to the data collected by the OECD, which are 
based on national surveys, the number of informal caregivers amounts to 
8.6 million in the five countries studied: 4 million in Italy, 3.3 million in 
Germany, 1.2 million in Poland, 57,000 in Slovakia and 19,000 in Denmark. 
These estimates have to be interpreted with caution because the data 
sources are different and not fully comparable. For example, in Italy the 
number of informal caregivers comprises all types of help and personal 
care provided by the family, while in Germany only the main caregiver is 
accounted for. 
The data are used to show the importance of formal and informal 
care by comparing the number of recipients of formal and informal care 
with the total number of people in need of care. Based on the EU SILC 
(Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) survey, we classified “people 
in need of care” as persons reporting severe impairments to activities they 
usually do due to long-standing illnesses (of more than six months). The 
share of dependent people increases sharply with age (from age 55 
onwards). In total, 14.3 million people were in need of care in the five 
countries in 2010. A comparison of dependent persons and people 
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receiving formal care shows that the majority either rely on informal or 
privately financed care, or receive no care. Dependent people receiving no 
care may cope with their situation by themselves using new technologies, 
privately financed helpers, and/or measures to adapt their homes to their 
needs. But they may also receive help and care from their partner, which is 
usually not considered ‘informal help and care’ and instead is taken as a 
matter of course. Thus, receiving ‘no care’ does not necessarily mean that 
there is no active help within the household.  
5.6 The number of individuals ‘in need of care’ will 
significantly grow up to 2025 
What are the effects of population ageing and societal changes on the 
formal LTC workforce? Answering this question requires estimations of the 
change in the number of dependent people, changes in the potential for 
informal caregiving and the availability of formal-care services. Our 
forecasting model takes into account changes in the number of dependent 
people and the potential of available informal care. We assume no changes 
in LTC systems or available care services.  
As the risk of multi-morbidity, impairments to daily living and 
mental illness increases strongly with age, the ageing process dominates 
the development of dependent people in the steady-state scenario. The 
number of dependent people is expected to increase significantly, although 
the trend shows remarkable variation across the countries studied. 
Figure 5.6 Changes in dependent persons between 2010 and 2025 (%) 
   
Data sources: Huismann et al. (2013) and EU SILC; calculations by DIW Berlin. 
Growth is lowest in Denmark and highest in Slovakia. In total, the 
number of dependent people is expected to increase by 1.24 million under 
the tough scenario and by 2.5 million under the friendly scenario. In all 
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The increase in the number of 
people in need of care is six 
times higher in Slovakia than 
in Denmark. 
countries the changes are markedly higher among the oldest people. In the 
tough (friendly) scenario the increase in dependent people aged 75+ ranges 
from 14% (33%) in Poland to 32% (50%) in Denmark. The driving factor is 
the increase in life expectancy for both males and females.  
The relationship between changes in life expectancy and morbidity 
(poor health status due to acute healthcare problems or long-standing 
illnesses) has been extensively discussed in the last few decades. Three 
theories have been developed – the compression of morbidity, the 
expansion of morbidity and the dynamic equilibrium – but no consensus 
has been reached. Additionally, changes in morbidity do not directly 
influence functional impairments and therefore the ‘need for care’. Mental 
illnesses are the exception, but there is no indication that new medical 
treatments will lead to a decline in their prevalence or incidence in the near 
future. Therefore no changes in age-specific need for care are assumed. 
5.7 Increase in partner care expected 
The future number of informal caregivers will be influenced by two trends: 
first, changes in living arrangements with more singles in the middle-age 
groups and an increase in the very oldest living together due to the increase 
in life expectancy; and second, the increase in female labour-force 
participation reducing the possibilities for providing intensive informal 
care to elderly relatives.  
Informal care is mostly provided by members of the family living 
within or outside the household of the dependent. Informal caregiving is 
more likely within the household (mostly partner care) than outside the 
household (mostly caregiving by children). Thus, the expected changes in 
living arrangements reduce the potential of informal caregivers. However, 
our analysis based on the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (also 
known as SHARE data) shows that the 
number of informal caregivers aged 50+ 
increases significantly in all of the studied 
countries under both demographic 
scenarios. 
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Figure 5.7 Changes in informal caregivers between 2010 and 2025 (%) 
   
Data sources: Huismann et al. (2013); SHARE wave 1, 2 and 4, weighted and pooled data; 
Radvanský and Lichner (2013) (data for Slovakia); calculations by DIW Berlin. 
A large group of informal caregivers is made up of working-age 
females (aged 40-69). As caregiving is often a physically and mentally 
demanding full-time job, the impact of caregiving on the labour-force 
participation of women has dominated the political debate on this issue 
over the last two decades. Empirical studies show that the impact of the 
need for caregiving on labour-force participation depends on various 
factors: the intensity of caregiving, the availability of LTC services, 
measures supporting informal carers to combine care tasks with formal 
employment and the situation in the labour market. In Slovakia, Denmark 
and Poland, no effect of caregiving on labour-force participation can be 
observed. In Denmark this is due to the generous social assistance system, 
while in Poland and Slovakia it is due to poorly developed formal care 
services. In Germany, the effect depends mainly on the intensity of the 
caregiving needed. Due to data restrictions, this could not be taken into 
account. Italy is the only country where caregiving has a negative effect on 
labour-force participation.6  
5.8 The gap in the formal long-term care market will widen 
up to 2025 
Depending on the LTC system, people in need of care receive a mix of 
informal and formal care services. The change in the number of formal-care 
recipients is calculated using constant age-specific utilisation rates for home 
care, nursing home care and cash benefits. Under the tough scenario, the 
number of residents in nursing homes and the recipients of home-care 
services will increase by 260,000 each. Under the friendly scenario, the 
increase in the number of formal care recipients is even higher: 513,000 in 
institutional care and 488,000 in home care. The increase is greater in 
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The growth in life expectancy 
leads to more couples growing 
old together, so the probability 
of caring by partners increases. 
institutional care than in home care in Denmark and Germany, while home 
care grows more in Poland. A high proportion of care recipients receive 
cash benefits for self-organised informal 
care in Germany, and care allowances 
directed to persons caring for them in 
Slovakia. The number of recipients of cash 
benefits increases to a lesser extent than 
the number of recipients of benefits in 
kind. In Italy, most severely disabled people receive a universal cash 
benefit to cope with care expenditures; around 498,000 people received this 
type of benefit in 2010.7 
Figure 5.8 Change in recipients of formal long-term care in kind and in cash 
between 2010 and 2025 (%)  
    
Data sources: Schulz (2013d), Coda Moscarola (2013b), Golinowska et al. (2013b) and 
Radvanský and Lichner (2013); calculations by DIW Berlin. 
The growing number of formal-care recipients requires additional 
staff to carry out the necessary tasks. The number of personnel needed can 
be calculated using constant ratios of recipients to staff employed in 
institutional care and home care. The underlying assumption is that the 
current number of staff engaged in nursing care activities is adequate, i.e. 
no shortage of staff exists. In Denmark, an additional 24,000 (under the 
tough scenario) or 45,000 (friendly) personnel are required to meet the 
increasing demand; the majority of staff required are social and health 
workers or assistants. In Germany, around 165,000 (tough) or 366,000 
(friendly) personnel are required; the majority are geriatric nurses, nurses 
and nursing assistants. In Poland, 11,000 (tough) or 20,000 (friendly) 
additional personnel are required, and in Slovakia the number is 6,000 
(tough) or 8,000 (friendly). In Italy, the demand for residential-care 
personnel is expected to increase by 53,000 (tough) or 86,000 (friendly). In 
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Italy, currently 800,000 additional privately financed caregivers are 
employed, supported by the universal cash benefit for the disabled. 
However, a great proportion of them are employed illegally.8 
Although an increase in the workforce supply in residential care and 
social work is expected in Denmark, Poland, Slovakia and (under the 
friendly scenario) Germany, the gap in the nursing and care market will 
widen. In Italy, a decline in the care workforce under both scenarios is 
expected, while the demand for the formal workforce is estimated to 
increase in line with the development of dependent people by around 19% 
(tough) or 31% (friendly). The demand side for the care workforce is also 
more dynamic than the supply side in the other countries studied. 
Table 5.3 Changes in the demand and supply of nursing and caring personnel 
between 2010 and 2025 (%) 
 Tough scenario Friendly scenario 
 Demand* Supply** Demand* Supply** 
Denmark 17.1% 6.6% 32.6% 12.9% 
Germany 17.3% -2.7% 38.5% 20.9% 
Italy*** 18.7% -17.7% 31.2% -0.3% 
Poland 15.8% 9.9% 28.1% 28.1% 
Slovakia 21.8% 0.9% 30.6% 18.8% 
* Demand for formal long-term care workforce based on national statistics. 
** Results of the NEMESIS model for the sector non-market services; Germany for 
residential care and social work. 
*** Change in dependent people as a proxy for formal labour demand. 
Sources: Boitier et al. (2013); Schulz (2013d); Coda Moscarola (2013b); Golinowska et al. 
(2013b); Radvanský and Lichner (2013); Schulz and Geyer (2013); calculations by DIW Berlin. 
Although an increase in the workforce supply in residential care and 
social work is expected (except in Italy), the gap in the nursing and care 
market will widen. The situation will worsen in particular in Italy. These 
results have to be interpreted with caution because the supply side is based 
on the results of the NEMESIS model that provides estimates of changes in 
employment in the broad ‘non-market services’ (Denmark, Italy, Poland 
and Slovakia) and ‘residential care and social work’ (Germany) sectors 
(Boitier et al., 2013). The changes in nursing and caring activities may be 
higher than the average change. Nevertheless, the huge difference between 
the estimated demand and supply indicates the expected imbalances in the 
care market.  
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5.9 Finding a balance between family and formal care is a 
major challenge 
What can be done to reduce the gap between demand and supply in the 
long-term care markets? 
Three areas of activity to meet the future care demand are discussed 
in public policy circles: 
a) Measures to increase the potential of informal care  
Informal caregivers are expected to remain the main care workforce 
in the future. Several strategies are discussed to support informal 
caregivers and to encourage more people to take over informal care 
or to increase their caregiving engagement, including care leave, 
financial support to family carers, training, counselling, flexible 
working time arrangements for carers, ICT to reduce the caregiving 
burden and support from professional caregivers. 
b) Recruitment of long-term care workers from abroad 
Measures to support the recruitment of foreign qualified nurses and 
carers include simplified recognition of vocational training 
certificates from abroad, free language courses, help with finding 
affordable housing, help with administration tasks and equal wages. 
c) Measures to increase the domestic long-term care workforce 
Employees in long-term care facilities experience unfavourable 
working conditions, such as working night-time shifts, high time 
pressures, low competences, low salaries and a low image of nursing 
professions.9 The improvement of working conditions is a high 
priority for the recruitment and retention strategies of nursing homes 
and home-care services. Relevant measures include an increase in 
wages, an increase in flexible working-time arrangements, an increase 
in the standing of nursing and caring professions, changes in the 
requirements for vocational training (substitution of formal training 
by training on the job), an increase in competences and the 
reorganisation of caring tasks and a reduction in formal 
documentation tasks. 
The future development of the formal-care workforce depends not 
least on the financial resources of the communities that are responsible for 
social care provision and national and regional politics with regards to 
LTC. To cope with the ageing population, politicians assign a high priority 
to measures supporting family caregivers and measures to provide formal 
care that is supplementary or complementary to family care.  
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Notes 
1 European Commission (2012). 
2 ”EU” always means EU27. 
3 To answer this question, the estimated changes in workforce demand are 
compared to the projections of future changes in employment differentiated by 
sectors under the friendly and tough scenarios (Boitier et al., 2013.). 
4 See, for example, Breyer and Ulrich (2000). 
5 See, for example, Zweifel et al. (1999). 
6 This is taken into account by the national expert in calculating the changes in 
informal caregivers. 
7 Coda Moscarola (2013b). 
8 Coda Moscarola (2013b). 
9 Colombo et al. (2011). 
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6. TWO FACES OF AGEING: OLDER 
WORKERS AND OLDER CONSUMERS 
ANNA RUZIK-SIERDZIÑSKA AND MAREK 
RADVANSKÝ* 
ue to lower fertility and longer life expectancy, today a larger share 
of the population than ever before is over 50 years of age. 
Demographic projections by Eurostat show that the share of people 
between the ages of 50 and 74 of the population aged 20-74 will increase in 
the EU27 countries from the current 40% to 47% by 2050. As a result, older 
people represent an increasing share of employment. This is not only a fact 
but also a necessity: the predicted shrinking of the European labour force 
requires workers to be productive and active for a longer.1 Another, less 
discussed consequence of ageing is that it might change the composition of 
household consumption in Europe, but it is unclear yet in what ways. 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to possibilities for labour 
market adaptation to the ageing process, especially possibilities for workers 
to stay economically active and productive for longer. It would appear to 
be easier for older people to work longer when they are relatively healthy 
and live longer, but there is no strong link between life expectancy and 
working life. Recent public system pension reforms have reduced expected 
replacement rates at lower ages and increased retirement ages. Will such 
changes be enough to induce people to work longer and make employers 
want to retain them? The answer is not obvious. 
                                                   
* Anna Ruzik-Sierdziñska: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research and 
Warsaw School of Economics; Marek Radvanský: Institute of Economic Research, 
Slovak Academy of Sciences. This chapter was compiled on the basis of research 
conducted within NEUJOBS Work Package Nos. 12 and 17 by a broad team of 
experts. 
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Working longer is also important for the level of future pensions. 
Old-age income should be high enough (or 'adequate') to prevent poverty 
and allow for a satisfactory level of consumption by future retirees. 
Pensioners in developed countries are relatively well protected against 
poverty today. The reduction of old-age poverty in OECD countries to 
12.8% in 2010 (lower than for the younger population) is an achievement.2 
Recent or planned changes to pension systems usually include a stronger 
link between the level of old-age benefits and contributions paid or age of 
retirement. This makes some groups more vulnerable to the risk of poverty 
in future, such as women with shorter average tenure than men (see also 
Chapter 7 of this volume). 
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the influence of ageing 
on the structure of consumption and its effect on employment in specific 
economic sectors. Changes in both household consumption and the 
structure of consumption should be the driving forces behind what is often 
referred to as the ‘silver economy’. This term refers to the set of economic 
activities linked to the production of goods and services targeted at the 
elderly. This segment of the economy is expected to grow significantly 
because of the ageing of the population. The aim of this section is to 
provide relevant information on the nature of the expected growth based 
on changes in private consumption and its possible effects on European 
labour markets. 
6.1 Transition from work to retirement varies between 
countries  
The future size and quality of the European labour force are important to 
economic growth in the region. Countries differ in terms of elderly 
activities and only part of life is spent in labour market activity (see Figure 
6.1). Earlier or later retirement is related to various social, health and 
economic factors, including social security systems and labour market 
institutions. As demographic ageing is expected to continue, it is important 
to know more about all of these factors in order to answer important 
questions: What efficient policy measures could avoid early retirement, 
which increases the costs of the pension system and the risk of poverty at 
old age? What can be done in the short term and in the long term? Are the 
‘recipes’ the same for all European countries? 
104  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
Health or disability are 
significant to retirement in 
all countries; other factors 
have different effects 
depending on the country. 
Figure 6.1 Duration of working life and life expectancy in European countries, 
2012 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
When we look at employment rates at 50+ years of age and the 
average employment length in a life cycle, European countries can be 
divided into four groups.3 In the group with 
high rates of employment at 50+ and a long 
working life (‘high-long’ countries) we find 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Estonia, Iceland 
and the UK. The countries where 
employment after 50 is low and average 
working careers are short (‘low-short’) are Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Poland. The two other groups are ‘high-short’ (with 
Austria, France, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria) and ‘low-long’ 
(Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Lithuania, Romania). Differences 
in retirement preferences of workers across countries are driven mostly by 
differences in labour market institutions and social security systems. 
Whereas the impact of health and disability on retirement is similar in all 
countries examined, institutional factors – such as benefit systems, taxes, 
labour market legislation, education and the availability of training or 
active labour market policies – create different (dis)incentives to work in 
different countries.4 
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Recent research demonstrates that around 79% of men and 81% of 
women receiving pensions in 2006 were working just before retirement, 
5.4% of men and 4.8% of women were unemployed, and 8.7% of men and 
7.6% women retired from a state of long-term sickness or disability.5 The 
share of those who retire directly from work increases with age. In the 
youngest age group (aged 50 to 54), almost 19% declared that they retired 
from a status other than work, unemployment or disability. This implies 
that there are fewer and fewer disincentives to work until old age provided 
by the social security systems and labour market institutions in European 
countries. But what are the other determinants of the transition from work 
to retirement?  
The sector of employment surely plays a role. Working in a ‘green 
job’ decreases the likelihood of wanting to stay employed longer in 
countries that have high employment rates at older ages but short average 
professional careers. This could be explained by the fact that ‘green jobs’ 
are usually physically demanding. Moving from physically demanding to 
intellectually demanding work environments could lead people to remain 
active in the labour market for longer in the future. This would not 
necessarily require a change in the structure of the economy, but rather the 
introduction of some improvements in existing sectors. For example, it has 
also been found that workers in agriculture plan to retire earlier in central 
and eastern Europe, which may reflect different working conditions. Also 
those employed in social or personal services plan to retire later in rich 
western Europe.6 
Respondents’ opinions on what would make retirees work longer (i.e. 
postpone their decision to stop working) show that flexible working time 
would be an advantage, and slightly less important would be better safety 
at the workplace. Only 5.6% of men and 5.5% of women think that more 
opportunities to update their skills would delay their retirement. The share 
of people saying that they would work longer with some prerequisites is 
higher among early retirees (see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1 Contributing factors to staying in work longer (persons not working and 
with an individual retirement pension) 
 More flexible  
working time 
More opportunities  
to update skills 
Better health /  
safety at workplace 
Sex    
Men 10.5% 5.6% 10.9% 
Women 10.1% 5.5% 9.6% 
Age    
50-54 20.3% 13.8% 20.3% 
55-59 13.9% 7.9% 13.8% 
60-64 10.2% 5.1% 9.6% 
65-69 7.7% 3.9% 7.8% 
Total - N 11 119 6 035 10 979 
Note: Percentages of persons in the study group who answered “yes”, i.e. they assume that 
the respective factor would have contributed to the person staying in work for longer.  
Source: Riedel and Hofer (2013); calculations based on Ad Hoc Module of LFS 2006.  
These findings allow certain policy conclusions. As health status and 
disability are important in all countries, public support should be used to 
address the social and physical health issues of older persons and to 
promote prevention and healthy lifestyles at younger ages. Activities 
promoting health and preventive activities (e.g. screening for the most 
prevalent chronic diseases after 50 years of age) could therefore be 
beneficial in terms of longer economic activity. 
6.2 The labour market and other activities are not substitutes 
in countries with high employment of older workers 
What do workers do after the end of their working life? Different types of 
activities at older ages can be substitutes for paid work, but some are 
chosen more often by older people in countries with higher labour-force 
participation at older ages.  On average, older adults in Europe are rather 
active in non-labour market activities outside the household, despite the 
decline in societal cohesion and the increasing fragmentation of society. 
Izabela Styczyńska et al. analysed older people’s engagement in social 
activities through declared participation in leisure activities, changes in 
participation in religious services and voting behaviour.7 
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Engagement of older people 
in social life is higher in 
countries with high 
employment rates at 50+. 
Leisure activities can be those shared with other people or solitary 
activities such as watching television or listening to the radio. Activities 
performed at home, such as watching television and listening to the radio, 
were the most popular way of spending leisure time for older people in 
Europe. The least commonly reported activity in this group is use of the 
internet. 
Research found that social activity can be treated as a substitute for 
labour market activity in low-employment clusters, but not in high-
employment clusters. This shows that labour market inactivity in low-
employment countries does not necessarily lead to social exclusion but can 
be replaced by other types of social engagement, and people who engage in 
more social activities have a weaker preference for paid work at an older 
age. 
In countries where the employment rate at older ages is high, older 
people’s level of engagement in meeting with friends is also higher. 
Furthermore, higher economic activity is found in countries where people 
claim to be happiest.  
Participation in religious services and meetings is another way in 
which people engage with their communities. This was measured as either 
active participation in religious services or the declaration of belonging to a 
particular religion. The majority of people 
indicate that they are associated with a 
particular religion. However, attendance of 
religious services is much less common. In 
clusters of countries with low employment 
rates at older ages, attendance of religious 
services is higher but decreases with time in all countries, confirming the 
hypothesis that the elderly are also participating in the ongoing 
secularisation of society.8 
The type of welfare regime could provide us with a framework for 
thinking about the relationship between the socio-ecological transition 
(SET) and elderly activity and wellbeing. Nordic countries have extensive 
institutional support for the elderly or families with children, while in 
southern European countries the majority of social services are provided 
and financed by family members. Thus, a one-size-fits-all policy addressed 
at increasing the participation of the elderly in social and economic lives 
might not be efficient due to various constraints on decision-making. These 
findings support the policy recommendations of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), which emphasises the need to “increase the number 
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A decrease in the employment 
rate after fulfilling requirements 
for retirement can hardly be 
attributed to falling personal 
productivity or earnings ability. 
of people participating actively as they age in the social, cultural, economic 
and political aspects of society in paid and unpaid roles and in domestic, 
family and community life” in order to improve their quality of life and 
wellbeing.9  
6.3 Productivity does not have to decrease with age 
Does productivity increase or decrease with age? The answer to this 
question is not as easy as intuition might suggest, and in fact the 
relationship between age and productivity is still not clear. Some studies 
underline that a small decline in physical and mental abilities from age 50 
is gradual and heterogenic (i.e. differs between people).10 Other functions 
remain unchanged or improve with age, and deterioration in abilities can 
also be moderated by lifestyle factors. Another issue is whether wages are a 
good approximation of productivity (as assumed in the classical model of 
the labour market) or whether they exceed productivity at older age. 
Assuming that earnings can approximate productivity (at least in 
certain occupations), are age-earnings profiles observed in the data linked 
to individual and employment characteristics, lifelong learning and labour 
market institutions? Researchers tried to answer this question by analysing 
how individual productivity changes with age in different countries and 
whether lifelong learning can contribute 
to higher labour productivity in the 
future.11 They found that age-earning 
profiles are partially explained by the 
structure of the workforce (age, 
education) and the sector/occupation of 
employment. The dynamics of earnings 
after the age of 50 differ less across educational and occupational groups 
than for younger employees. Under the assumption that wages are a good 
approximation of productivity, different structures of economies mean that 
the effect of ageing on productivity will not be homogenous across 
countries.  
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The impact of ageing on 
productivity could be 
mitigated with adult training 
and lifelong learning.  
Table 6.2 Projected age of maximum monthly earnings (expected turning point of 
the age-earning profile) in Poland, France and Spain  
   Type of profession Sector of employment 
 2002 2006 ISCO 1-4 ISCO 5-9 Industry and 
manufacturing 
Market 
services 
Non-
market 
services 
Poland 62 59 68 46 56 48 90 
France 60 62 63 50 59 60 113 
Spain 58 60 63 64 65 57 55 
Note: Based on estimated age-earning profiles. 
Source: Ruzik-Sierdzinska et al. (2013); calculations based on the Structure of Earnings 
Survey.  
The example above shows that countries can have similar age-
earning profiles but when employees are divided into groups, the picture 
becomes more interesting. In more intellectually demanding occupations 
(ISCO 1-4) wages increase until retirement, while in more manual 
occupations (ISCO 5-9) they start decreasing even as early as at 46 years of 
age. This creates an incentive for people engaged in non-manual tasks to 
work for longer, thus driving the earnings profile up. At the same time, 
lower-paid individuals leave the labour market prematurely – a 
phenomenon that is stronger in countries with younger eligibility for 
retirement and higher replacement rates. However, sudden falls in 
employment rates when people become eligible for retirement benefits do 
not imply a loss of ability to perform work-related tasks. The retirement 
age thus seems to artificially shorten the working life of individuals. 
Furthermore, ageing-related declines in productivity could be 
delayed or prevented by investments in adult training and learning for 
firms and workers. The estimation of the impact of participation in lifelong 
learning (LLL) on the earnings of employees aged 50+ shows a possible 
increase in wages, even as high as 6.5%. 
Estimated increases are higher in continental 
and southern countries than in northern 
countries. In line with previous studies, there 
is a negative correlation between the 
incidence of and returns to training for older 
workers. Furthermore, participation in training (in the previous month or 
year) is higher among females than males, declines with age and increases 
with the level of educational attainment.12 
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Age-earning profiles in some occupations and countries depend on 
the tenure at an employer. Preliminary results of the study using the 
SHARELIFE dataset point out to a bipolar distribution of tenure in life.13 
Some employees may work for about 20 years at one employer and others 
for about 40 years; some change jobs less often, some more often. In 
countries where people retire at higher ages, there are more frequent 
changes and shorter tenures at one firm. If this result is confirmed by other 
studies, effective policies should be focused on moving people from one 
group to another and identifying an effective instrument for this move. 
Figure 6.2 Average duration of a job among people with a minimum of 30 years of 
work experience 
 
Source: Calculations by Lis and Potoczna in Ruzik-Sierdzińska et al. (2013), based on 
SHARELIFE data. 
Complex but successful policy measures have been applied in 
countries with high employment rates among people aged 50+. Some 
examples of these include the introduction of incentives to postpone 
retirement by easing the wage loss associated with job changes (between 
sectors with no seniority-based compensation system) and support for 
lifelong learning. Thus, having comprehensive and appropriate policies in 
place is necessary to cope with the future ageing of the workforce. 
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Promoting longer working 
lives can be a natural 
strategy for organisations 
when the workforce is older 
and smaller in number.  
6.4 Employers and working environment play an important 
role in retirement decisions 
A discussion of longer working lives cannot be considered complete 
without raising the questions of how organisations deal with the 
phenomenon and which human resource policies are best designed for and 
applied to older workers.  The factors that determine human resource 
practices in a company include: i) the organisation’s characteristics; ii) job 
requirements within the organisation; and iii) management restrictions in 
dealing with older workers.14  
In addition to the industry in which organisations operate, one of the 
important organisational characteristics is the number of older employees 
working within an organisation. A study shows that the higher the share of 
older workers, the more likely the company is to actively accommodate the 
needs of older workers.15 Second, job requirements depend on the 
importance of firm-specific versus general knowledge for the organisation's 
competitiveness. Older workers will have an advantage when firm-specific 
knowledge is important. As a result, the company will try to invest in these 
workers and create disincentives for early retirement. Finally, the ability of 
management to enhance the productivity of older workers might be 
constrained by institutional factors, such as the strength of unions. 
It also explains that firms organise their personnel policies in relation 
to older workers according to three strategies:16  
 a focus on exit through retirement; 
 accommodation, i.e. actions and measures to compensate for the 
possible decline in physical and cognitive capacities with ageing; and  
 development, i.e. measures to increase the productive capacity of 
older workers. 
Employers have a bias towards using exit strategies, possibly 
particularly during recession times, with large differences across countries. 
Only 20% of employers in six countries analysed (Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) use at least one measure from 
each of the three age-based strategies. 
Therefore, the majority of European 
employers do not engage in human resource 
strategies that promote active ageing in the 
labour market. But the higher the proportion 
of older workers in organisations, the more 
likely those organisations are to employ 
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strategies of exit, development or accommodation. The same has been 
found in organisations using more seniority-based compensation, as they 
have a higher level of labour union involvement and require more training. 
Public-sector organisations are more age conscious in their HR strategies 
than private sector firms. It was not possible to examine changes over time 
on the cross-sectional database, but some previous studies show that 
employers’ behaviour and attitudes are gradually improving. 
A focus should be placed on improving employers’ attitudes and HR 
policies by promoting the concept of ‘active ageing’, following the example 
of organisations that already today have a high percentage of older 
workers and therefore have elaborated various strategies of age 
management. However, employers usually tend to opt for exit strategies, 
such as using the possibility of early retirement. This is especially easy 
when labour market institutions and social security systems do not prevent 
such behaviour. Choosing exit strategies can be a hangover from earlier 
times when social security systems were often treated as tools for HR 
management, especially under unfavourable economic conditions. 
The business cycle matters for employment policies. In times of 
economic decline, publicly co-financed investments for training older 
workers could be more important than forcing employers not to use exit 
strategies. Observations of past behaviour of firms suggest that promoting 
longer working lives can be a natural strategy for organisations when the 
workforce is older and smaller in number.  
6.5 Future elderly activity depends on the policies and 
attitudes of employers and potential workers  
The socio-ecological transition is changing the traditional patterns of 
employment. Part-time work and fixed-term contracts are becoming more 
common as labour market flexibility increases.17 This could affect the 
market activity of the elderly in different ways. Nordic countries, with their 
highly developed social protection systems, provide more stability for 
workers. Labour market rigidity, which is higher in other groups of 
countries, could make the labour market situation of the elderly less 
favourable. Prolonging labour market activity depends on various demand 
and supply factors, some of which can be influenced by policy measures, 
e.g. incentives in the social security system, health of the older population, 
LLL for older workers, safety at work, promotion of flexible solutions in the 
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Ageing provides an opportunity 
to enhance the competitiveness 
of the European economy 
through special products 
targeted at the older population. 
organisation of work, support for families with care duties. Others, such as 
preferences for leisure, are more difficult to change, at least in the short run. 
Future elderly activity has been investigated with regards to two 
aspects.18 First, there are policies of employers that are age-management 
friendly (indicated as ‘proper’) or anti-active ageing (‘wrong’). These 
policies can be supported to some extent by public active labour market 
policy programmes. The second aspect is a change in productivity – either 
an acceleration in growth that enhances longer activity, or a deceleration in 
growth. Productivity growth will depend on the development of lifelong 
learning as well as the health status of older workers. Four possible 
scenarios are discussed below on the basis of these two variables.  
It is reasonable to assume that in the shorter term, i.e. until 2025, age 
management could have a larger impact. By 2050, changes in productivity 
could be more important. 
Table 6.3 Possible scenarios of the labour force development dependent on two 
factors 
 Proper age management Wrong age management 
Productivity 
increase 
‘Maximum labour force with 
high productivity’ 
(S1) 
‘With the productivity increase 
of the knowledge-based 
economy, wrong age 
management not so damaging 
for economic growth’ 
(S2) 
Productivity 
decrease 
‘Less competitive economies, 
even with high labour-force 
participation rates’ 
(S3) 
‘Decrease in productivity 
combined with smallest labour 
force’ 
(S4) 
 
Scenario S1 combines the maximum labour force with high 
productivity. Scenario S4 indicates that a decrease in productivity 
combined with employer policies enhancing early retirement would result 
in the smallest labour force. Scenarios S2 
and S3 depend on the future structure of 
the economy, i.e. the sectors in which 
labour demand will be created. In a 
knowledge-based economy with a 
productivity increase, the wrong (or a lack 
of) age management (S2) would not be so 
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Future development of the labour 
force will depend not only on 
demography but also on employers’ 
attitudes, social and labour market 
policies and lifelong learning. 
damaging for economic growth, but it would cause lower labour-force 
participation rates at older ages. In flexible labour markets with a safety net 
that does not cause an inactivity trap, wrong age-management is also less 
distortive. A productivity decrease with proper age-management (S3) can 
lead to less competitive economies, even with high labour-force 
participation rates. It is difficult to say which scenario is the most probable. 
European countries differ; therefore various elements of active ageing 
policy measures (such as an increase in LLL participation or the promotion 
of age-management) should be presented in the presence of different 
country-specific institutions and preferences for leisure at older ages. 
6.6 Ageing as an opportunity for the European economy 
Besides the labour supply presented in the previous section, ageing and the 
related working life transition also influence people’s behaviour as 
consumers. Changes in demand and in 
the structure of consumption due to 
changes in the structure and number 
of older people in European 
economies should be the driving 
forces of what is often referred to as 
the ‘silver economy’. This term refers 
to a set of economic activities linked with the production of goods and 
services targeted at the elderly population. The European Commission is 
also continuously exploring this idea. For example, its 2009 ageing report 
emphasised possible positive effects of ageing on the private sector: 
“Ageing societies bring new opportunities to innovative firms through the demand 
for new or adapted goods and services”.19 
Ageing is currently considered a significant social and economic issue 
in Europe. The effects of ageing on consumption structures will lead to 
structural economic challenges. An increase in the demand for some 
specific goods and services can be considered an opportunity for some 
sectors or even for some small countries. On the other hand, some sectors 
will have to adapt to a decrease in demand due to behavioural changes. 
The main concept of the ‘silver economy’ is that supplying goods and 
services for the growing sector of elderly consumers has the potential to 
stimulate economic growth and create new jobs. In this chapter we will 
refer to ‘silver demand’, which is related to the consumption of households 
with a reference person over 60 years of age.  
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Silver demand will grow by 
more than 20% by 2030, 
mostly due to an increase in the 
number of elderly over time.  
The complexity of the ’silver economy’ lies in the fact that the elderly 
do not have identical consumption habits across the various EU member 
states. Among the ageing populations, there are many economic, social and 
cultural factors that influence consumption patterns. Generally, we can 
expect an increase in ‘silver demand’ in all member states that will differ 
only in volume and structure. It is assumed that both public and private 
expenditures will have significant effects on the structure of the economy. 
The most significant increase in demand is expected in the mostly publicly 
financed sector of health and social services, which is explored in Chapter 
5. In this chapter, only the future effects of private consumption are 
considered.  
6.7 The increasing significance of ‘silver demand’ 
The aggregate demand of households divided by age groups is determined 
by several factors, with the most important being the number of 
households and their wealth. Wealth is represented by average income in 
the relevant age group and levels of savings. However, whether older 
people finance their consumption by public and private transfer or by 
accumulated assets, in the aggregate view consumption by the older 
population can be expected to rise in the aggregate, thanks not only to the 
second demographic dividend theory20 
(and the implications for savings and 
capital accumulation broadly described in 
the economic literature), but also simply 
because the number of retirees will 
increase rapidly over time. (Any eventual 
drop in their purchasing power in the future will likely be easily offset by 
unprecedented rises in their number.) The most recent empirical studies 
therefore focus not only on the macroeconomic effects of their rising share 
in the total population and on production and consumption shifts, but also 
on consumption by older people themselves. Expressed another way, 
demand will be mostly affected by the structure of their consumption and 
changes in their consumption patterns. 
According to forecasts, population ageing will have a significant 
impact on the age structure of Europe’s households (see Figure 6.3).21 The 
number of households with a head of household (or ‘reference person’) 
aged over 60 in 2030 will significantly increase in both the friendly and 
tough scenarios. The number of households with a reference person aged 
45-59 years reaches its peak in 2020 and will then gradually reduce to the 
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level of 2006. Conversely, in the two youngest groups there will be either 
stagnation or a decline in the number of households. The situation across 
member states may vary slightly. 
Figure 6.3 Estimated number of EU households by age of the reference person* 
(millions) 
 
* Except Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Slovenia, where data availability of HBS was 
limited. 
Sources: Eurostat; Štefánik et al. (2013). 
In 2010, demand from silver households across European countries 
comprised roughly 28% of total household consumption.22 Considering the 
fact that silver households make up almost 36% of the total number of 
households, we can see that lower incomes in retirement lead to a 
decreasing ability to consume. The spending structure varies with the 
different ages and levels of wealth in each country. In Slovakia, ‘silver 
demand’ represents a relatively low share of total demand, standing at just 
under 25%. In contrast, a much higher share of over 32% can be observed in 
Germany, which is already facing an ageing population. According to the 
results of estimations, we can expect an increased share for ‘silver demand’ 
in the future.  
In the EU27, the share of households with a reference person aged 
over 60 will increase from almost 36% in 2010 to more than 43% in 2030 
(growth of over 20%). Similarly, in the case of total household 
consumption, an increase in the share of 60+ households to 32% in 2025 and 
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The structure of silver demand 
is quite strictly divided between 
western and central-eastern 
Europe, due to significant 
wealth differences. 
35% in 2030 is expected. The highest share is expected in Germany (38% in 
2025 and around 42% in 2030). The growing demand of these households 
will be significantly responsible for an increase in demand within the 
sectors with expected positive growth. 
6.8 The increasing share of older households will change the 
consumption structure 
Young households differ from older ones in their consumption structure, 
but there are also significant differences among older households. The 
increase in relative mean spending on housing is much higher in the case of 
the 80+ group than for the 65-79 group. The highest proportion of single 
households can also be expected in this group.23 Expenditure on transport 
(as a share of the total) of 80+ households is half that of households whose 
reference person is in the age group 50-64, whereas health expenditure 
grows with the age of the reference person, and spending on food remains 
at nearly the same level.  
When looking at international differences in the consumption 
patterns of households, a cluster analysis allows us to group the countries 
into three clusters based on similarities in the structure of consumption.24 In 
the first cluster, high-income European countries belonging to the original 
EU15 are joined by some of the more successful new member states, along 
with Norway and Croatia. The second cluster groups together low-income 
countries with new EU member states, joined by the former Republic of 
Macedonia. The third (Mediterranean) cluster covers some of the countries 
of southern Europe that differ from the countries in the first cluster, namely 
Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. 
The sectors with the highest growth potential are those 
producing/providing food and beverages, housing and utilities, 
restaurants and hotel services and, above all, privately financed health, 
social and long-term care. Therefore, 
similar additional effects can also be 
expected in publicly financed services, as 
the total demand in this sector is 
significantly covered by health and social 
insurance.25 Luxury goods and services 
such as restaurants, recreation and culture 
or alcohol and tobacco are more often demanded and consumed in 
countries with higher average incomes (mostly western Europe). In 
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countries with lower average incomes, represented mainly by the new EU 
member states, the elderly spend a larger share on services and products 
that are important for day-to-day living (food and housing). 
Figure 6.4 Clusters of countries based on the structure of consumption of 
households with reference person aged 60+ 
 
Note: Distance function 1. These two components explain 58.48% of the point variability. 
Source: Štefánik et al. (2013), based on Eurostat data. 
The structure of consumption is affected by a rise in the living 
standards of the EU population as a whole, or by the ageing of stronger, 
higher-income age groups leaving the labour market. Both could distort the 
structure of consumption towards more luxury goods, as they would have 
a positive effect on the income of the elderly. Thus, the core of silver 
demand is currently concentrated in high-income countries and its future 
development in central and eastern Europe will depend mostly on the 
speed of convergence across the EU. 
Demand for each product group will be affected differently 
depending on income flexibility, the welfare of households in each 
individual country, the rate of convergence and several other factors. 
Consumption of younger cohorts tends to decrease. There are, of course, 
products and services for which demand will decrease more significantly, 
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such as transport, clothing and footwear, and will thus face a higher 
proportional demand from younger age cohorts. 
Table 6.4 Shares of total consumption of households in European countries (based 
on friendly demographic projections) (%) 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
  60- 60+ 60- 60+ 60- 60+ 60- 60+ 60- 60+ 60- 60+ 
Food 9.74 4.35 9.53 4.72 9.50 4.83 9.45 4.95 9.11 5.39 8.74 5.82 
Alcohol and 
tobacco 
1.72 0.55 1.74 0.55 1.72 0.56 1.69 0.58 1.61 0.63 1.54 0.68 
Clothing 4.47 1.21 4.42 1.17 4.38 1.20 4.37 1.23 4.23 1.34 4.8 1.45 
Housing and 
utilities 
18.99 9.28 19.00 9.80 18.85 10.1 18.56 10.22 17.61 11.14 16.62 12.3 
Furnishing 4.16 1.60 4.5 1.59 4.2 1.62 3.98 1.66 3.85 1.81 3.74 1.96 
Health 1.92 1.26 1.74 1.37 1.74 1.40 1.76 1.44 1.80 1.57 1.90 1.70 
Transport 9.98 2.65 9.71 2.68 9.63 2.73 9.59 2.79 9.30 3.6 9.5 3.31 
Communi-
cations 
2.27 0.67 2.35 0.70 2.30 0.71 2.23 0.72 2.6 0.79 1.88 0.84 
Recreation 
and culture 
6.71 2.36 6.69 2.31 6.61 2.34 6.51 2.39 6.22 2.62 5.95 2.82 
Education* NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Restaurants 
and hotels 
4.61 1.21 4.55 1.17 4.55 1.20 4.57 1.23 4.47 1.34 4.36 1.46 
Miscella-
neous 
6.88 2.48 6.68 2.46 6.58 2.53 6.50 2.60 6.30 2.82 6.13 3.4 
Total 72.34 27.66 71.37 28.63 70.77 29.23 70.09 29.91 67.39 32.61 64.77 35.23 
* The information on private expenditures on education were not reliable in the HBS. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HBS; Štefánik et al. (2013). 
From a country perspective, German silver consumers tend to spend 
a significant part of their income on health care (mainly as co-payments), 
recreation and culture. This is determined by high income. The expected 
development of silver demand in Italy is fairly similar to that in Germany. 
Additionally, the elderly in Italy will spend a relatively high share of their 
expenditure on luxury products. In Slovakia, based on cultural and social 
behaviour, demand will mostly target goods and services for day-to-day 
living and health care. The demand of silver customers in Finland will 
target day-to-day necessities, as well as other more luxurious types of 
products and services.  
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The net effect of the silver 
economy will lead to loss of 1.9 
million jobs in the ‘tough’ 
scenario and a gain of 3.9 
million in the ‘friendly’ one. 
6.9 The different impacts of ageing on job creation under the 
‘friendly’ and ‘tough’ scenarios 
In both scenarios, the highest expected increase in the consumption of 
younger people is related to restaurant and hotel services. We can explain 
this fact by an expected higher standard of living in the EU that could 
result in increased demand for these types of services. In both scenarios, the 
highest increase in total private demand is expected to target health-care 
services for two reasons. The first is the fact that there will be more elderly 
citizens demanding care services. There will also be a large group of aware 
younger-age cohorts demanding preventive health care. In most of the 
selected products and services, the 
additional demand from both types of 
households by age is quite similar, and it 
needs to be borne in mind that as the base 
of the elderly is smaller, it is more 
dynamic. There are, of course, some 
exceptions – e.g. education, clothing and 
transport – for which a higher proportion is related to younger-age cohorts. 
With respect to demographic and economic changes in total demand for 
selected product groups, an increase of 19-38% will be seen in the case of 
the friendly scenario and 11-27% under the tough scenario (Figure 6.5).  
Structural shifts in demand will result in a change in the structure of 
labour demand. Productivity is expected to increase during the reference 
period by 21.7% under the tough scenario and 22.2% under the friendly 
one. The changes discussed above concerning demand could affect labour 
demand in different ways. For example, we can look at the expected 
changes in employment in sectors producing food, beverages and tobacco 
in the friendly scenario. In this scenario, the additional demand of both 
groups of households by age in 2025 is equal to around 15% of total 
demand in 2010. Due to higher productivity, and the assumption that 
employees producing products for younger customers at the beginning of 
the reference period will be producing this type of product over the whole 
period, a loss of approximately 100,000 jobs can be expected. Conversely, 
the increased demand of the elderly will generate an expansion in labour 
demand of around 1.1 million new jobs. In such a case, employees who are 
superfluous to the production of goods for younger households will 
effectively be employed in production for the elderly. The additional 
demand of elderly households will create approximately 4.4 million new 
job opportunities according to the friendly scenario.  
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Figure 6.5 Additional EU27 demand by product/services group and by age of 
household under the ‘friendly’ (F) and ‘tough’ (T) scenarios, 2010-2025 (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Štefánik et al. (2013). 
Figure 6.6 Expansion of EU27 labour demand generated by demographic 
transition by age of reference person under ‘friendly’ (F) and ‘tough’ (T) scenarios, 
2010-2025 (thousands of jobs created) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Štefánik et al. (2013). 
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Across countries there are two contrasting ageing effects on total 
employment: the effects of decreasing demand of households under 60 and 
the positive effects of older ones. Taking a more detailed country 
perspective, the negative effects of younger households on the total 
workforce ranges between -3.5% (friendly scenario) and -5.3% (tough) in 
Germany and between -0.1% and 0.6% in Slovakia from 2010 to 2025. 
Additional employment caused by growing silver demand is equal to 0.0-
0.6 % of the total workforce in Germany, 1.1-2.2% in Slovakia, 0.5-1.6% in 
Italy, 0.8–1.3% in Finland, and 1.2–2.0% in the EU27 as a whole. The total 
impact of changed consumption on employment varies from 0.5-2.0% of 
additional employment in Slovakia to job losses of between 2.9% and 5.3% 
in Germany. 
In Europe as a whole, the gross effect of the increased demand of the 
elderly will generate as many as 2.6 to 4.4 million new jobs during 2010-
2025. In contrast, changes in the demand of younger households, along 
with productivity gains, will result in job losses of approximately 0.5-4.5 
million. The total net effects of changed consumption on employment 
under the presented assumptions will lead to a loss of 1.9 million jobs in the 
tough scenario, and the creation of 3.9 million additional jobs in the 
friendly scenario. This decrease under the tough scenario should be 
considered as an important change and, in the light of EU employment 
targets, appropriate reform measures should be directed at the labour 
market in order to address it. 
6.10 The elderly as workers and consumers: Two sides of the 
same coin 
Population ageing in European countries is an inevitable process, and one 
that is generally perceived as negative. We have shown that this process 
has its specific characteristics and is influencing the economy and the 
labour market. Particular circumstances and the policies anticipating this 
process could even boost employment and innovation within EU member 
states, or at least diminish the negative effects of ageing.  
From an employment point of view, the majority of countries are 
taking measures to increase the retirement age (through changes in pension 
schemes, etc.). As was shown in the first part of this chapter, this approach 
requires more than just a simple adjustment of social security schemes 
related to older workers and retirees. Preventing skill obsolescence at older 
ages requires more investment in lifelong learning. Attitudes of employers 
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are usually an important determinant for the demand for older workers, 
and improved safety-at-work measures and support for families with care 
duties can influence the activity of certain groups of employees. Keeping 
the elderly in the labour market has a positive effect – not only by 
decreasing the burden on the pension systems but also by improving the 
standard of living and demand of the elderly.  
At the same time, changes in the volume and structure of 
consumption caused by the growing share of the elderly population may 
boost some sectors, while we will observe a decrease in aggregate demand 
in others. These ‘silver economy’ effects should lead to innovation in 
providing specific ‘silver goods and services’, which could even boost the 
EU’s export potential within the global economy.  
Based on the findings briefly described in this chapter, we can 
recommend the following policies that view the ageing process as an 
opportunity for further sustainable growth under the current processes of 
the socio-ecological transformation: 
 
 promote healthy ageing and prevention of disabilities; 
 adjust employment laws and policies to the specific needs of the 
elderly;  
 promote the single market in the cross-border use of health and social 
services, especially relating to long-term care; and 
 support the innovation processes related to prospective ‘silver 
sectors’. 
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Notes 
1 A chapter is dedicated to this issue in the companion volume to this present work (see 
Beblavý et al. (2014). 
2 OECD (2013), p. 164. 
3 Styczyńska et al. (2013) 
4 Riedel and Hofer (2013). 
5 The conclusions of Riedel and Hofer (2013) are based on an analysis of data from ad 
hoc module 2006 (AHM2006) of the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) in the EU27 
countries. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Styczyńska et al. 
8 Ibid. 
9 WHO (2002). 
10 See, for example, OECD (2006) cited by van Dalen et al. (2014) 
11 Ruzik-Sierdzinska et al. (2013). 
12 Ruzik-Sierdzińska et al. (2013) 
13 SHARELIFE is a retrospective part of panel Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe; see Ruzik-Sierdzińska et al. (2013).  
14 For more detailed background description, see van Dalen et al. (2014) 
15 van Dalen et al. (2014). 
16 Ibid.  
17 Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012) 
18 Ruzik-Sierdzińska (2014).  
19 European Commission (2009). 
20 This concept was introduced by Mason and Lee (2007), who examined the 
relationship between economic development and demographic transition. In the first 
stages of economic development, economies benefit from concentration of the 
population in the working age. Such gains, however, appear to be transitory: as 
economies mature, fertility declines and life expectancy rises, and the population ages. 
Nevertheless, transitory gains can be transformed into sustainable gains through the 
creation of human, and especially physical capital. The ‘second demographic dividend’ 
thus refers to a period of more rapid economic growth and a permanently higher level 
of per capita income and consumption. 
21 For a detailed overview of the data and methodology, see Štefánik et al. (2013). 
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22 Results are based on information about the structure of consumption from the 
European Household Budget Surveys (HBS). The limitations of cross-country 
comparisons are explained in European Commission (2003). 
23 See, for example, Štefánik et al. (2013). 
24 The relative mean expenditure of households with reference persons older than 60, 
on 12 COICOP 1-digit items entered the cluster analysis. For a detailed description of 
the data and the methodology, see Štefánik et al. (2013). 
25 The chapter is covering only private consumption effects.  
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7. WOMEN AS WORKERS – IN THE MIDDLE 
OF A MARATHON 
IGA MAGDA AND AGNIESZKA KAMIŃSKA 
s it possible to further improve the position of women on the European 
labour market? What will be the drivers for and obstacles to increasing 
female employment in the next decade? The socio-ecological transition, 
and above all its demographic component, will inevitably reshape the 
structure of labour markets: according to Eurostat forecasts, the European 
Union’s working age population will shrink by a considerable 8 million 
people by 2025 and its median age will increase considerably. Labour 
shortages are likely to hinder GDP growth and increase wage and 
inflationary pressures, threatening the sustainability of welfare states. Thus, 
policies that help to fill the gaps in labour supply are of great importance, 
and increasing women's labour market participation appears to be the most 
important of these.  
Women already have more and more incentives to be active on the 
labour market, and these incentives will be reinforced in the future. Female 
labour market entrants are increasingly well educated, which makes them 
more likely to find employment and to remain on the labour market (or to 
return to it after childbirth). The labour shortages in the coming decades 
will increase wage pressures, changing women's preferences from unpaid 
home duties to a working income, drawing more of them into paid 
employment.  
Nevertheless, problems and obstacles remain and despite a 
considerable improvement over the past two decades, the labour potential 
of women is far from being fully utilised – their employment and 
participation rates remain below the levels observed for men (10.6 and 12 
                                                   
 Iga Magda: Vice President of the Board, Institute for Structural Research, 
Warsaw; Agnieszka Kamińska: Institute for Structural Research, Warsaw. 
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The gender employment gap 
is still greater than 10 
percentage points in half of 
the EU member states. 
percentage points lower, respectively). Increasing these figures remains a 
challenge, as only well-coordinated, complex actions targeting various 
aspects and determinants of women's labour market attachment will be 
effective. This chapter summarises the main components of the necessary 
policy mix, describing the challenges and potential best solutions in the 
fields of education, maternity, retirement, lifelong learning, care choices, 
flexible employment contracts and wages.  
7.1 Women’s labour market participation could still grow 
Over the last two decades, the European Union has experienced a 
significant improvement in women’s labour market participation.1,2 This is 
the result of both long-term trends evident across developed countries and 
changes made to institutional frameworks in specific countries. Recent 
evidence from the global economic downturn has shown that the 
employment of women is more resilient to recessions than that of men, 
partially because of gender sectoral segregation (i.e. the male domination of 
the crisis-hit construction and manufacturing sectors, and the female 
domination of the services sector, which 
was spared the worst effects of the crisis). 
The fact that since the 1990s, women have 
contributed to the lion’s share of 
employment improvements highlights their 
growing role in labour markets. However, 
there is still significant potential for further action, since the gender 
employment gap – i.e. the difference between the employment rates of men 
and of women – is greater than 10 percentage points in half of European 
countries.3  
Changes in female employment and participation rates display strong 
age-specific patterns. Women of older age groups (45-64 years) have 
experienced the most notable employment improvements, and significant 
positive employment changes were also observed among prime-aged 
women.4 On the other hand, employment rates among younger women 
(under 25 years of age) have decreased in most European countries, mainly 
due to increasing enrolment of women in tertiary education.5  
Most improvements in female employment in the last two decades 
were driven by changes in the intensity of employment, i.e. increases in the 
amount that women of various socio-demographic groups are involved in 
the labour market. A positive contribution was also made by a shift in 
educational composition among the female population – well-educated 
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School-to-work transitions 
are easier in countries where 
study is frequently combined 
with work 
women have higher employment rates,6 so the increasing share of women 
graduating from tertiary education positively influenced total employment 
rates. This educational shift played a relatively greater role in central and 
eastern Europe (CEE) than in western European countries.7 Demographic 
changes observed over the 1990s and 2000s did impact the relative position 
of women in different age groups, but did not matter for the overall 
changes in employment levels. However, this will change considerably 
over the coming years.  
7.2 School-to-work transitions need to be made easier 
In the last two decades, the number of young people enrolling in tertiary 
education has increased considerably. Recent data show that two thirds of 
young women enter university, compared with 52% of young men.8 Thus, 
young women entering the labour market are now much better educated 
than both their male counterparts and women of older cohorts.  The rising 
human capital levels of women positively affect both their own career 
prospects and macro-level growth rates. 
However, in many countries students tend not to combine education 
with work, so the expansion of tertiary education has led to an increase in 
the average age of people entering the 
labour market and to lower employment 
rates for younger age groups (see Figure 7.2 
and Figure 7.2). At one extreme, there is a 
group of elitist educational systems (e.g. 
South Korea) where employers strongly 
value diplomas from the best universities and students have little incentive 
to combine study and work, which delays graduation and adversely affects 
employment.9 At the other extreme is a group of Nordic countries where 
young people demonstrate high levels of mobility between employment 
and education, moving between the two many times before completing 
tertiary education.10 In the latter countries, the age at which tertiary 
education is commenced and completed is considerably higher than in the 
former countries. Yet, school-to-work transitions are easier in countries 
where studying is frequently combined with work, so this educational 
model should be supported by public policies.  
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Figure 7.1 Economic activity rate among 
15-24 year olds in the OECD and EU15, 
by sex, 1985-2011 (%) 
Figure 7.2 Leaving education and 
combining school and work in OECD 
countries, 2008 
 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2013), 
based on OECD (2010). 
 
The Great Recession of 2008-09 aggravated the problem of joblessness 
among young people.11 Weak economic conditions after the recession have 
resulted in fewer job opportunities, making the transition from education 
to employment much harder. Young people find it more difficult to get a 
job, as they lack work experience. Although women have higher 
educational aspirations than men, they are less likely to be in either 
employment or education (see Figure 7.3). The traditional explanation for 
this is the responsibility of being young mothers.12 In 2013, about a third of 
inactive non-studying women aged 15-24 in the EU were not looking for a 
job due to their care responsibilities.13 However, a large share of NEETs is 
also made up of young persons who do not face family obstacles but cannot 
find a job.  
Finding a first job is harder for women despite being, on average, 
more educated than men.14 Generally, men and women in the EU only have 
similar levels of transition to a first job in the first few months after 
completing education. Later, the genders diverge and men are slightly 
more likely to find their first job than women. As mentioned, a plausible 
reason for this gender gap could be care responsibilities often resulting in 
difficulties in achieving a work-life balance. Compared with other women 
and with fathers, mothers are less likely to have made a rapid transition to 
their first job.15 However, maternity is only one potential explanation for 
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the gender differences in school-to-work transitions; studies suggest that 
women encounter other difficulties in entering and re-entering the labour 
market.16  
Figure 7.3 Percentage of 15-24 year-olds in neither employment nor education 
(NEET), by gender (2011) 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2013) on the basis of OECD (2013). 
The problem of NEETs is a major policy challenge, since long periods 
spent outside of employment and education have an adverse effect on 
young peoples’ future career paths. Work experience gained during studies 
is a key factor in helping to smooth the transition between education and 
employment and in increasing young workers’ – in particular, women's – 
labour force participation rates. This can be achieved in two 
complementary ways. The first solution is apprenticeship programmes. 
Universities should ensure that these programmes equip students with 
further knowledge and skills valued by employers. For some students, 
apprenticeships provide a real job opportunity, as employers offer 
positions to the best apprentices.17 More demanding is the second solution 
to gain work experience – combining tertiary education with employment. 
Labour market institutions are essential in ensuring a work-education 
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balance. Students are usually unable to work full-time jobs, and so would 
benefit from the promotion of part-time employment and flexible working 
hours arrangements. 
Access to public employment services should be extended to all 
young people, not only to those who are unemployed.18 Assistance 
measures such as job counselling might also be beneficial to those who are 
not currently seeking employment. Finally, policies targeting NEETs must 
be more diversified, because there are different reasons behind joblessness 
among this group (such as parenthood, a lack of skills or the decision to 
take a ‘gap year’). Policies aimed at increasing their skills (i.e. training 
programmes) and subsidising employment to provide them with work 
experience may be preferable. However, any considerable decrease in 
NEET rates will be caused by more vigorous economic growth fuelling 
labour demand. 
7.3 Combining work with maternity requires further 
support 
Maternity and childcare often require women to take a break from their 
professional lives, so employment rates among mothers are lower than 
those among other women. Young mothers in particular often withdraw 
from the labour market, as they are unable to combine employment with 
family responsibilities.19 The proportion of mothers leaving the labour 
market due to maternity varies across the EU (see Figure 7.4). The figure is 
lowest in the Nordic countries, where the employment rate among mothers 
is almost the same as the employment rate among childless women. In 
contrast, in most of the new member states there is a considerable 
difference between labour market outcomes for women with and without 
(small) children.  
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Access to affordable, good 
quality public childcare 
services is a crucial factor 
shaping mothers’ behaviour 
in the labour market 
Figure 7.4 Employment rates among all women aged 25-54 and those with a child 
aged below 15 among EU countries, 2011 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and OECD data. 
The development of public childcare services is a crucial factor 
shaping mothers’ behaviour in the labour market.20 Countries that offer the 
highest availability of pre-school child 
services (e.g. the Nordic countries and 
France) tend to have higher employment 
rates among young mothers. These services 
should not only be widely accessible, but 
also affordable. This is of particular 
importance for low-skilled and low-income 
women, whose labour market attachment is the weakest and who are most 
likely to fall into an inactivity trap.  
Flexible workplace arrangements, such as flexible working hours, are 
another means of helping parents cope with childcare. These seem to play a 
particularly important role when other policies ensuring a family-work 
balance are not sufficiently developed.21 However, flexible contracts are a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, higher flexibility tends to be 
associated with a lower degree of employment protection, and as such 
allows more jobs to be created. On the other hand, discriminatory practices 
or too little employment protection may discourage mothers from entering 
the labour market.22  
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The duration of parental leave should be assessed carefully. If it is too 
short and the child still needs special care, women might not be able to 
return to full-time employment and instead choose inactivity, from which it 
is usually more difficult to return.23 On the other hand, if parental leave is 
too long this will lead to skill deterioration and a decrease in women’s 
chances to return to the labour market. A transitory period of reduced 
working hours and the retention of some maternity benefit may be a good 
way for parents to gradually return to regular employment.  
A more equal distribution of childcare and home responsibilities 
across genders is as important for women’s employment prospects. This 
also includes caring duties related to the elderly, which we describe in 
more detail in Section 7.7. The fact that women are disproportionately 
burdened with caring obligations strongly diminishes their employment 
prospects, as they are likely to remain away from the labour market. At the 
same time, employers are more incentivised to discriminate against then as 
they assume women will have a higher propensity to have longer career 
breaks. Thus, effective policies aimed at raising women's employment need 
to encourage fathers to take an increased role in childcare duties, which 
will lift the burden from mothers. Making paternity leave obligatory, or 
designating a part of parental leave for men only, is an example of a policy 
practice in this area.  
Another maternity-related policy is ensuring that old-age pension 
system arrangements reward periods of inactivity due to childcare. This is 
necessary, yet these provisions should not discourage women from longer 
activity in the labour market. An example of a bad policy in this area is the 
provision of early retirement for mothers. Yet, as D’Addio concludes, 
pension systems, however well designed, will not be able to compensate on 
a large scale for inequalities on the labour market between men and 
women, or between parents and childless individuals.24 They form only a 
part of the overall policy response in a broader context of income 
redistribution and reduction of poverty among the elderly.  
7.4 Retirement policies have a major impact on women’s 
employment at older age 
The increase in employment among older women has been responsible for 
most of the employment progress in Europe over the last two decades.25 
However, employment rates among women aged 55 or above are still 
significantly lower than those for prime-age women. There is thus room for 
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further improvement, and bearing in mind Europe’s ageing population and 
solvency issues surrounding public pension systems, this poses another 
major policy challenge.  
The number of years spent by women on the labour market varies 
widely across European countries (see Figure 7.5). Women in Sweden and 
Denmark are active on the labour market for more than 35 years on 
average, whereas in southern European countries such as Italy and Greece, 
the number of expected years in employment for women is under 25. 
Southern Europe’s poor performance in this respect is due more to 
women’s complete withdrawal from the labour force than to longer career 
breaks related to education and childbearing. Lengthening women’s labour 
market activity would strongly boost these countries' total employment 
rates, helping to alleviate the gaps caused by population ageing. 
Figure 7.5 Average expected years in employment for women, 2002, 2006 and 
2011 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2013). 
Many European countries have made attempts to harmonise their 
statutory retirement ages for men and women.26 By 2040, the number of 
countries with different pensionable ages for men and women is expected 
to have fallen from 12 to 3 (see Figure 7.6).27 At the same time, the legal 
retirement age for women is expected to increase in 19 EU member states. 
Evidence from countries that have already increased the retirement age for 
women suggests that this has a crucial impact on retirement decisions, 
postponing women’s withdrawal from the labour market. Hence, a further 
increase in total employment rates among women – stemming from the 
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rising labour market participation rates among those aged 55-64 alone – is 
to be expected.  
Figure 7.6 Average pensionable age in OECD countries by gender, 1950-2050 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2013) on the basis of Chomik and Whitehouse (2010). 
Figure 7.7 Pensionable age in EU countries by gender, 2011 and 2040 
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak (2013) on the basis of a Polish Ministry of Finance mimeo. 
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Current pension system reforms, 
introducing a closer link between 
lifetime contributions and pension 
benefits, will negatively impact women. 
incomes. Current pension system reforms that introduce a closer link 
between lifetime contributions and pension benefits will negatively impact 
women, since they accumulate less 
contributions and experience 
longer periods out of employment 
than men.28 However, this change 
will postpone the decision of 
women to withdraw from the 
labour market and thus increase employment rates, in particular among 
older women.  
Finally, the aforementioned compensation for maternity and parental 
leaves within pension systems is another element that may impact 
women’s decisions on when to retire.29 A strong link between contributions 
and pensions will lower benefits paid to parents (mainly mothers), 
encouraging (or forcing) them to stay on the labour market for longer. On 
the other hand, generous maternity pension compensations may lead to 
excessively long periods out of labour market, which decrease the chances 
of returning to the labour market and future earnings (due to less work 
experience), again translating into lower pension benefits. Early retirement 
schemes offered to mothers are also likely to act against them, due to the 
lower pensions they would receive. Summing up, there are no easy 
solutions for incorporating maternity and parental breaks into pension 
systems in order to balance the family and pension policy goals. However, 
the increasing participation of women in higher education is likely to at 
least partially solve this problem by providing a strong incentive to stay on 
the labour market longer in order to reap the benefits of the investment in 
human capital.  
7.5 Lifelong learning improves employability 
Another crucial factor for increasing women’s employment rates (in 
particular, by helping to extend their working lives) is their participation in 
various forms of education at later stages in the lifecycle, which would help 
them to update skills, compensate for their skill loss during periods outside 
the labour market and adapt them to the changing labour market demand. 
There is a large strand of the literature on how the development of 
workers’ skills through lifelong learning (LLL) is essential to extending the 
length of time spent on the labour market and increasing employment 
levels.30 Better-qualified workers stay in employment longer as their skills, 
knowledge and experience are more highly valued by employers. From a 
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Women and men differ in 
their reasons for not 
participating in training 
macroeconomic perspective, better human capital positively affects a 
country's competitiveness and growth rates. 
Participation rates among adults in formal, informal (i.e. 
unorganised, associated for instance with leisure or learning from family 
members) and non-formal education (carried out within an organised 
framework) vary significantly across EU countries, and the challenges 
related to improvements in this area are different for men and women.31 
The key factors determining adults’ participation in lifelong learning 
activities are age (a higher age implies lower participation), educational 
attainment (well-educated individuals tend to participate much more 
frequently in LLL activities), the economic sector (people working in 
agriculture and industry invest little in gaining new qualifications), and 
labour market status (being employed increases the chances of 
participating in LLL activities). 
Gender differences play a minor role in determining overall LLL 
participation rates. Men and women take part in job-related training at 
similar rates in the majority of EU countries, with the exception of 
Denmark and Sweden. However, women are less likely to participate in 
formal education than men, while they outnumber men in non-formal 
training.32 Moreover, training participation is higher in the more female-
dominated sectors. That said, due to less continuous employment and to 
career breaks related to maternity, women experience a shorter average 
time spent in education, hence the need for stronger support for LLL 
activities for women.33  
Moreover, women and men differ when it comes to their reasons for 
not participating in training. Women are much more likely to opt out of 
further education due to family reasons.34 
When interpreting this result, we should 
remember that answers are subjective and 
can be country-specific In the Netherlands, 
the high share of respondents may stem 
from the high value assigned to family, including family responsibilities 
and childcare. The largest relative gender differences are observed in 
Sweden and Portugal. However, recent research suggests that the presence 
of children in a household does not create a difference in the intensity of 
formal education among men and women in adult life, though it does 
lower female participation in non-formal learning.35 
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Figure 7.8 Obstacles to participation in education related to family responsibilities 
by country  
 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak and Lis (2013). 
As family obligations prevent women from obtaining more 
qualifications, an improvement in their LLL participation can be achieved 
by policies that remove obstacles to the balance between education and 
family life. Such policies (again) include greater access to affordable 
childcare and flexible working hours. A more equal distribution of family 
obligations between partners would also play a positive role.  
Well-educated individuals are more likely to engage in LLL 
compared with those with lower educational attainment.36 This means that 
the differences in human capital levels across socio-economic groups 
increase with age. To prevent rising human capital inequalities, it is crucial 
to pay particular attention to low-skilled women with low labour market 
attachment, as they are least likely to invest in improving their 
qualifications. Moreover, the design of sector-level policies should be 
differentiated to reflect variation in sectoral LLL participation, which is 
much higher in knowledge-intensive services. These differences also 
contribute to lifetime educational inequalities.  
Furthermore, women might benefit from the recognition of informal 
learning. For instance, they are much more likely to adopt skills related to 
caring for children or the elderly.37 Their care competences could be 
formally recognised (with some additional training, if needed). Increasing 
demand for people with care skills is expected due to population ageing, 
and formal qualifications could be successfully put to use in the labour 
market.  
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The ongoing structural changes 
in the labour market are 
modifying the existing shape 
and structure of female/male 
wage differentials. 
The policy solutions should also involve counselling by public 
employment services and helping women to plan their educational choices 
to reduce the mismatch between skills learnt and skills demanded by the 
labour market. This will translate not only into higher probabilities of 
finding a job, but also longer average duration and better quality of jobs, 
further increasing female employment rates.  
7.6 Gender pay gaps remain a challenge, in particular among 
older workers 
Gender pay gaps exist in all European countries, and on average women 
earn less than men with similar endowments employed in similar 
workplaces.38 Average pay gaps hide a large degree of variation in female 
wage penalties (i.e. the difference in 
women’s wages with respect to those of 
men with similar characteristics working 
in similar workplaces) depending on age 
and level of pay. Similar observations 
relate to the economic returns to flexible 
employment forms (i.e. fixed-term 
contracts and part-time jobs), which exhibit significant variation in wage 
premia and penalties depending on age and earning level.39 Moreover, the 
ongoing structural changes in the labour market (mainly the demographic 
impact increasing the employment of older cohorts and increasing use of 
new, flexible forms of employment, as well as higher wage differentials) are 
modifying the existing shape and structure of female/male wage 
differentials.40  
The size of gender pay gaps varies significantly across countries. 
They are fairly low in the Netherlands and Norway, and are higher by a 
factor of more than three in the Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal and 
Slovakia, where, ceteris paribus, female prime-age workers earn 
approximately 25-30% less than their male colleagues. The size of the 
gender wage gap differs with age, but with no uniform pattern across 
Europe. In the majority of countries, the wage gap grows with age, with the 
peak at around 40-49 years, and tends to decrease at the age when female 
labour market participation declines (see Figure 7.9). However, the 
evidence on low pay gaps between labour market entrants does not hold 
for all European countries, particularly parts of central and eastern Europe 
where, early on in their careers, women already earn less than ‘comparable’ 
men.41 This is mostly due to relatively higher pay gaps among top earners 
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than among low-paid young women. It suggests that better-educated 
women in these countries experience more difficulties in effective 
education-to-employment transition and are more likely to face a glass 
ceiling. 
Figure 7.9 Gender pay gaps tend to increase with age, but not everywhere (median 
earnings, 2006) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.  
Forms of flexible employment appear to be a mixed blessing from a 
wage perspective. Women working on fixed-term contracts earn less than 
those working on a regular basis, all else being equal. The notable 
exceptions are Latvia, France and Greece, where fixed-term contracts are 
associated with higher earnings. Moreover, the decrease of the permanent 
job premium with age is confirmed for only a few (western European) 
countries,42 while in contrast to that in Poland or Hungary there is a clear 
rise in temporary contract wage penalties with age. Fixed-term contracts 
also pay clearly less than permanent jobs in CEE countries. Looking at 
other aspects of job flexibility, in all EU countries except Portugal and 
Hungary, women working on a part-time basis tend to earn less per hour 
than ‘similar’ women working full-time. At the same time, part-time work 
is relatively more beneficial for well-educated women with higher incomes, 
i.e. the hourly wage of top female earners is higher for part-time than for 
full-time workers.43 Finally, part-time work pays less for older women in 
particular; the gap is much lower among young female workers. The 
ongoing demographic changes are likely to further change the observed 
total wage gap. In particular, the increasing share of women employed at 
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the age of 50 and above will probably lead to deepening their gender pay 
gaps, especially in those countries where their participation rates are low at 
the moment and where women are likely to self-select to better paid 
employment.  
Reducing gender pay gaps is no easy task, partly because one cannot 
really know how much is due to discrimination. However, policies helping 
women to combine work and family life (e.g. childcare services) can be 
recommended since they decrease the so-called ‘motherhood penalty’. 
Countries with well-developed policies supporting mothers tend to have 
lower gender pay gaps. Another crucial factor is fathers’ increased 
involvement in caring obligations and household duties, which needs to be 
supported both by legal changes (e.g. more parental leave targeted at 
fathers) and promotional campaigns. Collective wage-bargaining may also 
play an important role in determining the position of low- and high-paid 
individuals. Decentralised bargaining schemes, where pay-setting takes 
place mainly at the firm level, support lower wage differences. Finally, 
equalising employment protection levels under different types of 
employment contract reduces labour market dualism and is likely to 
reduce contract-based wage gaps.  
7.7 Unbalanced division of caring duties impedes women’s 
employment growth 
The increase in female employment in the EU has triggered an expansion of 
dual-income households, but this does not automatically imply a more 
balanced division of paid and unpaid labour between women and men.44 
Alongside gender equality policies, particular welfare and care regimes 
affect female employment differently and shape the gender division of paid 
work and care by households. In addition, gender equality and care policy 
choices may have significant demographic consequences through their 
impact on the decision to have children.  
Care policies are represented by five models that broadly (though not 
precisely) reflect the classification of welfare regime typology.45 The two 
major policy components in the field of care are (and probably will 
continue to be) formal, institutional, publicly provided care on the one 
hand, and market-oriented, publicly funded but privately provided cash-
for-care schemes on the other. Research shows that the gender gaps in 
labour market participation correlate significantly and positively with the 
provision of formal care, whereas they correlate significantly and 
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Comprehensive gender equality 
policies ensure a supportive 
environment for dual-carer 
policy measures and boost female 
employment. 
negatively with the provision of informal care.46 Moreover, there is an 
almost linear relationship between the relative political empowerment of 
women and the expansion of formal care provision.  
From a policy perspective, short-term cash-for-care schemes seem to 
provide a cheaper and more flexible alternative to formal and institutional 
care.47 However, this market-oriented policy can only ensure the desired 
positive aspects (freedom of choice, good quality of care and decent 
employment for care workers) together with decreasing gender inequalities 
if it ensures quality control, standard basic employment guarantees and a 
well-established legal and institutional framework to prevent 
discrimination.  
In those countries where gender equality policies are weakly 
developed and/or informality plays a dominant role in social relations, the 
expansion of dual-earner households without the dual-carer family model 
may reinforce existing gender inequalities within households due to 
uneven care responsibilities and by 
imposing multitasking on women.48 The 
importance of comprehensive gender 
equality policies (the political 
empowerment of women and addressing 
work-life balance issues, including the 
transfer of care and domestic duties to 
men) is therefore obvious in shaping public perception and ensuring a 
supportive environment for dual-carer policy measures, which are 
necessary to boost female employment. 
Finally, one of the proposed policy solutions to the problem of the 
increasing burden of caring duties related to ageing is the massive influx of 
migrant female care workers (who are often employed in the informal 
economy under substandard employment conditions), but this obviously 
generates new forms of gender inequality. The paid employment 
opportunities for women who are supported by cheap and flexible care 
workers may improve; however, the (mainly migrant and female) care 
workers are at particular risk from the negative consequences of inequality. 
Thus, specific policies must be developed not only to guarantee the quality 
of privately provided services, but also the employment standards of the 
care providers themselves. A legal and institutional framework to prevent 
discrimination against and unfair treatment of care workers is one of the 
fundamental conditions of a fair market environment in the field of care.  
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7.8 Higher female participation rates can be encouraged by a 
coordinated, complex set of policies 
The previous two decades saw further significant changes in the position of 
women on the European labour markets. Women constitute an increasing 
share of the total workforce, and this trend will continue in the future. 
Despite more incentives to enter and remain on the labour market – such as 
higher educational attainments raising the probability of being employed 
(and the alternative costs of staying inactive) or future wage growth driven 
by labour shortages – obstacles to higher female participation rates remain. 
These require a coordinated, complex set of policies targeting various 
factors influencing women's employment determinants and barriers, at 
both the micro and macro levels.  
The most important recommendation for the policy mix is for the 
institutional setting to help to reconcile jobs with family life. Here, flexible 
employment arrangements and better access to childcare facilities will play 
a crucial role in increasing women’s attachment to the labour market from 
a life-cycle perspective, as a quicker return to employment after a period of 
raising a child increases labour market opportunities and also employment 
chances at an older age. More involvement of men in family life will also be 
of considerable importance for women's greater employment and must be 
supported by legal changes. Flexible job provisions would be helpful, inter 
alia, for women who aim to increase or update their qualifications. Another 
area of policies affecting female employment concerns the redesign of 
pension systems so as to lower disincentives to withdraw from the labour 
market (at older age, but also during child-related career breaks) without 
penalising maternity leave.  
Most of the policy recommendations proposed and discussed are not 
new solutions – in fact, they are at the top of the labour market and social 
policy agendas in Europe – and as such require no new funding. For 
instance, European countries are already undertaking several steps to 
smooth labour market entry for young people or to improve childcare 
access as part of the Europe 2020 strategy agenda. However, what is 
required is constant fine-tuning and revision of the policy solutions in 
response to changing needs and labour market settings, as well as local 
(national and regional) circumstances. No one-size-fits-all set of policies is 
possible, and this is not only because of diversity of labour market 
institutions across EU countries. The structure of labour demand also 
matters from an international, but also a regional, perspective. To give an 
example, policies aimed at helping women return to the labour market 
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after childbearing rely heavily on the participation of employers, but here 
the solutions must be different in a country/region dominated by large 
employers, who will be more likely to cooperate and appreciate long-term 
targets of helping in retaining women's labour market attachment, from the 
solutions in a country/region where work opportunities are created mostly 
by small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, for whom softer and more 
flexible solutions will be required so as not to create disincentives to hire 
women at all.  
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ocieties and policy-makers in Europe will face key labour market 
challenges in the years to come relating to economic recovery, ageing 
populations and shrinking workforces. The negative impact of the 
reduction in the size of the labour force could be mitigated by increased 
immigration. However, even under the assumptions of the ‘friendly’ 
scenario described in the introductory chapter (high fertility, extended life 
expectancy and increased immigration), the majority of EU countries will 
face a short-term decline in their working-age population. Immigration will 
not be able to fully compensate for a decline in the working age population, 
but it can bring about immediate population growth.1 
The importance of immigration in combating demographic 
challenges has been recognised by the European Commission, which has 
stated that “some of the additional and specific skills needed in the future 
could be found only outside the EU”.2 The EU has attempted to actively 
develop an ‘attractive’ labour immigration policy with the objective of 
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encouraging foreign highly skilled workers to come to the EU.3 In this 
chapter, we examine the determinants and challenges of the current EU 
framework for immigration law and policy. The key aspects and debates 
surrounding the attractiveness and selectiveness of labour migration 
policies include the discussion about the trade-off between migrant rights 
and openness to immigration, considerations on a revamped EU guest 
worker model, as well as debates on the importance of skill recognition in 
the EU. Our comparative approach enables us to draw lessons from other 
international experiences, such as those of the United States and Canada. 
8.1 Immigration policies to attract highly skilled workers are 
high on the EU agenda 
Labour immigration policies that attract foreign professionals to the EU 
have been high on the agenda of policy-makers. The Europe 2020 strategy 
identifies the need to attract highly qualified third-country nationals in a 
context of growing global competition. Top priority has been given to 
third-country workers labelled as ‘highly qualified’ to fill the perceived 
needs of EU member states’ labour markets.4 In policy discourses, however, 
the EU seems somehow a less advantageous or appealing destination in 
comparison to other countries.5 The European Commission stated in 2007 
that:  
The attractiveness of the EU compared to such countries [as the 
United States and Canada] suffers from the fact that at present 
highly qualified migrants must face 27 different admission 
systems, do not have the possibility of easily moving from one 
country to another for work, and in several cases lengthy and 
cumbersome procedures make them opt for non-EU countries 
granting more favourable conditions for entry and stay.6 
Thus, the US and Canadian labour migration systems are often cited 
as successful models to follow in an alleged race for the brightest minds. 
The priority of an EU labour immigration policy is of relevance for the 
wider development of a common EU migration policy. 
The European Commission has confirmed this attractiveness and 
‘competition for talent’ policy paradigm in its Communication titled “An 
Open and Secure Europe – Making it Happen” of May 2014. The 
Communication underlined that “Europe must attract new talent and 
compete on the global scale” and that: 
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Demographic changes, in particular the shrinking of the working 
population in Europe, coupled with significant skill shortages in 
certain sectors […] hinder the EU’s productivity and thus its 
economic recovery. Increasing global competition for skills and 
talents affects labour markets in many Member States and will be a 
decisive factor for Europe’s economic prosperity in the decade 
ahead.7 
The European Council Conclusions of 26-27 June 20148 adopted the 
new Strategic Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) for the period 2015-20.9 The Guidelines consider it a key priority to 
develop rules maximising the opportunities for legal immigration to make 
the EU an attractive destination for ‘talents and skills’. As the Stockholm 
Programme,10 the third EU multi-annual programme covering EU policies 
on AFSJ, comes to an end in 2014, the development of a European 
immigration policy is in a crucial phase.  
8.2 Key challenges of the EU’s labour immigration policy  
Since the Tampere Conclusions and the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999, the EU has tried to build an AFSJ. While important 
European laws and agreements have been adopted over this 15-year 
period, the current policy picture is one in which a common EU labour 
immigration policy is still very much lacking. Indeed, the legislative 
framework that has been developed so far reveals a number of deficiencies 
or unfinished elements affecting its normative and political configurations. 
We have identified four such features of the current EU labour immigration 
policy. 
First, EU immigration policy is affected by fragmentation and 
dispersion dynamics, which lead to legal complexity and uncertainty. This 
is partly the result of the Council's failure to reach agreement on the 
Commission’s 2001 proposal for a directive intended to (horizontally) 
regulate the entry and residence conditions for all third-country nationals 
exercising paid and self-employed activities.11 The Commission 
subsequently presented the Policy Plan on Legal Migration that established 
the basis for a hierarchical, differentiated and fragmented EU legal 
framework on labour immigration granting variable sets of rights, 
standards and conditions for entry/residence to different migrant worker 
groups and countries of origin.12 The rationale behind this fragmented 
policy approach was driven by the attractiveness and selective policy 
paradigm, i.e. to ‘attract’ third-country nationals who were by then deemed 
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to be ‘needed’ in the EU, in particular ‘highly skilled’ and ‘seasonal’ 
workers.  
Nine years later, the package of sectoral legislative initiatives has 
been adopted including: a Directive on a common application procedure 
for a single (work and residence) permit and a common set of rights for 
legally residing third-country nationals;13 the EU Blue Card Directive;14 the 
Seasonal Employment Directive;15 the Intra-corporate Transferees and 
Unremunerated Trainees Directive;16 and the re-casting proposal of the 
Researchers’ and Students’ Directive.17 Alongside these Directives, 
international agreements and mobility partnerships between the EU and 
third countries stipulate rules and standards, some of which foresee 
employment- or education-related provisions. These instruments provide 
the basis for a highly fragmented EU framework for immigration law and 
policy. 
A second feature characterising the first generation of EU labour 
immigration policies is discrimination in respect of categories of workers 
resulting from the above-mentioned Policy Plan.18 Indeed, when the 
Commission proposed to adopt a sector-by-sector approach, actors such as 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the EU body 
representing civil society and social partners, expressed concerns about the 
consequences for workers.19 This critical issue has also been emphasised by 
others – Cholewinski stresses that the internationally recognised principle 
of non-discrimination was challenged in the EU through the 
implementation of the ‘sectoral policy approach’.20 Indeed, extra-Union 
labour immigration policy heralds the allocation of different rights to third-
country workers depending on their perceived value to the EU labour 
markets.21 
A third feature affecting the current normative shapes of the EU’s 
immigration policy is the multi-layered nature and multiplicity of legal 
statuses for third-country workers across the EU. Groenendijk identifies a 
practice of dual or multiple migratory statuses and the tendency for 
member states to continue issuing national residence and work permits 
rather than the permits provided for in EU migration law22 such as the EU 
Blue Card Directive, which has led to a competing and complex multi-level 
system of statuses and schemes for ‘highly qualified third country 
nationals’.23 The Blue Card Directive has established minimum standards 
providing “for a common floor, not a common ceiling”.24 The possibility 
given to member states to retain their national migratory schemes for 
highly qualified immigrants has not been conducive to a genuine European 
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No single theory has been 
widely accepted to account for 
the emergence and perpetuation 
of international migration. 
scheme and even raises questions over the added value of the Blue Card 
system.  
A final characteristic of the EU’s immigration policy is the barriers for 
third-country nationals to access rights under EU immigration law. EU 
immigration law already provides a supranational set of rights concerning 
various aspects, including access to long-term permanent residence, family 
reunification or highly qualified employment. However, it has been 
pointed out “it is not rights enshrined in the law what matters but rather 
access to them”.25  
The issue of ‘attractiveness’ of immigration policies is closely related 
to the question of why people decide to migrate (or not) from one country 
to another. Yet, research suggests looking beyond push/pull theories that 
have been shaped by scholars such as Ravenstein and Lee.26 With his paper 
“The Laws of Migration”, Ravenstein attempted to explain migratory 
movements within and between countries.27 These laws state, inter alia, 
that economic factors are the main causes of migration,28 and Ravenstein’s 
theory formed the basis for the ‘push/pull factor theory’, which was 
developed by Lee in 1966.29 Different migration theories have been 
proposed to explain why international 
migration begins and why it perpetuates 
across time and space.30 However, as 
Massey et al. emphasised in 1998, “at 
present, there is no single theory widely 
accepted by social scientists to account for 
the emergence and perpetuation of international migration throughout the 
world, only a fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in 
isolation from one another, sometimes but not always segmented by 
disciplinary boundaries”.31 Thus, the strength of the overall economy and 
labour market conditions may very well induce people to go to a certain 
destination country, but they relate to only one pull factor that cannot 
explain migratory movements in their entirety; otherwise, no professionals 
would be left in the southern hemisphere. 
8.3 ‘Rights versus numbers’: Is a trade-off in immigration 
policy possible? 
The relationship between rights and the degree of openness in immigration 
policies has received considerable attention and debate in scholarly and 
policy venues. Does the granting of rights play a role in the attractiveness 
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of migration policies? Bestowing rights and non-discrimination on third-
country nationals is crucial for their socio-economic inclusion and 
integration into the receiving societies.32 The legally binding EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is inclusive as it applies to a large extent to everyone, 
not just nationals of EU member states but also third-country nationals.33 Is 
there a trade-off between the openness of migration policies and the 
granting of rights?  
Ruhs argues that one of the main reasons why states often hesitate to 
ratify international migrants’ rights instruments lies in the ways in which 
these instruments affect their sovereignty/national interests when granting 
or restricting migrant rights. In his view, it is important to focus on the 
‘costs and benefits’ that the granting of specific rights to third-country 
workers implies for receiving countries. Ruhs’ starting premise is that 
migrants’ rights perform an instrumental role as determinants in 
international labour migration. His main argument is that there are ‘trade-
offs’ in high-income countries between ‘openness’ to admitting migrant 
workers and rights granted to them after admission.34  
The equation between ‘equality of rights’ and ‘restrictive immigration 
policy’ has been subject to extensive discussion.35 It has been emphasised 
that there is no evidence in immigration policy debates of a linkage 
between openness and rights in the UK: “The recent British experience 
suggests that increased numbers are a more important constraint upon – or 
driver of – changes to rights’ regimes than the openness of policy per se.”36 
Indeed, increased numbers of one category of migrant (e.g. migrants from 
the European Economic Area, or EEA) can lead to effects in the policy 
sphere upon other unrelated groups (non-EEA).37   
Some of these rights are actually minimum labour standards foreseen 
in International Labour Organization (ILO) instruments. Indeed, one of the 
more problematic aspects inherent to the ‘more openness, less rights’ logic 
is that it may challenge the set of international labour standards developed 
by organisations such as the ILO. The current emphasis on temporariness 
and rights trade-offs can be highly problematic from the perspective of 
ensuring the protection of migrant workers’ rights and labour standards.38 
In Cholewinski’s opinion, the trade-off framing is inappropriate as it locks 
individuals into a ‘zero sum game’ (rights versus numbers). It also leads to 
a ‘race to the bottom’ and frames third-country workers as commodities, 
with economic ‘utility’ at its core.  
Ruhs advocates “the liberalisation of international labour migration, 
especially of lower-skilled workers, through temporary migration 
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programmes that protect a universal set of core rights […] by restricting a 
few specific rights that create net costs for receiving countries”, which he 
denominates as a “core rights approach”. The question arises of the extent 
to which such costs are based on objective evidence. Are these real costs or 
perceived costs? How do these costs, as well as the practice of granting 
different sets of rights to different groups of migrants, influence social 
cohesion?  
Tentative answers to these questions are offered by Acosta Arcarazo, 
who highlights experiences from South American countries on the ‘rights 
versus numbers’ rhetoric and comes to the following conclusion: in 
Argentina, Spain and Portugal, migration has been mostly affected by the 
economic opportunities in certain labour market sectors rather than by any 
specific legal framework restricting third-country nationals’ rights and 
benefits.39 It is, in his view, far from clear whether it is rights or job 
availability that matters the most. The degree of restrictiveness of an 
immigration policy does not seem to be the most decisive factor in 
determining immigration or emigration, but it may lead to social exclusion, 
harsher living conditions and unnecessary obstacles to human mobility.  
8.4 Matching demand and supply: A redesigned EU ‘guest 
worker’ model?  
A main dilemma raised by the trade-off discussions relates to the degree of 
temporariness that the emerging EU labour immigration policy implicitly 
promotes, in the form of a revamped ‘guest-worker’ model. One of the 
main challenges facing the current and next generation of EU immigration 
policy-makers is to not repeat the past mistakes of the failed guest-worker 
programmes. Indeed, the adoption of the EU Directives on seasonal 
employment and intra-corporate transferees show a worrying trend 
towards ‘temporariness’ that resembles too closely the failed guest-worker 
programmes of Germany and Switzerland.40 The former Swiss model of 
employment of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, allowed Italian workers 
to be employed for nine months a year for many subsequent years without 
ever obtaining a more stable and secure residence status.41 Thus, it can be 
concluded that such temporary migration policies might well be at odds 
with the social inclusion of immigrant workers into the receiving societies, 
as they are primarily based on exclusion and expulsion after a certain 
period of time in the receiving country.42 
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Preferential treatment of certain 
migrants based on a ‘narrowly 
defined measured demand for skills’ 
is a self-defeating policy option. 
The academic literature underlines the importance of taking due 
account of ‘historical experiences’ and of ‘lessons learnt’ from previous 
policies. A growing body of literature points to the inherent ‘policy failure’, 
‘fallacy’ or ‘policy gap’ between the publicly stated goal and objectives of 
states’ migration control policies and the actual outcomes that can be 
observed regarding the social phenomenon of cross-border human mobility 
for employment-related purposes.43 This gap may become even greater 
when a supranational migration policy actor, such as the EU, is at stake.  
With a view to future EU policy-making, it is therefore essential to 
consider the fact that more often than not, migration control policies have 
achieved precisely the opposite effects to what was originally intended by 
national policy-makers. Castles highlights the well-known example of the 
German guest-worker recruitment policy between 1955 and 1973, which 
was intended to recruit workers temporarily but resulted in permanent 
settlement, family reunion and the emergence of diverse societies in 
Germany.44 Is the emerging EU immigration policy likewise prone to 
failure? As Castles points out, “migration policies may fail if they are based 
on a short-term view of the migratory 
process […] it is necessary to analyse 
the migratory process as a long-term 
social process with its own 
dynamics”, as a ‘societal process’ 
which cannot be enshrined in law in 
liberal democratic regimes.45 ‘Short-termism’ (a short-term perspective) in 
policy-making tends to be a commonly shared trend in this area. 
From an economic viewpoint, Kahanec shows how ‘skills-based 
selective frameworks’ in which preferential treatment is given to certain 
migrants based on a “narrowly defined measured demand for skills” is a 
self-defeating policy option.46 This is also the case from the perspective of 
financial costs. In his view, the “identification of skill needs and regular 
adjustment, fine tuning and monitoring of the system involve significant 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs”. Moreover, the criteria for ‘selection’ 
are based on “a small set of observable characteristics that only proxy the 
true determinants of migrants’ employability and labour market 
potential”.47 
International experiences reveal similar deficiencies. “Although the 
US legal framework is predicated on non-citizens obtaining their 
immigrant visas overseas at a US consulate, […] only a miniscule number 
of individuals coming to the United States as permanent labour migrants 
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The assumption that the US and 
Canada provide more attractive 
migratory schemes in comparison 
to the EU has been contested. 
are overseas when they seek permanent resident status. Rather, almost 
everyone who satisfies the employment-based immigrant categories is 
already working in the United States.”48 Labour migration to the United 
States is mainly employer-led and a large majority of non-US citizens enter 
the country as ‘temporary visitors’ or ‘non-immigrants’. Fullerton points 
out that temporary foreign workers have a weaker legal status in terms of 
bargaining power and labour mobility, including limited options to change 
employer, in comparison to those migrants benefiting from permanent 
pathways.49 This demonstrates the vulnerability of cost/benefit and 
selective migratory schemes.  
A similar move towards a system said to combine the US and 
Australian models has been identified in Canada, where the system 
increasingly functions as a points-based system geared towards specific 
skills (a points-based selection model) and mainly focuses on temporary 
admission of foreign workers. When examining the so-called ‘Canadian 
Experience Class’, Gabriel highlights that the system focuses purely on the 
interest of the state and that the economy renders vulnerable those 
temporary workers in “low-skilled occupations offering no path to 
permanent residence” and leads to irregularity of their stay, thus 
“subjecting Canada to similar problems to those European countries 
experienced with their guest workers”.50 
8.5 Recognition of skills and qualifications plays a key role 
in attractiveness 
The opportunities that countries grant to skilled individuals to make full 
use of their qualifications and competences constitutes a central 
determining factor fostering attractiveness, competitiveness and growth. 
Thus, efficient systems for the recognition of foreign-acquired diplomas, 
skills and work experience represent a 
key instrument to realise this potential. 
In practice, however, obtaining 
recognition of one’s qualifications and 
diplomas, and lengthy administrative 
recognition procedures, continue to 
present major obstacles to international mobility and the inclusion of third-
country workers in domestic and international labour markets.  
The EU is no exception in this respect. The lower returns to foreign 
education and work experience, combined with limited mastery of the host 
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The lack of skills recognition 
forces migrants to Europe to 
downgrade to jobs below their 
level of qualification.  
country’s language, help explain higher over-qualification rates for 
immigrants relative to native-born workers.51 Kahanec therefore argues not 
only that Europe is losing in the global competition for skilled migrant 
workers, but also that migrants to Europe tend to downgrade to jobs below 
their level of qualification.52 Amongst the various options available in 
respect to migration policy frameworks, one that might be of more 
relevance is the identification of skills in shortage in a given labour market. 
In Kahanec’s view, however, a key challenge of such a policy is to identify 
skills shortages in a way that is not ‘political’ and takes due account of 
market failures.  
Securing skills recognition remains very limited in practice. A key 
issue is that there is no commonly shared definition of what constitutes a 
‘skill’, or one that clarifies what is a ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ skill or 
talent.53 The definitions are too often poorly and artificially framed in terms 
of ‘occupational skills’ or ‘educational attainment’, or even in terms of the 
receiving country’s ‘needs’.54 These challenges have also been addressed by 
Kahanec, who poses the following questions: How can a particular worker 
be assigned to a specific skill group? How can the fact that ‘needs’ for 
specific skills are time-dependent and vary over the short, medium and 
long term be addressed? What may be needed today may not be needed 
tomorrow. Kahanec believes that time-dependency and politicisation are 
the two main obstacles challenging the effectiveness of skills recognition 
and skills matching.55  
The experience of Canada is illuminating. Gabriel highlights the 
uncertainties over whether ‘labour needs’ can be effectively determined by 
the state. She points out that admission to a country does not guarantee 
immigrants a job commensurate with their 
experience and skills. In her view, points-
based systems face a common challenge 
consisting of the difficulty in differentiating 
between qualifications of varying quality 
and utility. Gabriel criticises the selective 
approach (to match demand and supply) in Canadian migration policy on 
the basis of “immigrant skill underutilisation” and a main policy focus on 
“short-term economic gain”.56 
Indeed, discussions on skills and labour market needs are too often 
hampered by a narrative that categorises skills as ‘low’ and ‘high’ and 
assumes the viability of these categories in domestic and supranational 
contexts.57 ‘Medium’ skills are often ignored. Yet, as has been demonstrated 
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in several EU member states and as is also the case with the EU Blue Card, 
the labelling of an individual as a ‘highly skilled’ third-country national 
does not necessarily relate to the specific ‘skills’, qualifications or 
experience of the person involved, but rather to first, the ‘utility’ of the 
worker in a labour market sector that is considered to be facing ‘gaps’, and 
second, the actual salary level that the worker will receive in the receiving 
country.  
So when official discourses refer to a ‘mismatch’ or lack of ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’, it is not entirely clear what they are referring to. Moreover, 
an interesting development is that the ‘temporary’ or ‘guest-worker’ 
migration management models are now redefining the target group of 
‘good’ immigrants they want to attract. Increasing numbers of states are 
shifting their policies on ‘attractiveness’ and ‘permanent settlement’, or 
even granting nationality to ‘investors’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ with golden 
visa programmes and/or citizenship-for-sale schemes.58 
8.6 Dilemmas of labour migration policies persist  
There are a number of dilemmas and challenges associated with labour 
migration policies in different supranational and international settings, and 
key questions arise that call for further research.  
First, policies are ‘attractive’ in comparison to where? The rhetoric of 
attractiveness presupposes that other ‘developed’ world economies such as 
the United States or Canada seem to be in conscious competition with the 
EU over a certain kind of desired foreign labour force, the so-called 
‘talented’, ‘highly qualified’ or ‘brightest’ workers. This competition is used 
to justify differential treatment in relation to the desirable labour migrant. 
Yet, is there such a ‘person’? It is also often assumed that these countries 
may constitute ‘good examples’, ‘lessons learnt’ or even ‘models’ for the EU 
to follow in its ongoing internal deliberations on the way forward. This 
holds true for certain elements but the US and Canadian immigration 
systems face similar dilemmas and are not as ‘attractive’ as they are often 
portrayed in the EU policy discourse. For example, the downside of the 
employer-driven US system is that this system translates into less 
protection offered to immigrants vis-à-vis employers. The admission 
procedures under the US immigration scheme are not as straightforward or 
quick as assumed; this is one element that the US bill pending in the House 
of Representatives entitled “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act 2013” aims to remedy.59 Also, 
geographical mobility in the US cannot easily be compared with intra-EU 
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mobility due to a number of reasons, including structural, linguistic and 
cultural differences.60 
Second, policies are attractive to whom? It must also be borne in 
mind that the ‘attractiveness’ of migration policies is in the eye of the 
beholder; by focusing on the ‘attractiveness’ of the policies to a foreign 
labour force purely from an economic perspective – i.e. in terms of the 
‘needs’ of the receiving state – the ‘attractiveness’ of policies from a migrant 
worker’s viewpoint is relegated to a secondary policy concern. For migrant 
workers, ‘attractiveness’ may well concern issues related to security of 
residence, non-discrimination, access to fundamental social rights and 
compliance with international labour standards.61 This aspect is closely 
connected to the next point. 
Third, how can an immigration policy be made ‘attractive’? Among 
the factors here, reference is often made to an improved set of rights and 
benefits conferred on foreign workers and other incentives such as the 
easing of administrative procedures (fast-track), unrestricted access to the 
labour market, the provision of information/employer sponsorship, and so 
on. While some of the rights and benefits are indeed non-negotiable core 
components of international and European instruments by which EU 
member states are bound, there is little evidence of their effects on 
emigration. It is also difficult to argue that there is a direct correlation 
between the granting of rights and openness. An underlying problem is 
that any trade-off framework legitimises inequality of treatment on the 
basis of dubious grounds related to ‘quotas’, ‘skills’ or ‘needs’, which are 
often hugely politicised and based on short-term considerations. 
Fourth, what kind of foreign worker is it hoped will be ‘attracted’ by 
an immigration policy? The paradigm of attractiveness often refers to a 
recruitment logic focusing on those individuals considered to be the 
‘brightest’ available. The starting principle here is a utilitarian and 
economics-oriented approach that justifies inequality of treatment amongst 
workers. But who are those highly skilled and talented individuals? Which 
criteria are used to categorise a worker in a specific skill group? It is often 
assumed that exact methodologies exist to identify and match relevant 
‘skills’ and ‘needs’ in national labour markets. The argument appears to 
assume that achieving a perfect match between skills of immigrants and 
national labour market needs and priorities is feasible, but this assumption 
has been challenged in this chapter.  
164  GREEN, PINK & SILVER? THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE 
 
Any EU proposal to codify the 
existing fragmented instruments, 
statuses and rules should be firmly 
anchored in a rights-based and non-
discriminatory approach. 
8.7 Future EU migration policy must overcome 
fragmentation and legal uncertainty 
In the next generation of EU labour immigration policy, action must be 
taken to overcome fragmentation, legal uncertainty, discrimination and 
competing multi-layered migratory statuses. This action can take different 
forms. One view suggests that the European Commission under President 
Jean-Claude Juncker should present new legislative initiatives. For 
example, Peers advocates the 
introduction of an EU immigration 
code (or code on legal immigration) as 
previously proposed by the 
Commission.62 This code should 
establish a more ambitious level of 
harmonisation than currently exists 
by, first, raising existing EU standards, and second, creating a simplified 
and more consistent set of common regulations.63 A non-legally binding 
corpus or compendium of existing EU rules and statuses could be a first 
step in that direction. Any proposal for codification should be firmly 
anchored in a rights-based and non-discriminatory approach.64 
Another priority should be to remove both formal and informal 
obstacles to the recognition of qualifications and diplomas, as they 
constitute barriers to international mobility and to the inclusion of third-
country workers in labour markets. Measures that improve the use of 
foreign-acquired skills include: disseminating information on recognition 
procedures and their outcomes; facilitating early and timely recognition; 
implementing procedures for recognising professional credentials acquired 
abroad and allowing early labour market access; and, finally, negotiating 
mutual recognition agreements between receiving and sending countries.65 
An alternative approach emphasises improved monitoring and 
enforcement of existing EU migration standards. The European 
Commission under President Juncker should focus on making better use of 
infringement proceedings where necessary. Here, common EU guidelines 
aimed at national practitioners and civil society organisations to better 
ensure implementation by relevant regional and local administrations and 
litigation before the relevant courts are vital. Broadening the dialogue with 
and inputs from social partners (employers’ associations and trade unions) 
and civil society organisations is equally important. Finally, strategic 
partnerships with relevant actors – such as the Council of Europe, the 
United Nations and the ILO – could prove to be useful in this area. As the 
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Commission has underlined, significant efforts are still required to improve 
the implementation of internationally agreed frameworks and to better 
enforce the protection of human rights of migrants.66 The EU should 
therefore promote international human rights and labour standards, in 
particular with respect to those immigration policy dimensions now falling 
within the scope of EU law. 
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9. POLICY PUZZLES WITH THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF ROMA 
VERA MESSING 
oma are the largest non-migrant ethnic minority group in Europe 
and an extremely vulnerable one. Their population is estimated to 
be between 9 and 12 million (roughly equal to the population of 
Belgium) and in comparison with the rest of the continent, it is a young 
population with a higher-than-average share of working-age individuals.1 
In contrast with other ethnic minority groups, they have no historical 
homeland and live spread across most European countries, but they are 
particularly concentrated in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Serbia and 
Slovakia, which are home to over half of Europe’s Roma.2  
In some European countries, the widespread exclusion of Roma from 
the primary labour market adds considerably to the challenge of meeting 
the Europe 2020 target of an employment rate of 75% for those aged 20-65. 
The estimated economic and fiscal costs of the exclusion of Roma from the 
formal labour market are staggering, ranging from €231 million in Serbia to 
€887 million in Romania.3 Furthermore, Roma are a young population with 
relatively high fertility rates, and therefore can and should be regarded as 
an important resource in ageing European societies. However, in spite of 
numerous ways and funds to support the Roma population in European 
societies, their labour market situation has not improved significantly. Most 
of the programmes are not efficient and do not actually reach out to 
vulnerable Roma. In this chapter, therefore, we examine the most 
important factors behind the poor employment situation for Roma and 
potentials for active labour market policies (ALMPs) to influence 
                                                   
 Vera Messing: Research Fellow at the Center for Policy Studies, Central European 
University, Budapest. 
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opportunities for unemployed Roma in five European countries: Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. 
Figure 9.1 Roma population in Europe 
 
 
9.1 Roma face widespread exclusion from the primary 
labour market   
The analysis of the position of Roma in the labour market is complicated by 
a lack of ethnic data, as well as competing definitions of who the Roma 
people are. What we refer to by ‘Roma’ or ‘Gypsies’ is not a politically, 
socially or culturally homogenous group. ‘Roma/Gypsy’ may be 
understood rather as an umbrella term denominating population groups 
with very different ethnic identities, languages, traditions, history or level 
of inclusion, even within the same country and definitely across Europe. 
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Many people identify Roma based on visible signs of poverty and 
exclusion, irrespective of whether or not the individual himself or herself 
identifies with the Roma people, and therefore some authors4 argue that 
the concept of Roma/Gypsy is more a construction reflecting the 
perceptions of the majority society than an actual ethnic community. It is 
also important to note that in contrast to public perceptions, the majority of 
Roma are indigenous minorities, meaning that they have been citizens and 
lived for centuries in their respective countries, and – with a few exceptions 
– they are settled and are by no means nomadic in today’s Europe. The 
common feature of Roma is that they experience a high level of social 
exclusion, prejudice and discrimination in all European countries. 
Figure 9.2 Employment of Roma versus non-Roma living in their vicinity  
 
Note: This figure summarises employment of Roma as measured by the FRA Roma survey 
in 2011, which investigated Roma living in spatial concentration. Even though the survey is 
not representative of all Roma in Europe and employment is measured by indicators that 
are not comparable with EUROSTAT indicators collected in the course of the Labour Force 
Survey, to date this is the only comparative source of information at a European level. The 
survey covered also non-Roma living in the vicinity of Roma and found that the 
employment gap between the two groups is significant. 
Source: FRA (2011). 
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The most important causes for 
low employment of Roma is their 
generally low educational levels, 
together with widespread racial 
discrimination.  
A pilot survey conducted by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) covered Roma who fall under the broad definition of 
the Council of Europe (including, for example, Roma, Gipsies, Gitanos, 
Sinti, Travellers, Kalé and Gens du voyage), independent of their citizenship 
or whether their lifestyle was sedentary, semi-sedentary or mobile.5 
According to the data, Roma citizens have employment rates well below 
the average of other citizens and non-Roma living in their vicinity. The 
maximum observed value was recorded in Bulgaria, where 30% of 
working-age Roma are in employment. The data point not only to the low 
level of employment among Roma,6 but also to the unfavourable 
employment structure for Roma in many countries. It is notable that – 
especially in Bulgaria, Spain and Romania – less than half of the total 
‘employment rate’ consists of stable, full-time employment providing a 
calculable and due income. Roma are more typically involved in unstable 
and unsafe employment arrangements, such as part-time jobs, ad hoc jobs 
or self-employment, the latter frequently being a cover for an unemployed 
situation. In this context, it is crucial to understand what interventions are 
accessible and helpful to this population group.  
9.2 Low-skillness has different employment consequences 
in different countries  
Several intersecting causes trigger low employment indicators, the effects 
of which amplify each other. Labour market disadvantage is primarily a 
result of the dramatically low level of 
education of Roma in comparison to the 
rest of the population forming a majority 
in the respective countries. The UNDP 
Regional Roma Survey found that self-
declared illiteracy is extremely high 
among Roma in Bulgaria and Romania 
(13% and 25% of adults, respectively) and, despite some improvement, it 
remains significant even among young Roma adults. This is not the case in 
Hungary and Slovakia, however, where illiteracy is negligible and 
restricted mainly to the older, non-working age cohorts. The lack of 
essential skills – such as reading, maths and basic computer and 
communication skills – that are required in the labour market is an 
important explanatory variable for the low employment rates.7  
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The picture does not improve much when formal education is 
considered. Romania presents the worst situation, where a third of adult 
Roma have no formal educational qualifications and only a third have 
lower secondary or higher education. In Hungary and Slovakia, the 
situation is significantly better: most Roma complete lower secondary 
school. However, an upper secondary school qualification (ISCED 3), 
which can be regarded as a threshold for stable formal employment, is rare 
even in these two countries. The ethnic gap is immense at this stage: in 
contrast to 10-19% of Roma, 57-91% of the total population of the respective 
countries has completed upper secondary education.8 Although there have 
been substantial improvements in educational attainment, meaning that 
younger generations have higher educational levels than older-age groups, 
a lack of education in Romania and Bulgaria remains a severe problem 
even for the youngest age groups. 
Figure 9.3 Educational levels of adult Roma in four central and eastern European 
countries 
 
Note: The UNDP/WB/EC survey (FRA and UNDP, 2012) did not include Spain, while data 
derived from the FRA survey, which is comparative across the EU member states, did not 
include educational qualifications transferable to ISCED codes. 
Source: UNDP/WB/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011.  
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Low-skillness has different consequences in different countries and 
sectors of activity.9 In Slovakia and Hungary, a low level of education has a 
more powerful effect on employment opportunities than in Spain, Romania 
or Bulgaria.10 This discrepancy can be partly explained by differences in the 
structures of the national economies of the respective countries, more 
specifically the presence of economic sectors/branches that can absorb the 
low-educated Roma workforce. In Romania, Bulgaria and Spain, the 
construction, tourism and agriculture sectors – which employ a 
considerable share of low-educated workers – make up an important share 
of the national economies, even though the crisis since 2008 has had a 
significant negative effect. The Spanish economic boom of the 1990s and 
2000s provided plenty of jobs for vulnerable groups, including migrants 
and Roma. In contrast, in central and eastern European countries, and 
especially in Slovakia and Hungary, the current situation is determined by 
the transitional shock of the early 1990s, during which the economies 
experienced a sharp drop in demand for low-skilled and unskilled work. 
This change in the economic structure also has important geographical 
implications: certain regions, and precisely those where a considerable 
share of Roma live (east and south-east Slovakia, north-east and south-west 
Hungary), suffered disproportionately due to the decline of heavy industry 
after 1989. Lasting economic depression and long-term unemployment are 
extremely widespread in these areas. 
Labour market programmes are not equipped to tackle the issue of 
low-skillness, in general. It is important to understand that economic 
structures of the post-transition economies continue to determine the 
demand for qualifications of the labour force to which school systems have 
not adapted. Therefore, the lack of highly educated workforce and the 
oversupply of low-skilled workforce cannot be tackled within the 
framework of labour market policies, but should primarily be addressed 
through the system of public education. Labour market programmes are 
equipped to make only minor adjustments and corrections in terms of 
training in specific areas. Nevertheless, we have identified a few instances 
in which countries have attempted to deal with the inadequate educational 
levels of unemployed Roma. For example, in Spain and Hungary, 
employment offices (EOs) offered training courses tailored to the needs of 
the local economy.11 However, the overwhelming experience was that due 
to inadequate design, poor targeting techniques, a lack of financial support 
to beneficiaries and discrimination in the selection procedure, meaningful 
training remained inaccessible for most Roma in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovakia.  
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Regulatory factors may also contribute to low chances of employment 
as they inform the investment decisions of multinational companies, which 
are important employers of the low-skilled workforce. The high cost of 
officially employing workers is a crucial factor in this respect. Analysing 
current country-specific regulations on taxes, social contributions and 
minimum wages, the cost of labour was calculated and sizeable differences 
were found across the five countries.12 The cost of employment seems to be 
an important factor determining the proportion of Roma that had the 
opportunity to enter the labour market. In Slovakia and Spain, where the 
cost of employing a person at the minimum wage is higher by a factor of 
between two and five compared with Romania and Bulgaria, a significantly 
lower proportion of Roma are formally employed. Hungary is an exception 
to this rule to some extent: relatively high employment costs are coupled 
with relatively high employment rates of Roma, but this is due to the fact 
that beneficiaries of job creation programmes13 financed by the state are 
registered as formal employees in the labour statistics. However, public 
work programmes are not an inherent segment of the primary labour 
market and do not appear as employment in the statistics for other 
countries (e.g. Slovakia). 
In the framework of ALMP, wage subsidies have the potential to 
increase formal employment of the low-skilled (and low-productivity) 
workforce by easing burdens of employment (social security contributions 
and taxes) for a certain period of time. Such measures were available in 
most countries but because Roma were not named as a target group and of 
the fact that numerous conditions were attached to such subsidies 
(administrative burdens and commitments to provide an employment 
contract beyond the period of the subsidy), employers were dissuaded 
from making use of such schemes and Roma typically did not benefit from 
this measure.  
9.3 Discrimination and informal work are distinctive 
features of the Roma labour market 
A very important factor feeding into the low employment rate of Roma is 
the extensive racial discrimination that Roma/Gypsy people face in central 
and south-east Europe. Roma are discriminated against during the 
selection procedure itself.14 Our empirical fieldwork research also 
confirmed that ethnic discrimination is not necessarily hidden; in Romania 
and Bulgaria, job advertisements even indicate explicitly that Roma should 
not apply, while in Slovakia and Hungary more concealed forms of 
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There is significant 
informal, unreported and 
sometimes unpaid work 
hidden behind the low 
employment rates recorded 
among Roma.  
discrimination are prevalent, such as applicants with Roma names or racial 
signs being refused without further explanation. Racial discrimination is 
not exclusive to business employers; state employers and even stakeholders 
in the labour market, such as employment offices and job centres, may also 
act in a discriminatory way.  
Although relevant legal safeguards against racial discrimination as 
well as an institutional framework for addressing complaints of 
discrimination existed in all of the countries, awareness of discrimination 
as well as the enforcement of anti-discrimination regulation remained weak 
in the field of employment. A potential way to counteract the consequences 
of racial discrimination is to target certain labour market programmes 
specifically at Roma. However, such approaches are rare, usually local in 
scope and project-based and therefore irregular and unstable. Spain is an 
exception in this respect: EU funds dedicated to social inclusion are 
distributed by four NGOs, one of which (the Fundació Secretariado Gitano, 
or FSG) is a pro-Roma organisation. This arrangement allows Roma to have 
a significant voice not only in the distribution of large funds dedicated to 
inclusion, but also in programme design and monitoring. A further 
consequence of this structure is that in contrast to the project-based 
financing prevalent in central and eastern European countries, funds 
dedicated to the inclusion of Roma are stable and calculable over the long 
run.  
Discrimination, combined with high costs of employment and the fact 
that the recession hit the classic employment sectors of Roma 
disproportionately hard, results in the extensive exclusion of Roma from 
official employment, pushing them towards informal segments of the 
labour market. A number of qualitative in-
depth studies15 and surveys have emphasised 
that employment of Roma deviates 
considerably from typical employment in that 
i) it is usually irregular, ii) it includes activities 
that are not considered as employment 
(collecting and trading with goods, waste 
recycling), iii) it is unstable, and iv) is outside 
the scope of the formal and sometimes even the legal labour market. 
Qualitative, in-depth investigations, as well as the EU-wide FRA Roma 
survey and the UNDP/WB/EC survey16 covering southern, central and 
eastern European countries, reinforce the notion that there is significant 
informal, unreported and sometimes unpaid work hidden behind the 
recorded low employment rates.   
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Here we need to refer to factors that, contrary to public perception, 
do not enhance the low employment rates of Roma. According to public 
opinion, the reason for the high unemployment of Roma is their lack of 
willingness to work. There is no empirical proof for such beliefs; on the 
contrary, the latest UNDP/WB/EC and FRA surveys reveal the opposite: 
Roma have an overwhelming preference for safe and regular jobs as 
opposed to unsafe and irregular jobs. Between 75% and 93% preferred 
having a secure but modestly paid job to an unsecure job with high income. 
Another common misconception about the causes of high unemployment is 
that Roma tend to exploit the welfare systems. An analysis of the financial 
incentives of staying employed as opposed to turning to the welfare system 
disproved the feasibility of such a strategy.17  
9.4 Targeting programmes is an important dilemma of 
policy design 
A crucial dilemma for experts as well as for practitioners is how best to 
organise active labour market policies (ALMPs). The predominant mode of 
targeting ALMPs is mainstreaming, which involves identifying 
characteristics of vulnerability and addressing them, irrespective of the 
ethnicity of the recipient. The most significant argument in favour of 
mainstreaming is that it avoids the risk of ethnicising Roma. Policies that 
define target groups according to factors that cause vulnerability – such as 
those with low education, in economically disadvantaged regions or 
marginalised communities, or of a certain age – would have the potential to 
reach Roma, given that they are overrepresented in these vulnerable 
groups. In contrast, promoters of ethnically targeted programmes argue 
that racial discrimination is the most important source of the lack of labour 
market opportunities, and disregarding this factor necessarily leads to 
Roma being overlooked by ALMPs.  
A crucial guiding document for Roma integration in Europe is the EU 
Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS), which was 
elaborated under the imperative of EU in 2011. The document was a 
pioneering step because it represented an explicit political commitment to 
improve the situation of Roma. This framework document advocated for an 
ethnically targeted approach, stating that it is “crucial to [...] ensure that 
national, regional and local integration policies focus on Roma in a clear 
and specific way”.18 Implicitly, the document aims to assure the 
channelling of targeted solutions through mainstream institutions; namely, 
to ensure that Roma are explicitly named as a potential 'at-risk' or 
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'vulnerable' target population for mainstream measures. This is referred to 
in EU documents as the principle of “explicit but not exclusive targeting”. 
Although most national social inclusion strategies and action plans follow 
this idea by naming Roma among the social groups with multiple 
vulnerabilities, our research found hardly any signs of implementation of 
this principle in labour market policies in the four central and eastern 
European countries.  
The most recent EU document on Roma integration, the effects of 
which have yet to be seen, is the European Council’s recommendation on 
effective Roma integration measures: 
With a view to promoting the full equality of Roma in practice, 
take effective policy measures to ensure their equal treatment and 
the respect of their fundamental rights […] This goal could be 
achieved either by means of mainstream measures or by means of 
targeted measures, including specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages, or by a combination of both, 
paying special attention to the gender dimension.19 
This document does not provide useful guidelines with regard to the 
most pressing dilemma of policy design, namely, how to reach out to 
vulnerable Roma and monitor the impact of policies on this segment of the 
population. Nevertheless, it gives equal weight to ethnically targeted and 
mainstream interventions.  
Formulating an employment programme for the Roma population 
entails considerable political risk in the countries of central and eastern 
Europe, where prejudice and negative attitudes towards Roma are 
widespread, not only within the population but also among politicians and 
employees of public institutions. Governments are therefore reluctant to 
explicitly target Roma. In addition, as a result of a lack of data from 
monitoring activities on the ethnic background of programme beneficiaries, 
ethnic targeting remains weak. It is no wonder that with the exception of 
the Spanish ACCEDER programme,20 ethnically targeted policy 
interventions are sporadic, local and powerless. We therefore move on 
from examining just ‘Roma employment programmes’ to identifying 
labour market interventions and measures that have the potential to 
intervene in the low employment rates of the Roma population. 
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9.5 Mainstream schemes: Job creation, regional development 
programmes and labour market services 
Active labour market policies are often considered an effective tool for 
promoting labour market inclusion and tackling long-term unemployment, 
especially in times of economic crisis. For this reason, we first look at 
government expenditure by type of action in the five countries analysed so 
far. With the exception of Spain, the level of ALMP spending is well below 
the EU average in all countries (very close to zero in Bulgaria and 
Romania), despite the fact that long-term unemployment rates exceed the 
EU average significantly in four out of the five countries.21  
Figure 9.4 ALMP expenditure by type of action and by member state, 2012 
(% of total ALMP expenditure)* 
 
* For Spain, the data refer to year 2011. 
Source: Eurostat database. 
However, it is not only the level of spending on ALMPs but the 
combination of the various measures that matters. According to Figure 9.4, 
some countries apply a true mix of ALMP measures (Spain and Slovakia), 
while others display a dominant preference for one measure and dedicate 
most of their funds to this (Hungary and Bulgaria).  
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Roma employees at 
employment offices improve 
the implementation of ALMP 
for Roma at the local level. 
Direct job creation programmes in the form of public work 
programmes (PWPs) and public employment programmes (PEPs)22 were 
the most widely available measures to unemployed Roma in Hungary,23 
Bulgaria and Slovakia,24 while their implementation was significant but not 
overwhelming in Spain.25 The scope and content of direct job creation 
varied significantly among the four 
countries, with Hungary standing out in 
terms of the share of the ALMP budget 
spent on direct job creation (more than two-
thirds). However, the positive impact of 
direct job creation programmes on labour 
market inclusion was often mitigated by the very design of these 
programmes. Public work and public employment programmes are either a 
combination of labour market and social welfare policy measures (e.g. 
participation in public work is tied to the receipt of social welfare 
allowances, as in Hungary), or can be the exclusive terrain of social policy 
(as in Slovakia). Our fieldwork investigation26 identified important 
weaknesses in direct job creation schemes that worked to the detriment of 
their efficiency and resulted in counter-effective outcomes in some cases. 
The most significant problems with job creation programmes can be 
summarised as follows: 
 In Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, public work schemes trap 
beneficiaries (especially marginalised Roma) in the cycle of welfare 
support and PWPs/PEPs. These programmes proved to be extremely 
inefficient in supporting the return of the unemployed to the primary 
labour market because they did not offer any additional labour 
market services – such as training, orientation, job search or 
consultation – and no limitations were set concerning the number of 
occasions an individual could benefit from the schemes. Also, in most 
of the cases – in Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria – direct job creation 
programmes offered mundane, superfluous activities. Such 
programmes in fact became a form of mandatory work imposed on 
the welfare-dependent and long-term unemployed and failed to 
improve employment opportunities for their beneficiaries. That no 
outcome indicators related to labour market inclusion were 
formulated by the programmes reflects the fact that these 
programmes were not really meant to support labour market 
inclusion.  
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Public work does not 
address the causes of long-
term unemployment. 
 Job creation following the logic of workfare enhanced local 
hierarchies and structures that result in the exposure and 
powerlessness of Roma and unemployed in other vulnerable groups. 
This was the case in Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, where 
participation in public employment was tied to entitlement to social 
welfare benefits. 
 In Hungary, where the scope (the number of beneficiaries) of the 
PEPs was too large and the range of potential beneficiaries was 
defined in a non-restrictive way, the programme distorted the local 
labour market equilibrium. Even the highly skilled temporary 
unemployed were addressed by job creation and as a result, public 
institutions replaced some of their regular workers with PEP 
beneficiaries.  
In sum, PEPs/PWPs offered short-term solutions that did not address 
the causes of long-term unemployment. Job creation programmes might be 
an effective form of intervention in severely marginalised regions, for the 
most vulnerable population groups and for a restricted period of time, but 
only when implemented in a carefully designed manner and with a wide 
range of additional services offered to 
beneficiaries. It is important to understand 
that PEPs could become popular despite their 
poor performance because they entail 
significant political gains. They offer short-
term employment for those with serious difficulties in the open labour 
market and are therefore supported both by programme participants and 
the local middle classes, who see them as a tool to activate the ‘indolent’ 
poor and Roma. In addition, the political elite regards them as a means of 
improving labour statistics, an important indicator of governmental 
performance in crisis-hit economies.  
A few programmes – typically EU-funded development programmes 
in Hungary and Slovakia – address the issue of regional inequalities and 
the explicit marginalisation of Roma. In Slovakia, marginalised Roma 
communities are targeted explicitly by including them as a horizontal 
priority in the country’s development programmes. In Hungary, the most 
underdeveloped micro-regions with a large share of Roma receive 
substantial support for complex development of their economies, human 
resources and infrastructure. In Catalonia, geographical targeting is applied 
by the Llei de Barris (Neighbourhood Law) programme, which addresses 
certain impoverished urban zones. Such geographical targeting is 
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theoretically an appropriate way to reach out to a significant share of 
vulnerable Roma without ethnicising poverty and long-term 
unemployment. However, these programmes are complex in nature, 
meaning that they focus on intersecting spheres of disadvantage (such as 
infrastructure, housing, education and community development) and have 
a less explicit focus on employment. Our field research, as well as 
evaluation studies of the respective programmes, show that geographically 
targeted complex development programmes failed to reach the most 
disadvantaged in the course of their implementation. Lack of meaningful 
inclusion of Roma NGOs in the design and implementation at the local 
level was one of the major reasons why these programmes were likely to 
disregard the actual needs of the marginalised Roma communities.27 
An important prerequisite for improving the labour market inclusion 
of Roma is that employment offices (EOs) – the state agent assigned the 
mission to support the unemployed in their efforts to reintegrate into the 
labour market – provide high-quality, tailored services to clients in 
vulnerable situations. Yet, we found significant variation in this respect. In 
all of the central and eastern European countries, EOs were seen by 
unemployed Roma as purely administrative units that manage registration 
of unemployed status without providing meaningful support. Moreover, 
unemployed Roma described frequent experiences of open discrimination 
and humiliation by EO staff in Romania and Bulgaria.28 Therefore, Roma, 
and especially those living in marginalised areas, are often reluctant to turn 
to the EOs, whose staff are unsupportive and whose services do not meet 
their needs. To improve the implementation of ALMPs at the local level, 
EOs in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain employed mediators of Roma 
background, who turned out to be less prejudiced and discriminatory 
towards Roma clients and had better communication capacities and 
knowledge of the community.29 Consequently, Roma clients displayed 
greater trust towards them and the office. In Slovakia, social workers 
provided personalised counselling to unemployed Roma.30  
Geographical distance constituted an additional barrier. In all of the 
countries (except Spain), Roma residents of small rural settlements had 
difficulties in accessing the EO situated in the town serving as the centre of 
their micro-region. Either travel expenses were not covered (Romania and 
Bulgaria) or their reimbursement was delayed (Hungary), causing 
difficulty for the economically deprived rural Roma people to access this 
service. A suitable solution for bridging geographical distances was found 
in one Hungarian settlement, where the EO operated a mobile office with 
regular office hours in each settlement within its service area.  
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Employment data 
disaggregated by ethnicity 
are crucial for the design of 
successful policies. 
9.6 Policy implications: Monitoring, targeting and anti-
discrimination 
A crucial obstacle to understanding the impact of labour market support 
and services on unemployed Roma is the lack of employment data 
disaggregated by ethnicity. Collecting information and monitoring 
outcomes with regard to the participation of 
Roma in ALMPs is a key prerequisite of 
programme targeting and design, and the EU 
could play a pioneering role in this effort. The 
legal framework in individual countries 
makes it difficult to collect information on the 
ethnic background of ALMP beneficiaries. Nevertheless, depending on the 
regulatory environment, there are several options for obtaining the most 
important information.  
First, self-declaration of beneficiaries’ ethnic background (including 
an option for multiple ethnic identification) could become a part of 
anonymised monitoring of ALMP impact in those countries where the 
collection of data on ethnicity is not banned. Such data would allow for an 
analysis at the programme, region or population group levels, or a 
combination of these. As such programmes are predominantly financed by 
EU funds, the EU is in a position to urge national governments to collect 
anonymised data on ALMP beneficiaries’ ethnic background in a sensitive 
manner, respecting the right to self-identification and multiple identities.  
Another data source with the potential to inform policy-makers is 
Roma surveys (either conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency or 
by national governments), which should ask about participation in various 
types of ALMPs.  
Finally, harmonisation of data collection is a truly supranational 
mission, so EU institutions could play an important role in encouraging 
national statistical bodies to collect information about self-declared ethnic 
background of respondents in large-scale EU-wide comparative surveys, 
such as the Labour Force Survey or Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). Such data collection should take into account the 
sensitivity and complexity of ethnic identities and offer the possibility of 
multiple identification. This arrangement would produce reliable data on 
the presence of the Roma population in ALMPs as well as some outcome 
indicators at an aggregate level. 
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The targeting of programmes is a genuine challenge for policy-
makers: in addition to finding ways to identify the populations most in 
need of support, they must take into account political forces and public 
attitudes, as well as the challenges of implementation posed by the 
individual targeting techniques. Our research highlighted that exclusive 
ethnic targeting of employment programmes is rarely a feasible and 
efficient way to reach out to Roma, especially in countries where 
discrimination and anti-Roma prejudice is widespread and strong. In 
addition, ethnically targeted programmes have no instruments to ensure 
that their beneficiaries are Roma. On the other hand, with the exception of 
those programmes that have little or no impact on employment 
opportunities (such as public work schemes), mainstream programmes 
usually do not reach out to Roma either. However, targeting programmes 
according to a careful combination of the factors behind vulnerability (low 
education, age, health situation, living in marginalised regions, having 
small children) together with the adoption of the EU principle of “explicit 
but not exclusive targeting of Roma” may enable a significant number of 
Roma to be reached. Thus, mainstream programmes can and should 
identify an ethnic target about the share of Roma among beneficiaries at an 
aggregate level. The formulation of such targets raises the awareness of EO 
workers and creates an important incentive to reach out to unemployed 
Roma. 
Improvements in the delivery of services by employment offices to 
marginalised Roma communities would automatically support their 
employment opportunities. Presently, employment offices tend to focus 
their efforts on administrative duties, such as registering the unemployed 
or publishing announcements, and fail to provide genuine support to the 
unemployed. Service delivery could be improved via various approaches in 
parallel. Where prejudiced and negative attitudes of EO servants present a 
substantial problem (Bulgaria and Romania), implementing awareness-
raising and sensitivity training for EO servants is essential. Surveying client 
satisfaction in EOs, including experiences of discrimination, could also 
inform the development of EO services. To achieve greater outreach to and 
understanding of marginalised Roma communities, it is desirable to 
employ staff from the Roma community in EOs. However, Roma staff 
members should not be seen as exclusively responsible for treating Roma 
clients, as such a practice would ‘ethnicise’ both Roma mediators and Roma 
clients. The problem of geographical accessibility of EO services for Roma 
living in marginalised areas could be resolved with a change of logic: the 
services should go to the clients instead of the currently prevalent principle 
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that ‘clients should travel to the office’. In this spirit, the development of a 
system of mobile employment offices providing services in smaller, 
marginalised settlements at established dates and times could be a 
beneficial step.  
Different active labour market programmes have different potential 
to reach out to and support vulnerable populations, and marginalised 
Roma in particular. The basic principle of designing ALMPs should give 
preference to market-compatible ways of intervention, offering incentives 
for employers rather than creating a secondary labour market or 
administratively punishing the unemployed (as is the case in several 
central and eastern European countries). Presently, direct job creation 
(public work and public employment programmes) is a key programme 
type in most of the countries reaching marginalised unemployed Roma. 
However, these programmes have failed to facilitate sustainable 
employment. Direct job-creation programmes for the most marginalised 
and vulnerable segments of the labour market may only be appropriate if 
they meet a number of conditions, the most important of which are the 
following: 
 They offer meaningful activities that add value and, ideally, are 
operated in the form of job try-outs. 
 They are part of a complex intervention including more of the 
following elements: tailored training, personalised mentoring and 
efficient job-match services. 
 They are offered only to the unemployed in the most vulnerable 
situations and only for a limited period of time. 
 Their design ensures that beneficiaries are not trapped inside the 
vicious circle of public work-social benefit. 
Training cannot reconcile the immense ethnic gap in educational 
attainment, but it can make adjustments and corrections in areas where the 
disequilibrium in the labour market appears to be local. Still, the research 
has identified certain steps aimed at improving the impact of training 
programmes for unemployed Roma.  
 The content and qualifications provided by training programmes 
should be regularly adjusted to the needs of the local labour market.  
 Training programmes should be as practical as possible, and 
organised in cooperation with local firms. 
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 As opposed to the prevalent ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of many 
training programmes, courses should be more personalised and 
adapted to the needs and capacities of unemployed individuals.  
Anti-discrimination and affirmative action is a neglected approach; in 
central and eastern European countries the enforcement of the principle of 
non-discrimination is rare. Although there is an extensive academic and 
policy debate about the pros and cons of affirmative action, we argue for 
the positive impact of some measures such as i) employing Roma in public 
offices in charge of designing and implementing ALMPs, ii) giving 
preference to Roma applicants for jobs in public offices, and ii) promoting 
active participation of Roma NGOs in the design and monitoring of ALMPs 
targeting the disadvantaged long-term unemployed. The EU, as a 
supranational entity formed on the basis of shared values of non-
discrimination and promoting human rights, could play a pioneering role 
in encouraging national governments, as employers of state institutions 
and service providers, to not only adopt but to actively implement anti-
discrimination and affirmative action on their own terrain. 
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10. SOCIAL SERVICES AS AN OPTION FOR 
SUSTAINABLE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
TOMÁŠ SIROVÁTKA AND BENT GREVE* 
any welfare states in Europe continue to register high levels of 
unemployment, in particular long-term unemployment among 
young people.  The ongoing crisis raises the question of how to 
ensure that there will be jobs in the future so that Europe can move 
towards 2020 with growing participation rates and lower levels of 
unemployment. Employment in post-crisis Europe is further affected by 
the continuous restructuring of production and of societies, and the rising 
competition from low-income countries that compete on the basis of low 
wages. There is therefore a need to create not only jobs in traditional 
agriculture and industrial production but also services jobs, which cannot 
be outsourced.  
The services sector encompasses a broad and diverse range of jobs. 
This chapter focuses on a specific services sub-sector: health and social 
work (HSW).1 This sub-sector is an integral part of welfare states. Although 
its primary goal is to support societal development, at the same time it 
creates employment opportunities for both unskilled and highly skilled 
labour. Health and social services is therefore an area in which the welfare 
state has the possibility to create jobs as part of a social investment strategy. 
Social services can provide new jobs while at the same time it might raise 
the level of welfare provided by many welfare states. 
This chapter addresses a number of questions relating to both the 
past trends and the future of employment in the health and social services 
sector. We look at the drivers of demand and supply that influence 
                                                   
* Bent Greve: Department of Society and Globalisation, University of Roskilde, 
Denmark; Tomáš Sirovátka: Institute of Public Policy and Social Work, Masaryk 
University, Czech Republic. 
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The increasing expenditure on social services 
is a general trend in contemporary welfare 
states, better measured by increases in 
employment in social services than simply 
public expenditure on social services. 
employment in the sector and consider possible future developments. 
Special attention is given to the financing of the welfare state and the 
governance of employment growth in social services, and particular 
attention is also paid to the prospects for employment of those most at risk 
in the labour market (e.g. the unskilled). 
10.1 Differences in employment in social services across the 
EU countries are huge 
The remarkable growth of social services in Europe began slowly after 
World War II, in connection with increases in female labour market 
participation, the ageing of the population and the growth of the public 
sector. The role of social 
services in contemporary 
societies has increased due to 
the societal, economic and 
demographic changes since 
the 1970s. The increasing 
emphasis on social services is 
further seen as a general contemporary trend in welfare state architecture.2 
Employment in social services can serve as an indicator of development. 
When using expenditure on social services (such as ‘in kind social 
protection expenditure’) to measure their development, a difficulty arises 
in that many services are supported through cash benefits used to purchase 
a specific service, and these specific cash benefits are difficult to distinguish 
in the data. Similarly, only public expenditure on social services is available 
to be measured, while private expenditure is not.  
 
Box 10.1 Limitations of the data on employment in health and social services 
 Eurostat does not usually publish data on employment in health services and 
social services separately (due to possible reliability problems resulting from 
the sample size in many EU member countries). 
 The demarcation between health care and social care is often blurred, 
especially in long-term care. There is a similar problem with the distinction in 
the education sector.  
 The distinction between home and institutional care is often blurred, 
especially in countries that provide cash care allowances. 
 It is often hard to obtain data on informal arrangements; nevertheless, 
informal care options may be available. In the long-term care sector in 
particular, there may be more informal than formal workers. 
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Social services expanded, yet the variation 
across EU countries is huge, with the 
highest employment in social services in 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and the 
lowest in the southern and eastern 
European  countries. 
After the year 2000, employment in the HSW sector in many EU 
countries grew much faster than in many other sectors of the economy: it 
was the third-fastest-growing sector in the EU economy between 2000 and 
2007.3 Employment in HSW is less cyclical than employment in the rest of 
the economy, as it is largely financed by public funds.4 In 2010, the 
employment rate in health and social services accounted for 6% of the total 
population of productive age. Over the last ten years, employment in the 
sector has increased on average by 0.7 percentage points per year (see Table 
10.1). The variation across EU countries is stark, ranging from 2.7% in 
Romania to 14% in Denmark.  
Four groups of countries can be distinguished. The first cluster, 
which is quite distant from the other clusters, consists of four countries 
where the employment rate in health and social services is between 10.6% 
and 14.0% (Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark). This 
is followed by a group of 
countries where the employment 
rate is between 8.4% and 9.1% 
(Belgium, France, Germany and 
the UK). In the third cluster, the 
employment rate in the sector is 
slightly above average for this sector across Europe, at between 6.1% and 
7.7% (Luxembourg, Austria and Ireland). In the large fourth group – a 
southern, central and eastern cluster – the employment rate in social 
services ranges between 2.7% (Romania) and 4.8% (Portugal). The change 
in employment from 2000 to 2010 also varies within each cluster. In the first 
cluster, there was very strong growth in employment in the Netherlands 
(+3.4 percentage points), but a decrease in Sweden (-2.7 percentage points). 
Growth was quite strong in the second and third clusters, particularly in 
Ireland (+2.5 percentage points) and Germany (+2.1 percentage points). In 
the fourth (southern, central and eastern) cluster, only moderate growth 
mostly of below 1% prevailed, while Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Poland stagnated. 
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Table 10.1 Employment rates in health and social services, 2000-2010 
  2000 2005 2010 Change 2000-2010 
Denmark  13.3 13.2 14.0 0.7 
Netherlands  9.9 11.3 12.3 3.4 
Finland  9.4 10.5 11.2 1.8 
Sweden  13.3 12.0 10.6 -2.7 
UK  7.8 8.8 9.1 1.3 
France  6.5 7.8 8.4 1.9 
Germany  6.5 7.4 8.6 2.1 
Belgium  7.2 7.5 8.4 1.2 
Ireland  5.2 6.6 7.7 2.5 
Austria  5.4 6.3 7.0 1.6 
Luxembourg  5.1 6.2 6.1 1.0 
Portugal  3.7 4.5 4.8 0.9 
Malta  4.0 4.1 4.6 0.6 
Czech Republic  3.9 4.4 4.5 0.6 
Spain  3.0 3.8 4.3 1.3 
Italy  3.3 4.0 4.1 0.8 
Slovakia  4.0 3.9 4.0 0 
Slovenia  3.3 3.6 3.9 0.6 
Lithuania  3.9 4.2 3.9 0 
Hungary  3.6 3.8 3.7 0.1 
Poland  3.6 3.1 3.5 -0.1 
Estonia  2.9 3.6 3.5 0.6 
Greece  2.6 3.0 3.3 0.7 
Cyprus  2.5 3.0 3.0 0.5 
Bulgaria  3.0 3.0 3.1 0.1 
Latvia  2.8 3.4 2.9 0.1 
Romania  2.1 2.3 2.7 0.6 
Average  5.3 5.8 6.0 0.7 
Note: Sectors N (Q) by NACE: health and social services. 
Source: Eurostat (2012) and own computations, adapted from Sirovátka and Greve (2014). 
The picture is similar when the share of employment in health and 
social services (including employment services) is analysed. There is a 
cluster of countries where this share is between 15% and 20% of total 
employment (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands), and a 
second cluster where it is between 10% and 14% (Belgium, Germany, 
France, the UK, Austria, and Ireland). The third cluster, where the share of 
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employment in health and social services is between 7% and 10%, is 
comprised of Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Spain, Malta and Portugal, 
while the remaining countries exhibit lower shares of employment in the 
sector (see Table 10.2).  
Table 10.2 Employment in health services, social and employment services as a 
share of total employment, 2010 (%) 
NACE 
rev. 2 
Human 
health 
activities 
(Q86) 
Residential 
care 
activities 
(Q87) 
Social work 
without 
accommo-
dation (Q88) 
Employ-
ment 
services 
(N78) 
Social 
services 
only 
Total 
HSW 
Denmark 7.1 4.6 7.5 0.7 12.8 19.9 
Netherlands 7.2 4.8 4.4 1 10.2 17.4 
Sweden 6.9 4.9 3.6 1.4 9.9 16.8 
Finland 7.3 3.3 5 0.3 8.6 15.9 
UK 7.2 2.5 3.4 0.8 6.7 13:9 
France 6.9 2.2 4 0.5 6.7 13.6 
Germany 7.2 2.7 2.3 0.9 5.9 13.1 
Ireland 8.4 1.2 3.2 0.3 4.7 13.1 
Austria 6.6 1.6 1.5 0.4 3.5 10.1 
Luxembourg 4.8 1.9 2.7 : 4.6: 9.4 
Malta 5.4 2.3 : : 2.3:: 7.7 
Spain 4.9 1.4 1.1 0.2 2.7 7.6 
Italy 5.3 1.1 0.9 0.2 2.2 7.5 
Portugal 4.2 1.7 1.4 : 3.1: 7.3 
Czech 
Republic 
5.1 1.2 0.7 (0.1) 2 7.1 
Hungary 4.3 1.5 0.9 0.2 2.6 6.9 
Lithuania 5.7 0.7 : : 0.7:: 6.4 
Poland 4.5 0.6 0.8 (0.1) 1.5 6.0 
Slovakia 4.5 1.2 1.1 (0.2) 2.5 6.0 
Slovenia 4.2 1.3 (0.4) : 1.7: 5.9 
Greece 4.8 0.3 0.5 : 0.8: 5.6 
Bulgaria 3.7 0.5 1 : 1.5: 5.2 
Latvia 3.6 0.7 (0.6) : 1.3: 4.7 
Cyprus 3.4 0.5 0.4 : 0.9: 4.3 
Romania 3.6 0.4 0.5 : 0.9: 4.5 
Estonia 4.7 : : : : : 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS) (data on the specific 
types of service are not available); adapted from Sirovátka and Greve (2014). 
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The variation in the share of employment in health services across EU 
countries is relatively limited. However, there are differences when looking 
at the share of total employment accounted for by social services: in 
Denmark it equals 12.8%; in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands it lies 
between 8% and 11%; in Belgium, Germany, France and the UK, it is 
between 5% and 8%; in Luxembourg and Ireland it is close to 5%; while in 
the remaining countries it is below 4% (and below 2% in many post-
communist and southern European countries). 
The identified clusters overlap somewhat with Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare state typology: there appears to be a social-democratic cluster, a 
continental/liberal cluster, a Mediterranean cluster and an eastern 
European cluster.5 Employment in health and social services is lowest in 
eastern European countries with low GDP, and therefore seems to be 
driven by both the institutional setting and budget.  
10.2 Social services is a female-dominated sector in which the 
workforce is ageing rapidly 
In 2009, 78.2% of employees in the HSW sector were women. The female 
employment rate in the sector is growing mainly in countries with a 
previously lower female employment rate, while in countries with a 
previously higher female employment rate it has decreased slightly. Of the 
new jobs in the sector during the decade after 2000, 81% were taken by 
women.6  Eurostat LFS data from 2010 confirm this finding for all the sub-
sectors under consideration, with the exception of employment services. In 
health services, the share of women in total employment ranges from 62.9% 
and 63.5% (in Italy and Greece, respectively) to 85.6% and 86.7% (Finland 
and Latvia); in residential (social) care it ranges from 75.9% (Germany) to 
90.1% (Portugal); and in social work/services without accommodation it 
ranges from 74.7% (Germany) to 94.4% (Greece).  In most countries, over 
80% of workers in residential care facilities and social work without 
accommodation are women.7 
There are several reasons for this domination by women. First, jobs in 
social services are ‘easy entry jobs’ for most women, even those who are 
low skilled, since there are many jobs in the sector that require limited 
skills or experience. Second, employment in social care began to grow at a 
time when many women were entering the labour market. Finally, services 
display lower productivity levels and growth rates than other industries. 
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This lower productivity is reflected in lower wages, which may make the 
jobs attractive primarily to second earners in a family.  
There is already some evidence that the workforce in HSW is ageing: 
the share of people aged over 50 working in the HSW sector in the EU 
increased from approximately 20% to 28% between 2000 and 2009.8 
However, the extent to which ageing will lead to labour supply shortages 
in the future is not entirely clear. This is due to the possible impact of 
migration and a possible increase of the supply of labour in case demand 
for labour goes up, with the option to move from inactivity to employment, 
including staying longer in the labour market, and for some to increase the 
number of hours they work. 
10.3 There are job prospects in social services for both highly 
skilled and low-skilled workers 
Another question is whether the growth of employment in social services 
will continue and how much the low-skilled groups, which are most 
affected by unemployment risks, will profit from this. The evidence from 
the EU countries where social services are relatively more developed shows 
that growing employment in health and social services brings not only jobs 
for professionals in health and social care, but also many jobs cleaning and 
performing other tasks in home help or help within institutions in care 
services.  What matters is the public support for these services, the 
purchasing power of the clients and effective regulations.  
The comparison of the educational level of workers in the HSW sector 
broken down by age group shows that in the group of countries where 
employment in social services is high (e.g. Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands), the share of low-skilled ‘help service jobs’ is also relatively 
high, especially for those aged over 50 and below 30 (typically above 20%, 
and up to 30% in Denmark for those over 50, and around 15-23% for the 
group aged under 50). In the second group, represented by Belgium and 
the UK, where employment in social services is above average, and also in 
Spain and Italy where it is below average, the share of low-skilled ‘help 
service jobs’ is above 20% for the group aged over 50, and about 10% for 
the group aged under 30. In Finland, Germany and Austria (where 
employment in social services is high or above average), the share is 
between 10% and 15% for all age groups except the group below 30 in 
Germany, where it is 23% (see Table 10.3). 
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Table 10.3 Education levels of workers in the HSW sector by age, 2000 (%)  
 Age Education High Medium Low 
Denmark 15-29 26.1 51.1 22.8 
30-49 50.4 34.7 14.9 
50+ 40.1 29.9 29.9 
Sweden 15-29 29.1 55.6 15.4 
30-49 46.7 44 9.3 
50+ 42 33.5 24.5 
France 15-29 39.2 48 12.8 
30-49 38.1 43.3 18.6 
50+ 36.2 34.3 29.6 
Netherlands 15-29 32.6 51.5 15.8 
30-49 38.9 48 13.1 
50+ 37.8 40.8 21.4 
Germany 15-29 20.3 56.1 23.6 
30-49 37.3 53.7 9 
50+ 39.1 49.1 11.8 
Italy 15-29 51.9 39 9.1 
30-49 41.9 41.5 16.6 
50+ 44.8 31 24.2 
Belgium 15-29 50.5 38.7 10.8 
30-49 51.6 35.5 12.9 
50+ 50.6 27.6 21.8 
Spain 15-29 70.7 22.1 7.2 
30-49 60.3 25.7 14 
50+ 51 24.2 24.9 
United Kingdom 15-29 43.1 46.1 10.8 
30-49 52.8 36 11.1 
50+ 45.5 34.7 19.8 
Austria 15-29 17.3 66.7 16 
30-49 25.3 64.2 10.5 
50+ 32.1 53.6 14.3 
Finland 15-29 35.6 50.8 13.6 
30-49 54.9 41.8 3.3 
50+ 41.5 47.6 10.9 
Czech Republic 15-29 34.8 63 2.2 
30-49 25.1 71.7 3.2 
50+ 23.6 67 9.4 
Note: Rows add up to 100%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey; own calculations; adapted from Sirovátka and Greve (2014). 
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Social services provide jobs 
both for high- and low-skilled 
workers, even among the 
younger generation. 
The general conclusion is that in countries where the share of social 
services in the whole health and social services sector is high, job 
opportunities for low-skilled employees are also high, although this 
depends on the ability to support the service sector either through public or 
private resources. 
On the other hand, in countries such as the Czech Republic where 
employment in health social services is quite low, the share of unskilled 
workers in social services employment is only 9% for those aged over 50 
and 2% for those aged under 30. This finding may indicate current 
problems, but also indicates a huge potential for future job generation for 
unskilled workers in the social services sector in countries like the Czech 
Republic – the conditions for this being sound public finances, adequate 
financing of services from both public and private sources, effective 
regulation of service providers (i.e. quality standards) and access to 
services.   
10.4 Employment growth in social services will be driven by 
growing demand for these services   
There is a broad range of drivers and factors that stimulate the 
development of social services and employment in social services. On the 
demand side, the growth of employment in social services will be driven 
primarily by ‘general drivers’ of social services growth. Changing roles for 
women and their growing labour market 
participation and employment are leading to 
increasing demand for social and community 
services, mainly care services.9 There is also a 
more general trend for services to dominate 
industrial production due to the demand 
shift towards services sectors.10 This means that countries where the 
economy is performing well and where the purchasing power of the 
population is high should generate higher demand for social services due 
to public as well as private purchasing of such services.    
The impact of rising overall purchasing power may vary across 
countries, depending on income inequalities. The Keynesian assumption of 
the volatility of demand due to increasing income inequalities provides an 
argument for the introduction of inbuilt stabilisers such as income 
redistribution, among other things, in order to stimulate demand for 
services.  
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Population ageing is also an important driver of employment growth 
in social services, due to rising demand for elderly care, long-term care and 
healthcare.11 Not only is an increase in the volume of services needed with 
the increase in the numbers of elderly people in need of care, but also “[due 
to the] level of dependence and the poly-pathologies of the elderly, long-
term care services are increasingly called upon to provide more 
professional and often more medical services to a broader and more 
differentiated segment of the population”.12 
Finally, the emerging new social risks are increasingly putting 
pressure on the provision of various social services: the challenges of work-
family reconciliation, especially for single parents (demand for care 
services); challenges emerging from the dynamics of the post-industrial 
labour markets such as out-dated skills (demand for employment services 
and lifelong learning); and challenges of poverty and social exclusion 
(demand for social assistance services, social housing, social work services 
and emergency services). 
10.5 The impact of drivers of supply is less clear 
There are both potentially negative as well as positive drivers of labour 
supply in social services. A hypothetically ‘negative’ supply factor is 
represented by Baumol’s disease;13 the problem being that productivity 
growth in the service sector is slower than in manufacturing. The 
traditional interpretation is that if wages in services are tightly coupled to 
wages in manufacturing, employment expansion in private services will be 
slowed down.  
There are three possible responses to the cost-disease problem. The 
first, allowing labour costs to adjust, may result in many services 
disappearing due to low earnings and lack of labour supply. Another 
possible approach (typical of Nordic and continental countries) is to adjust 
earnings in the services sector to the level of earnings in the overall 
economy. Due to high labour costs, personal services would then grow 
very sluggishly, if at all (resulting in jobless growth). The third solution is 
to subsidise services via government production or subsidies to consumers 
(through something like special tax benefits).14 
Thus, the productivity lag could foster employment growth in the 
sector if services were to be produced by government, or consumers were 
to be subsidised when purchasing the services.  This is why the impact of 
the crisis on the public budgets for social services can have strong negative 
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implications for employment in social services if the purchasing power of 
the population does not enable public provision of the services to be 
counterbalanced.  
Then there is a range of positive factors stimulating labour supply. 
First, the theory of the political business cycle explains that political elites 
are interested in positive election results and strive to avoid electoral 
punishment. The downsizing of the public sector can result in a loss of 
votes, especially if welfare programmes are involved. Some studies posit 
that globalisation leads to an increase in welfare services in response to 
public demand stemming from their fears of economic changes.15 
Furthermore, there are pressure groups with an interest in promoting 
employment in the public sector. Vested interests matter a lot: service 
providers tend to form coalitions with service consumers. Since social 
services are labour-intensive and also consist of highly skilled and 
influential professional groups (such as civil servants, doctors and 
teachers), their interests are very likely to play a role.16 
Second, the public sector serves as a buffer against the risk of 
economic instability, the expectation being that the public sector is 
relatively large when other employment possibilities are scarce or that 
public employment grows as a response to growing unemployment.17 Since 
governments follow anti-cyclical public employment policy in order to reap 
electoral benefits, rising unemployment should have a positive effect on 
public employment growth; rising public budget deficits cause a reduction 
in the growth of public employment, whereas rising GDP per capita should 
have the opposite effect.18 For example, in a situation of rising budget 
deficits, the rising cost of public employment might lead to a reduction of 
public social services employment in the future. Overall, it seems that 
according to the theory of the political business cycle, support for the 
supply of social services depends on several circumstances.  
If voters evaluate officials on their recent performance, politicians can 
be expected to shift the use of the political business cycle mechanism 
towards policy domains that are easier for them to manipulate, such as 
public employment, which is more ‘street visible’.19 
Finally, path dependency is an important factor. In the period of 
welfare state expansion, social services have developed well in some 
countries.  This is because the expansion of social services was easier in the 
period of welfare state expansion than in the phase of welfare state 
retrenchment, when new programmes are hard to finance and require an 
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The complex mix of demand 
and supply drivers provides 
strong arguments for the 
expectations of the growth in 
social services. 
expansion of the resource base and/or a reallocation of resources away 
from established programmes.20 
Moreover, according to the ‘timing hypothesis’ which claims that the 
advancement of policies responding to new social risks (typically this is a 
substantial part of public/social services such as education, active labour 
market policies or childcare) is difficult for those countries that are 
confronting these risks later, or in the face of emerging challenges from 
population ageing and economic austerity affecting welfare programmes.21 
When considering the path dependency hypothesis and the timing 
hypothesis together, it is highly likely that the development of social 
services will be difficult in times of crisis and post-crisis periods, especially 
for those countries where these services are still underdeveloped, with the 
difficulty being greater if public finance debt is high. This is the case for the 
countries in southern Europe and post-communist central and eastern 
European countries. 
To sum up, there are convincing theoretical as well as empirical 
arguments for employment growth in social services in the future, as 
evidenced by the employment growth between 2000 and 2010. The 
financial and fiscal crises did little to alter the continuous growth of 
employment in social services that has lasted since 2000.  When using data 
that capture employment figures year-by-year for the EU27, the evidence 
shows that there was an increase in employment in social services each 
year from 2008 to 2010 with little variation.  
10.6 Growth in social services is supported by several key 
factors 
An empirical examination of the factors influencing the employment rate in 
social services among EU countries in the period 2000-10 relies on the 
Pearson correlation coefficient of the 
employment rate in social services with the 
variables listed in Box 10.2. This singular 
measure was chosen because the complexity 
of the relationships among these variables 
could make attempts to distinguish the 
dependent and independent variables 
misleading. The variables listed in Box 10.2 were therefore used to shed 
light on the differences in employment rates in social services across EU 
countries.  
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Box 10.2 Factors influencing employment in social services 
 Financing of the welfare state (government revenues, tax on labour, social 
protection expenditure, social protection expenditure in kind) 
 Demographics (population ageing – old age dependency, fertility rate) 
 Political-economic cycle captured by proxy variables that directly influence the 
supply and demand for social services (GDP growth, public deficit) 
 Employment patterns (employment rates, unemployment rates – total, male, 
female) 
 
An analysis of three time points between 2000 and 2010 reveals 
persistent country differences during the period. This indicates that the 
range of factors that influence employment in social services is stable over 
time. A high level of employment in social services is associated with a 
higher level of government revenues, higher expenditure on social 
protection (both total and in-kind), a higher level of employment (total, 
male and female), a lower level of unemployment (total, male and female) 
and perhaps higher fertility rates. In 2000 and 2005, it was also associated 
with a lower level of public finance deficit, but in 2010 this relationship no 
longer existed. Similarly, while in 2005 stronger economic growth was 
associated with lower employment rates in social services, in 2010 the 
opposite was true.  
These findings indicate that fiscal policies have been the most 
important factor: sufficient financing has been associated with higher 
employment in social services. Second, sound public finances, indicated by 
a low public deficit, has also had relevance both for sufficient financing and 
for the growth of employment in social services. There was a positive 
correlation between GDP growth and employment in social services in 
2010; the causal relationship can, of course, work in both directions. Finally, 
a negative correlation between employment in social services and the 
public deficit was indicated in 2000 and 2005. A public deficit obviously 
reduces the possibilities for the government to support employment in 
social services.  
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Table 10.4 Correlation coefficients between employment rates in social services and 
selected variables in the EU in 2010 
 Employment rate in social services (N or Q) correlated with: 
Strong > 0.66 Moderate > 0.33 Weak, 
insignificant 
Correlation 
coefficients PE 
in 2010 
Social protection 
expenditure in kind 
(.853)*** 
Employment rate 
women  
(.677)*** 
Public deficit 
 Total government 
revenues from taxes 
and soc. Security 
contributions  
(.782)*** 
Employment rate 
men (.574)*** 
Unemployment 
rate men 
 Social protection 
expenditure total 
(.780)*** 
Unemployment 
rate women  
(- .482)** 
Old-age 
dependency 
 Fertility rate  
(.747)*** 
Unemployment 
rate total  
(- .412)** 
 
 Employment rate total 
(.741)*** 
GDP growth  
(.383)** 
 
 Tax on labour (.690)***   
Notes: Employment in the public sector and social services: NACE: N (Q) Health and social 
work; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.   
Overall, strong drivers of employment growth in social services have 
been confirmed. First, growing female employment combined with policies 
to reconcile family and work result in increases in social services 
employment. The development of social services creates new job 
opportunities for women and at the same time enables them to balance 
their work and family lives, thus facilitating participation in the labour 
market. Second, politics matters: a deliberate strategy to foster public-sector 
employment with an emphasis on social services in times of economic 
slowdown has been identified. This is underpinned by pressure groups 
(employees in the public sector) and a strong legitimacy of social services 
among the public (social services address life-cycle risks affecting all 
classes/groups). Third, financing of social services plays a crucial role, and 
public financing still represents the major part of this. For this reason, the 
level of public revenues, the levels of public expenditure on social services 
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The ageing of society will become 
a strong driver for the 
development of employment in 
social services in the future. 
and specific ‘services-related benefits’ and, finally, sound public finances, 
indicated by the level of public-finance deficit, play a role. However, at the 
same time, private finance is becoming increasingly relevant. 
The ageing of society, as indicated by the old-age dependency ratio, 
did not prove to be significantly correlated with social service employment. 
Welfare state models and family models may imply alternative or informal 
caring options when public social services are insufficient, for example in 
post-communist countries or in southern Europe, with the negative 
consequence of a lower female employment rate. Nevertheless, the impacts 
of ageing on the demand for social services will be more pervasive in the 
future due to the expected rapid changes in demographic structures.   
In the context of the crisis, however, it is difficult to envisage 
increased public investment in social services, in particular in countries 
where this expenditure used to be low and that now are facing increasing 
public deficits. The key problem, identified mainly in those EU member 
states (such as southern or post-communist countries) that have not yet 
developed their social services to levels comparable with other EU 
countries, is that many are currently facing public-finance deficits due to 
the crisis and are expecting increases in expenditure on pensions (cash) due 
to population ageing.    
10.7 The fiscal constraints could be alleviated by greater 
redistribution 
Welfare states have been under pressure for several years, with cuts in 
spending on welfare in many European countries. This section discusses 
two important issues related to current 
and future employment in social 
services.22 The first is whether and how it 
is possible to achieve sustainable 
financing of welfare states. The second is 
whether there might be certain 
instruments available that can have a significant influence on the 
development and creation of jobs in social services.  
Recent years have seen a reduction in public sector spending, but also 
an increase in statutory tax rates and VAT. Fifteen countries in the EU 
increased VAT in 2012 or in the first half of 2013, and 23 countries have 
increased either the statutory tax rate or tax base. At the same time, 
corporate income tax rates or tax bases have been reduced in many EU 
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countries.23 Taxes as a percentage of GDP have hovered around 40%, on 
average, across all EU countries in recent years. A decline in the level of 
GDP therefore reduces the options for financing social services. This, 
combined with the fact that many countries have experienced pressure on 
their financial sectors and a need to support them in the wake of the 
financial crisis, has resulted in less room for financing social services.  
Taxes on labour are the most important form of tax in the EU. Despite large 
differences between EU countries due to historical reasons and traditions, 
there have been some trends towards convergence. 
There has been a further general trend of broadening the tax base in 
many countries over the last few years. This has been done in various ways 
in the EU member states, and has made it possible to combine lowering tax 
rates (especially for companies) with maintaining a relatively constant level 
of revenue as a percentage of GDP. Indeed, “taxing consumption and 
property appears to have significantly less adverse effects on GDP than 
taxing income”.24 A taxation strategy in this direction would therefore be 
effective in creating economic growth and thus possibly more jobs, as 
would a strategy with a focus on how to tax immobile factors (such as 
houses and land) more than mobile factors (such as capital). Moving 
taxation in this direction would also ensure better sustainability of public 
sector income, although it would not remove the ups and downs resulting 
from the business economic cycle. Still, there is a problem in that not all 
countries report tax expenditures regularly and systematically, with 
obvious implications for the volume of revenue collected and the 
complexity of the tax system.25 One area where, despite the attention it has 
received, there have not been real changes is environmental taxation, which 
has remained more or less constant over this period. 
The ongoing international discussions to ensure a higher level of tax 
compliance and to reduce tax havens26 can also be argued to form part of a 
strategy that will help ensure more stable public sector income, and at the 
same time may make it possible to increase overall public sector revenues 
without having to change tax rates. Thus, a movement towards better tax 
compliance, including international cooperation on fighting tax evasion, 
will make it possible to establish a better and more sustainable way of 
financing welfare states. 
A higher level of public sector income is only one, albeit important, 
necessary condition for having the financial means to support the 
development of jobs in social services. There are, in principle, two different 
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A combination of individualisation of 
service accompanied by empowerment of 
clients, quality standards and targeting 
both financial support and intensive 
services are supportive of employment 
growth in social services. 
routes that can be taken to increase employment in social services by the 
welfare state. 
One route is increasing the level of employment in social services 
within the public sector (for example, increasing spending on day-care for 
children, care for the elderly or healthcare). If there are overall increases in 
revenues and the limits regarding public sector deficits, then this would, 
depending on political preferences, be a possible option for increasing the 
level of employment in the field as a whole.  
The other route is using incentives to try to encourage private 
households and companies to engage more people in social services. This 
might be done in two different ways. The first is by giving tax rebates, 
which is contradictory to the broadening of the tax base and implies the use 
of more tax expenditures.27 However, an argument for doing it this way is 
that certain types of services in private households that are part of the 
hidden economy – such as care and cleaning – could be moved to the open 
economy, while at the same time the use of social services would be 
increased. Naturally, the size, structure and level of support need to be 
carefully monitored to avoid paying large amounts for activities that are 
already being done. 
The other way would be to pay part of the expenditure of private 
persons in employing people in areas of social services when they 
document that those employed are registered and have paid VAT, either 
through a direct economic payment or beforehand by issuing vouchers. 
This would reduce the cost to the individual buying social services, and 
thus should in principle increase the demand for social services. Again, 
there is naturally a risk that society will support people who are already 
buying this service and also a risk 
that private providers will 
increase their prices with the level 
of public support. So this way 
would also need to be carefully 
monitored and evaluated in order 
to avoid expenditure that will not 
provide good results for society. 
Still, the implication is that in order for the welfare state to support the 
development of social services, a prerequisite is ensuring stable financing 
of the welfare state. 
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10.8 Governance of social services may bring employment 
gains  
Employment in social services is influenced by governance of the sector. 
The process of rearranging the relationships between the state, the market 
and families in services provision has brought about a trend splitting the 
functions of regulation, financing and service delivery, as well as the 
pluralisation of actors. The role of the state as a direct service provider is 
diminishing, while the market and NGOs are becoming more important.   
The processes associated with this phenomenon, seen to some extent 
in all EU countries, are as follows:  
 Marketisation (outsourcing of services delivery to private providers, 
more competition, an increasing role of private resources in the form 
of co-payments/fees for services). 
 Increasing emphasis on the complementary relationship between 
formal (professional) and informal (family) services provision. 
 Individualisation of services with increasing attention to the needs of 
clients, choice and empowerment; their choice is greater (through the 
use of vouchers or through becoming direct purchasers of services) 
and/or their rights are better guaranteed (rights to services, services 
quality standards). 
 Stronger state regulation (quality standards of services, price limits). 
All these elements have an impact on the sustainability and 
development of social services and on employment in the sector. However, 
there are remarkable differences among EU countries with respect to these 
processes, although there are also some common trends.   
The evidence indicates that in most countries, mixing public and 
private sources will be necessary for sustainable public finances. This 
strategy may bring important employment gains if and when the 
governance framework provides effective regulation of the use of resources 
available in the following respects: setting quality and professional 
standards and systems of the controls; maximising choice for the users of 
the services; and combining universal accessibility of services with targeted 
support to users.  Nevertheless, in order to fulfil the above tasks, a certain 
level (threshold) of public financing is necessary. 
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10.9 More employment in social services in the future  
There are possibilities and options for greater employment in social 
services, given the expected continuing changes in welfare states and given 
the demographic changes that imply an increasing need for such services. 
Furthermore, the private sector also seems to be moving towards the 
services sector and there is an expectation of greater demand for social 
services, a natural development as societies become richer. People and 
societies with higher levels of income demand more social services. The 
political will to support jobs in the area is also important. 
An increase in social services will imply greater demand for both 
highly skilled and unskilled workers in the future. The reason for this is 
that welfare services comprise different kinds of functions and needs. The 
development of a variety of jobs in the area of welfare services can be an 
important feature of a more varied labour market in terms of the 
qualifications required. 
The crisis has not fundamentally changed the general patterns of the 
demand and supply drivers of employment growth in social services. 
Nevertheless, some pre-conditions and circumstances have become more 
important. 
First, the business cycle seems to be crucial in determining how 
countries can successfully grow employment in social services, as it 
strongly influences the economic opportunities for welfare states. GDP 
growth, labour productivity growth and low public deficits support 
growing purchasing power of the population and increasing demand and 
ability to pay for social services privately, as well as the ability of the 
welfare state to collect taxes and to support social services. Tax governance 
and compliance is therefore also important with regard to the ability to 
ensure financing of public social services. 
Second, in countries where the economic realities are less favourable 
towards financing social services, some specific circumstances may play an 
increasing role. One important issue might be the ability of policy-makers, 
and the opportunities available to them, to modernise the welfare state by 
redirecting expenditure from benefits towards services. This could range 
from passive spending, with negligible impact on unemployment, to active 
welfare spending that supports employment and growth (social 
investments). The other way might be to reduce the relative level of 
employment in public sector administration, where technological 
innovations (ITC and others) and governance reforms can make 
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Social services are needed and can be 
afforded in the future if EU countries 
have sustainable finances, i.e.  sufficient 
public financing and effective regulation.  
performance more effective and efficient. Finally, this could help legitimise 
increases in public support for social services.  
Third, innovations in welfare technologies can bring increases in 
employment and improvements in job quality in social services. Seemingly, 
these technologies replace (unskilled) work in social services such as 
cleaning and other home help tasks, or health control and aid. On the other 
hand, they could help to employ professional home care, which would 
provide more job opportunities even for unskilled workers. At the same 
time, job quality may be improved in the home care sub-sector, since some 
routine tasks require less effort while providing more room for an 
approach focused on personal needs.   
In the long term, the first prerequisite for welfare states to continue 
and perhaps expand employment in the field is therefore sustainable 
finances, as this will enable the welfare state to have a role in the provision 
of services, whether public or private. Governance of social services will 
have an impact on their development and on employment in the sector. An 
effective combination of public and private resources, the individualisation 
of the services accompanied by 
empowerment of the clients and 
providing rights to services, 
regulation of quality standards 
and professional services, support 
for access to social services and 
the effective allocation of services with respect to the needs of users are all 
supportive of growth of employment in social services, as are innovations 
in welfare technologies. 
Social services might thus be an option for sustainable growth in 
welfare and employment in Europe in the years to come, although 
sustainable finances are important in order to achieve this goal. 
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Notes  
1 According to NACE (Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community) sector Q: human health and social work activities. 
2 Taylor-Gooby (2004, p. 224) argues that “the new social risk policies now being 
developed do not invariably reflect the characteristics of the existing old social 
regime”. 
3 See Holman and McClelland (2011). 
4 For a discussion on this point, see European Commission (2008a). 
5 Esping-Andersen (1990). 
6  Compare European Commission (2010). 
7 We omit Malta, where it is 64.9%, as an outlier.  
8 European Commission (2010). 
9 Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 60) has argued for the strong association between day-
care coverage and the female employment rate, and has also discussed the impact 
on employment of changing women´s roles (Esping-Andersen, 2008). 
10 Purchasing power is a key driver of this trend. “The service economy is driven 
by broadening purchasing power throughout the population” and “the 
disappearance of cheap domestic servants and of the housewife” (Esping-
Andersen, 2008, p. 4). 
11 This has been documented by many authors; see Bosch and Lehndorf (2001), 
European Commission (2010), Jensen (2008; 2009), Esping-Andersen (2008) and 
Tepe (2009). 
12 See European Commission (2008a).  
13 Baumol (1967) 
14 For a discussion on this point, see Esping-Andersen (2008, pp. 111-114). 
15 Compare Tepe (2009); Rodrik (1998) in Jensen (2009). 
16 For a discussion on this topic, see Pierson (1994). 
17 Compare discussions in Rouban (2008), Pierre (2008) and Tepe (2009).   
18 These assumptions were suggested by Cusack et al. (1989) and confirmed by 
Tepe (2009). 
19 Tepe and Vanhuysse (2013, p. 5). 
20 These issues have been widely discussed by, among others, Pierson (1994, 2005), 
Huber and Stephens (2006) and Anderson and Meyer (2006), 
21 Tepe and Vanhuysse (2013), following Bonoli (2007). 
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25 European Commission (2013). 
26 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-13-0905_en.htm.   
27 Farnsworth (2013); Sinfield (2013). 
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Services impact on people’s quality 
of life and also social inequality. A 
higher demand for services 
generates new job opportunities. 
 
 
11. EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN CHILDCARE 
AND SOCIAL INCLUSION SERVICES 
MICHAELA GSTREIN 
ood quality childcare and social inclusion services are essential 
factors contributing to inclusive growth, and figure prominently on 
the EU agenda.1 Childcare and social inclusion services not only 
provide new employment opportunities for job seekers2 and become 
efficient target areas for social investment (instead of social support) by 
welfare states, but they also empower citizens and improve people’s 
quality of life.3 Furthermore, childcare provision is crucial for female labour 
market participation.4 The relevance of childcare provision for female 
labour market inclusion and its importance for social inclusion, societal 
development as well as smooth social and economic transitions has 
recently been highlighted in the ‘beyond GDP’ debate, which broadens the 
usually growth-focused debate by introducing measures of quality of life,5 
social quality6 and the effects of income equality.7 
However, several trends have contributed recently to the decoupling 
of job quantity and job quality in the childcare and social inclusion services 
sector. First, the economic crisis often resulted in severe financial cut-backs 
in public services8 and a certain 
reorientation of welfare state policies 
as a result of budget constraints, 
sometimes towards subsidised but 
private care solutions. Second, 
informal care-related labour migration 
is putting pressure on wages and working conditions of local services. 
Third, atypical work is generally on the rise. Finally, it has been shown that 
                                                   
 Michaela Gstrein, Senior Researcher, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. 
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The health and social work 
sector has been growing 
despite budget cuts.  
the dominance of female workers in a sector is often related to large and 
persistent gender gaps in pay.9  
This chapter therefore examines the impact of these developments on 
childcare and social inclusion services. The main aim is to shed light on 
employment patterns, development paths, changes in skills and 
employment conditions, but also to determine if this sector could offer new 
employment perspectives, especially for older workers. 
11.1 Childcare and social inclusion services high on the EU 
agenda 
The childcare and social services sector has been affected by growing 
female participation in the labour market and by the Great Recession. 
Although there are substantial differences in participation rates and the 
nature of female employment across Europe, women in the EU accounted 
for the majority of job growth between 2000 and the onset of the crisis. 
Even then, the female employment rate declined to a lesser extent than that 
of men in Europe.10 This appears to be partly an outcome of structural 
changes in industrial sectors (which mostly concerned men), but also of 
increases in demand for (and thus employment in) the services sector, 
which mostly seems to concern women. 
Despite crisis-related budget cuts in 
most European countries, the health and 
social work sector in the EU has been 
growing over the last ten years. This 
development has been fuelled not only by 
innovation, ageing and increasing female labour market participation, but 
also by increasing expectations of individual, self-determined (but socially 
supported) life models.  
As pointed out in a recent European Commission report on social 
services of general interest,11 the health and social work sector – with 
employment growing faster than in other sectors – has become an 
important source of job creation in recent years. The same is true for the 
childcare and social services sector, which is a small but important part of 
this larger sector.  
The Social Investment Package12 urges European countries to focus 
more on the provision of various public services, including education-
related childcare, long-term care and health. Whereas the document on 
investing in children13 stresses the importance of improving access to early 
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Current socio-ecological 
transitions are increasing the 
share of work in the care sector – 
a sector in which productivity 
cannot grow endlessly.  
childhood education and care in order to enhance the labour market 
participation of parents with increasingly diverse working patterns (and as 
a prerequisite for future educational and employment outcomes), the 
document on investing in health14 highlights access to quality healthcare as 
an important element in maintaining a productive workforce and 
improving the population health status, especially for disadvantaged 
groups and the less wealthy. The document on long-term care15 points out 
that – although it is a responsibility of member states – access for all to 
financially sustainable, high-quality long-term care is a common objective 
of EU collaboration in the Social Protection Committee of the European 
Commission.16 
11.2 The childcare and social inclusion service sector is 
influenced by a broad set of factors  
The next socio-ecological transition away from fossil fuels will increase the 
share of work in the care sector17 – a sector in which, on the one hand, tasks 
cannot be replaced by machines and, on the other, labour productivity 
cannot be enhanced much unless a true 
revolutionary technological change 
materialises.18 With the demand for 
empathy and care work, the challenge 
might be to increase human labour at 
lower productivity (and maybe lower 
income). This view is also reflected in EU 
reports. While the sectoral focus supplement on health and social services 
of the EU report on employment and the social situation19 states that “the 
share of employment in health and social work (…) has been growing 
significantly in the last two decades”, the European Commission report on 
social services of general interest finds that wage levels remained below 
those of the overall economy.20 
The childcare and social inclusion service sector is also influenced by 
social policies and institutional factors in general. Experts argue that labour 
market reforms significantly enhanced women’s participation.21 Over the 
last 20 years, labour market reforms have increased labour force 
participation of young women by almost 25% and participation of highly 
educated women by more than 30% across 15 EU member states. However, 
the labour market reforms are effective only when deregulation is 
accompanied by sufficient social compensation. Furthermore, Kroos and 
Gottschall point to the weak professionalisation of caregiving jobs, which 
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Childcare and social inclusion 
services offer jobs for more than 
6% of all EU workers, with 
women accounting for more 
than 80% of them. 
generates outsiders and thereby contributes to a trend towards dualisation 
(i.e. differing working conditions and social status).22 While ‘insiders’ in the 
care sector are characterised by permanent contracts and full-time work, 
‘outsiders’ tend to work part-time or on temporary contracts.  
Despite such dualisation, post-modern values regarding the roles of 
men and women in society, as well as the distribution of time between care 
and paid work result in a greater institutionalisation of care activities and a 
growing care sector,23 in which unfavourable working conditions may also 
affect retirement plans and result in early exits. While less likely in rich 
European countries, this seems more common in central and eastern 
Europe.24 Thus, monitoring sectoral developments and working conditions 
becomes an important political issue.  
11.3 A strongly female-dominated sector 
Who works in the childcare and social inclusion service sector?25 We show 
that between 2001 and 2011, more women than men worked in the field, 
with a trend for growth not only in employment in general, but also in the 
share of female employees.26 Despite minor differences between education-
related childcare, on the one hand, and social inclusion services and non-
educational day care on the other, gender segregation is a general 
phenomenon of work in this sector, which persists throughout Europe. 
Women dominate, with 5.6 women for every man employed in the sector in 
2011. 
In 2011, 5,648 million people found employment in education-related 
childcare across the EU, while an additional 7,668 million people worked in 
the field of social inclusion services – 
together accounting for 6.1% of total 
European employment.27 Nevertheless, 
the size of childcare and social inclusion 
services within total employment varies 
throughout Europe. For education-related 
childcare, it was between 1.4% in 
Romania and 7.1% in Malta, while for social inclusion services it ranged 
from 0.4% in Turkey to 12% in Denmark. Women accounted for 88.3% of 
employees in education-related childcare, and a slightly lower percentage 
(82.4%) in social inclusion services and non-educational day care. With a 
total of 11,308 million women and 2,008 million men, the ratio of female to 
male workers was 85:15.  
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On average across Europe, a 
third of workers in the sector 
are aged 50 or above. 
When investigating the age structure over time, it becomes clear that 
employment in childcare and social inclusion services is generally 
dominated by young and middle-aged 
workers (i.e. those between 15 and 49 years 
of age). Yet, in line with the ageing EU 
labour force predicted by Dolls et al.,28 the 
data show rising numbers of older workers 
in the sector. On average in Europe in 2011, the share of older employees 
(i.e. those aged 50 or above) amounted to more than a third (32%) in 
education-related childcare, and ranged from 20% in Greece to 41% in Italy. 
For social inclusion services and non-educational day care, the share of 
older employees varied between 20% (in Austria, Slovenia and Turkey) and 
41% (in Latvia). The European average was, at 30%, quite similar to that of 
education-related childcare. Over the last ten years, the share of older 
workers in both sub-sectors has increased significantly in most (but not all) 
countries. Although some of this effect is surely due to ageing of the 
workforce itself, the strength of this effect in some countries, together with 
strong increases in female employment, suggest increased older female 
activity (i.e. new jobs for older women) in this sector.  
Strong increases in employment of women aged 50 and over (in 
absolute numbers) from 2007 to 2011 are observed for education-related 
childcare in Germany, Poland and Italy, while milder increases are 
observed in Spain, France, Slovakia, Sweden and Hungary. In social 
inclusion services and non-educational day care, the increase of older 
female workers is marked in Germany, Spain, France and the Netherlands. 
11.4 Increased service demand results in more jobs 
Employment trends observed in the last few years (as well as demographic 
developments and the increasing participation of women in labour 
markets, with the resulting need for more formal care and social-support 
arrangements) seem to suggest that the above-described trends will grow 
stronger. The typical patterns of a work-oriented consumer society, where 
precious time is spent on a multitude of tasks and the outsourcing of 
services (from the family to the market) becomes a daily need, also 
contribute to the expansion of such service sectors.  
In contrast to the fast employment growth and job creation in the 
health and social work sector in general,29 there seems to be no overall 
growth trend (either as a share of total employment or in absolute 
numbers) in education-related childcare (see Figure 11.1). Employment 
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growth in education-related childcare from 2001 to 2007 was modest: the 
number of people employed increased by only 100,000 for the whole of 
Europe. However, increases in employment were unevenly distributed 
across the continent. 
Figure 11.1 Number of people employed in education-related childcare, 2001, 2004, 
2007 and 2011 (thousands) 
 
Source: IHS based on Eurostat (2012a). 
The number of people employed in inclusion services and non-
educational day care increased more strongly (see Figure 11.2). With 
growth of employment of approximately 600,000 from 2004 to 2007, the 
childcare and social inclusion services sector has become a substantial 
provider of jobs in many countries. Yet, the situation is less clear for 2007 to 
2011, when approximately 200,000 jobs appear to have been lost again (in 
particular in France and Germany), probably due to the crisis. The net 
increase between 2004 and 2011 was thus around 400,000.  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
DE ES MT FR PT AT NL EL HR MK EE LU IT PL SE HU RO CZ SK LT
rising more or less stable decreasing
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
2001 2004 2007 2011
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN CHILDCARE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION SERVICES  227 
 
Qualifications in education-
related childcare (and schooling) 
are usually higher than country 
averages. 
Figure 11.2 Number of people employed in social inclusion services and non-
educational day-care, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 (thousands) 
 
* Data break. 
Note: Low reliability for LT (04/07), HR (04), EE (01).  
Source: IHS based on Eurostat (2012a).  
11.5 Mixed skills dominate social inclusion services 
The data analysis shows that those employed in the field of education-
related childcare are, as a rule, better educated than the average employee. 
This results from the fact that educational services tend to require higher 
educational attainment (such as a certain formal pedagogical or university 
education) of workers. Many of the jobs are thus for the higher or highly 
educated.30  
Yet, qualification requirements differ between countries, as do job 
descriptions and the composition of services offered (and thus skills 
required). The picture is more diverse in 
social inclusion services and non-
educational day care: there is a mix of 
qualifications, with different countries 
exhibiting different splits between 
higher, medium and lower levels of 
education (see Figure 11.3). The share of highly qualified workers in the 
sector is highest in Poland, the UK, Spain and Ireland, and is lowest in 
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Portugal, the Czech Republic, France and Romania. The largest share of 
low-skilled workers in social inclusion services and non-educational day 
care was found in Portugal (and Turkey), followed by Spain and Italy. The 
Czech Republic exhibited the largest share of medium-skilled workers in 
this sector. The share of highly skilled was clearly above the country 
average for social inclusion services and non-educational day care in 
Poland, Bulgaria and Italy. It was visibly lower in Ireland, Belgium, 
Finland, Sweden and France. 
Figure 11.3 Qualifications of those employed in social inclusion services and non-
educational daycare compared to total economy, 2011 (%) 
 
Note: Classification of qualifications: low (ISCED 1+2); medium (ISCED 3+4); high (ISCED 
5+6). 
Source: IHS based on EUROSTAT, special data order (2011) and online database (2012).  
What developments can be detected over time? In line with the 
predictions of Boitier et al.,31 we observe generally increasing skill levels in 
both sectors, resulting in favourable changes in the composition of skills 
from 2001 to 2011. While this is true for both sectors, in some countries 
(Germany and Portugal) the share of the highly educated (ISCED 5+6) in 
education-related childcare declined. In social inclusion services and non-
educational day care, the wider variety in the range of skills persists over 
time, despite overall improvements. Again, only in a few countries (France, 
the Netherlands and Slovakia) did the share of the highly educated not 
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grow. Accordingly, the initial assumption that new jobs in childcare and 
social inclusion services might only be of lower quality is not confirmed by 
the data: overall job growth involved medium and higher skills, but not 
lower. 
11.6 Working conditions vary, but part-time work dominates 
Many employees in childcare and social inclusion services work part-time. 
In general, part-time employment in the sector is above average (where 
labour market flexibility permits such arrangements). With a large share of 
those employed being female, the findings point to a strong macro-level 
correlation between the share of female employees and the share of part-
time workers in this sector. This is true for employment in social inclusion 
services and non-educational day care (Figure 11.4) as well as for 
employment in education-related childcare.  
Yet, the direction of the causality remains unclear. Does the sector 
require more part-time work – which women are more interested in 
providing – than other sectors, so that the sector becomes ‘female’? Or does 
the sector attract more women, who often prefer part-time contracts, 
thereby increasing the share of part-time work in the sector? 
Figure 11.4 offers a country comparison of sectoral (s) and national 
(n) levels of part-time employment in social inclusion services and non-
educational day care, while at the same time indicating the share of female 
workers. While the share of female workers in the sector is similarly high in 
all countries, the extent of part-time employment varies. The red rings 
group countries with similar shares of part-time employment in social 
inclusion services and non-educational day care. The rings around the 10% 
and 20% lines indicate countries with low or limited labour market 
flexibility, where part-time work in the sector is (more or less) as low as, or 
only a little above, the national average across all sectors. The rings around 
the 40% and 50% lines indicate countries with generally higher labour 
market flexibility, where part-time work in the sector is more common than 
the average across all sectors, particularly in social inclusion services. 
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Figure 11.4 Female employment and part-time work in social inclusion services 
and non-educational day care, and in the total economy, 2011 (%) 
 
Notes: s = social inclusion services and non-educational day care, n = total economy. 
Source: IHS based on EUROSTAT, special data request (2012) and online database (2012).  
Despite the large share of part-time workers, fixed-term contracts in 
the field of education-related childcare are no more frequent than in other 
sectors of the economy. Interestingly, it is the share of permanent contracts 
that is generally higher – making it easy for those using education-related 
childcare services to maintain contact with the same person over longer 
periods of time. The exceptions are Germany, Italy and Portugal, where the 
shares of fixed-term employment in the sector are above the national 
averages. 
In social inclusion services and non-educational day care, the 
incidence of fixed-term contracts is slightly above average (17% in the EU 
versus a 14% average across sectors), with Spain (33%) and also Finland, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Greece and Poland (each with approximately 25%) 
exhibiting much larger shares of fixed-term employees. 
11.7 Tailoring policy to country-specific features of the sector  
It is clear from the analysis undertaken in the previous sections that 
countries follow different development paths. Notwithstanding 
convergence in Europe across many fields, education-related childcare and 
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social inclusion services remain very particular and country-specific. 
Despite the overall EU trends in employment growth, skill improvements 
and above-average part-time employment in this sector, we observe 
different structures in 2011 and different development patterns between 
2001 and 2011 across countries in this strongly gendered field of work.  
Whether these country-specific deviations are temporary outcomes of 
the recent economic crisis or are mid-term or even long-term trends will 
only become clear in the next few years, when welfare policies have 
adjusted to ageing requirements and (new) budgetary constraints. 
Countries follow different development paths depending on their 
starting position in terms of sectoral size, age structure and welfare-regime 
orientation. Nevertheless, the overall trend points towards skill increases, 
an increase of part-time jobs and even greater feminisation of the sector. 
Therefore, families that use such services should expect a growing share of 
older but well-educated service providers who are mostly on permanent 
contracts (and are thus available for a longer period of time). The expansion 
of the education-related childcare and social services sector will hopefully 
match needs and allow for the more formal delivery of such services – 
freeing families up for other important issues of everyday life.  
It is important for policy-makers to monitor working conditions, 
earnings and gender pay-gaps in this changing sector, as well as working 
on skills upgrading and related educational requirements. With EU 
discussions about quality of services and availability and access for all, this 
should also be a primary national target. 
Welfare policies also need to be carefully and repeatedly adapted to 
new emerging needs resulting from both ageing and family outsourcing. 
Although the actual initiatives might need to consider GDP growth-related 
budgetary constraints, policy-makers should aim at inclusive social 
developments and set their policies in order to smooth past and upcoming 
societal changes related to socio-ecological transformations. 
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12. LOW-SKILLED MIGRATION: 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPEAN 
DOMESTIC CARE 
ATTILA BARTHA, OLENA FEDYUK AND 
VIOLETTA ZENTAI*  
ver the last 15 years, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, migration policy in the European Union has principally 
focused on security-related issues of migration, such as border 
management, visa policy and readmission agreements. In the field of legal 
migration,  the EU directives have, next to creating a right to family 
reunification and long-term resident status, concentrated on the entry and 
residence of specific groups, including students, researchers, seasonal 
workers and highly skilled.1 EU labour immigration policy is thus 
characterised by a selective and sectoral approach in the admission of 
immigrants, and a growing number of countries have been adopting 
points-based systems. In several EU member countries, however, the 
unprecedented increase of immigrant labour has occurred in low-skilled 
occupations. The domestic care sector has attracted a particularly high 
share of migrants and, in some countries, massive immigration of low-
skilled2 female workers has continued since the onset of the global financial 
crisis.3  
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Glasgow; Violetta Zentai: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, 
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Welfare regimes, transnational 
care chains, national state/market 
care policy mixes and family 
policies are shaping low-skilled 
migration into the care sector. 
Domestic care is a fast-
expanding sector in 
employment terms and a key 
sector for migrant employment. 
These trends4 raise a number of policy-related questions in the areas 
of migration, care and employment. Why have certain countries proved to 
be particularly attractive to immigrant 
care workers? How are the different 
European welfare and care regimes, and 
state and market policy mixes, shaping 
the inflow of low-skilled migrants into 
the care sector? What are the impacts of 
this migration of predominantly low-
skilled women on care systems, female employment opportunities and 
gender equality in the receiving and sending countries? How is the position 
of the new EU member states that have been among the main sending 
countries within the European transnational care chain changing? What are 
the working conditions in the domestic care sector and what kind of 
policies could ensure that the sector provides decent employment 
opportunities for both migrant and non-migrant workers along the lines of 
the socio-ecological transition (SET)?5 
12.1 Migrants are increasingly overrepresented in domestic 
care employment  
Domestic care has been one of the most dynamic sectors for employment in 
Europe in recent times. Estimations on the basis of EU Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data indicate that the number of domestic care workers increased by 
about 40% in the EU15 member states6 
between 2000 and 2010,7 and the majority 
of domestic care workers in the EU are 
migrant women.8 Moreover, of the three 
major sectors where migrants are strongly 
overrepresented, only ‘private households 
with employed persons’ have expanded in terms of employment since the 
onset of the recent crisis (the two other industries where migrants are 
significantly overrepresented – hotels and restaurants, and especially 
construction – suffered significant employment losses after 2007). 
Altogether, in European OECD member countries, 424,000 new jobs were 
taken by foreign-born workers in care work-related sectors between 2008 
and 2012: employment of immigrants increased by 20.2% in ‘activities of 
households as employers of domestic personnel’ and by 44.5% in 
residential care activities (see Figure 12.1).9  
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Figure 12.1 Three industries with the largest positive and negative changes in 
foreign-born employment in European OECD countries, 2008-12 (thousands) 
 
Source: OECD (2013). 
Concerning future prospects, the NEMESIS model10 forecasts a 
significant increase in care demand to 2025 in Europe: by 15-22% in the 
tough scenario and 28-39% in the friendly scenario. The care workforce 
supply will not be able to meet this growing care demand without 
significant migrant labour inflows, as the supply of domestic care labourers 
is expected to increase by less than 10% in the tough scenario and by 12-
28% in the friendly scenario.11 Unless major policy changes are made in the 
field, policy-makers will have to count on a further substantial increase of 
migrant care workers over the next decades.  
12.2 Migrant domestic workers meet European care demand 
through transnational care chains  
The important role of migrant domestic workers has long been recognised 
in meeting European needs for care.12 Yet, due to a lack of reliable 
comparative data and a large component of informal employment of 
migrant care workers, analysts have been cautious about including the 
assessment of migrant flows when discussing care policies. From a policy 
perspective, the key mechanisms can be interpreted as the intersections of 
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Transnational care chains in Europe 
involve the migration of eastern 
European women to provide care in 
western European homes. 
migration, employment and national welfare and care regimes.13 The 
approach of transnational care chains explores the connection between care 
work, migration and social and gender inequalities in a global 
perspective.14 Care is commodified and mainly female care workers are 
imported from less developed to more developed parts of the world. 
Care chains imply that paid forms of care (whether domestic work or 
care for children, the elderly or the 
sick) have become an important 
source of employment for women in 
many developing and eastern 
European countries. Joining the labour 
force, however, requires a substitute 
for migrating women’s role in their own families. Accordingly, intra-EU 
migration within European care chains encompasses the exodus of eastern 
European women from their homes to provide care in the homes of others, 
and also the impacts of this female migration outflow on care systems and 
families in central and eastern Europe.  
The role of migrants in care provision is fairly uneven across Europe. 
Why are some countries particularly attractive for immigrant domestic care 
workers? Several factors matter in this respect, foremost of which are the 
specific features of national welfare and care regimes: institutional 
provision of care (e.g. kindergartens, social workers and retirement homes), 
policies on work-life balance and monetary subsidies for care provision 
(e.g. welfare payments or tax relief). Moreover, by imposing certain 
migration regimes or occupational quotas for domestic workers, states can 
create indirect incentives for a rising market of private care workers of 
immigrant origin. Concerning the inclusion of immigrant populations, at 
least two dimensions matter: legal, formal access to citizenship; and the 
multicultural policy framework shaping the socio-political inclusion of 
immigrant populations.15  
It should be noted that migration policy regime typologies and 
assessments usually have a western receiving-country bias. The attention to 
new currents of labour migration from central and eastern Europe (CEE) to 
Nordic, western and southern European countries overshadows migration 
chains in which CEE countries function both as sending and receiving 
entities of low-skilled care workers and are thus themselves in the process 
of building migration policy regimes. In addition, in the predominantly 
sending eastern European countries, the massive outflow of female care 
workers aggravates welfare, care and family policy tensions, particularly 
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Population ageing and the 
spread of cash-for-care schemes 
feed the demand for domestic 
care workers... 
... but with sub-standard wages 
and employment conditions. 
because of the low level of fertility and the general withdrawal of publicly 
provided welfare and care services over the last two decades. 
12.3 The demand for migrant care workers is typically a 
demand for jobs with substandard conditions 
Two major factors feed the expansion of the care sector in EU countries, 
and both are related to population ageing in European societies. Low 
fertility rates have implied an increasing policy focus on childcare services, 
while the trend of population ageing itself has generated growing demand 
for elderly care provisions. Moreover, 
there is an additional factor of a fiscal 
nature supporting the demand for 
domestic care workers: the spread of cash-
for-care schemes as part of the welfare 
reform agenda enhances the 
commodification of care through the direct provision of financial resources 
to users, and opens up opportunities for the incorporation of paid domestic 
and care work.16  
But why are native populations strongly underrepresented among 
domestic care workers? Indeed, the demand for migrant care workers is a 
specific form of demand: typically, a need for migrant women who are 
willing to take jobs with substandard 
wages and employment conditions that 
are unacceptable to the native workers.17 
The wage levels of immigrant care 
workers indicate that they are overrepresented at the lower end of the pay 
scale of this sector. Paradoxically, stronger immigration controls indirectly 
support the ability of employers to ‘underpay’ migrant care workers. 
Because pull factors of migration dominate in western European care 
labour markets, stricter border control cannot effectively discourage the 
arrival of immigrants.18 And without permission to work, immigrants with 
irregular status become particularly vulnerable to abuse of working 
conditions.19 Employers thus often rely on immigrants who are ready to 
provide care services in a more flexible, informal and insecure working 
environment.20 These substandard working conditions, while attracting a 
particularly vulnerable segment of immigrants, indirectly close the 
domestic care sector employment opportunities for native low-skilled 
workers.  
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Limited public provision of care 
and a stronger role of informality 
attracts many immigrants to 
liberal and especially Southern 
welfare regimes 
12.4 The liberal and southern welfare regimes are particularly 
attractive for immigrant care workers 
The presence of migrant domestic care workers is fairly uneven across 
European countries, and Italy and Spain are the two major target countries 
for CEE migrants in this field. But why are the Mediterranean countries 
more attractive for low-skilled immigrant care workers than their more 
developed north-western European counterparts? Most explanations of the 
care-migration nexus depart from Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare 
regimes,21 which distinguished three major types of welfare in Western 
Europe: the liberal, the conservative and the social-democratic welfare 
regimes. Following later empirical research, two additions to the original 
typology of Esping-Andersen seem relevant in order to embrace a larger 
European perspective: the Mediterranean or southern European regime 
type,22 and the post-socialist or central and eastern European23 regime type. 
Table 12.1 summarises the care-specific characteristics of European welfare 
regimes24 using the main features of care systems: the level of financial 
generosity, the dominant institution of care and the role of formal versus 
informal types of care provision. It also presents the migration patterns of 
care workers in the particular welfare regimes. 
The lower the level of generosity in public financing of care, the 
higher the importance of non-state care-providing institutions (i.e. the 
market and family), and the stronger role of informality in care provisions 
in particular may well predict the immigration potential in different 
welfare regimes. Thus in the Nordic 
countries, where good quality care is 
publicly provided, the demand for 
immigrant care workers is rather 
limited. The western European 
Bismarckian countries follow a similar 
pattern, although the importance of 
informal relations and the stronger role of family in care results in a less 
straightforward picture.25 In the liberal regime, however, less generous 
financing of care and a stronger role of the market logically implies a 
higher level of demand for less expensive migrant care services. And in the 
Mediterranean countries – where public provision of welfare services is 
more limited, care is traditionally provided by family members and 
informality plays a dominant role in socio-economic transactions – the 
specific demand for immigrant care is striking.26  
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Familialist care policy patterns 
support informal care use in 
several Mediterranean and post-
socialist countries. 
Table 12.1 Main features of care in European welfare regimes and migration 
impacts 
Welfare 
regimes* 
Financial 
generosity 
of care 
Dominant 
institution 
of care 
Formal vs. 
informal 
dimension 
of care 
Migration 
position in 
care chains 
Social-
democratic 
(Nordic) 
High State Formal Receiving, 
moderately 
intensive 
Conservative 
(Bismarckian, 
Christian-
democratic) 
High State/mixed Partly informal Receiving, 
moderately 
intensive 
Liberal 
 (Anglo-Saxon) 
Medium/low Market Partly informal Receiving 
Southern 
(Mediterranean) 
Low/medium Family Mainly informal Receiving, 
 intensive 
Post-socialist 
(central and 
eastern 
European new 
member states) 
Low/medium Family/ state Mainly informal Sending 
within the EU, 
but receiving 
in global care 
chains 
* In the EU28, the social-democratic regime is represented by Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden; the conservative Bismarckian regime by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands; the liberal regime by Ireland and the UK; the southern 
regime by Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain; and the post-socialist countries 
by Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Source: Own elaboration based on typologies of Esping-Andersen (1990), Sapir (2006), 
Williams and Gavanas (2008), Kraus et al. (2010), Hemerijck (2013) and Korpi et al. (2013). 
The group of post-socialist countries is more heterogeneous than the 
other four welfare regime types. Although some of the CEE EU member 
states follow rather Bismarckian conservative patterns concerning the main 
features of care, most show a marked 
similarity with the Mediterranean 
countries of the EU. This implies that in 
the future, assuming that wage 
differentials between western and 
eastern European countries gradually 
fall, we can expect that typical CEE countries will provide less migrant care 
workers to western Europe, and at the same time will also attract an 
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increasing number of immigrants for domestic care tasks. Thus, post-
socialist states will likely become important destinations within the global 
care chain, importing care workers from the global south and especially 
from the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries.27 This process is indeed 
ongoing: a share of the migration of Ukrainian domestic care workers has 
recently been redirected to Poland.28 
This surprising similarity in care policy features between 
Mediterranean and central and eastern European countries mainly derives 
from the re-familialisation policy tendencies in the latter group of 
countries: over the last 25 years, the post-socialist countries have followed – 
either explicitly or implicitly – a familialist care policy pattern.29 As a result, 
while formal early childcare use (below the age of three) was high in CEE 
countries compared to western Europe during the state socialist period, 
today formal care use in early childhood is lowest in the post-socialist 
countries (see Figure 12.2).  
Figure 12.2 Full-time equivalent (FTE) formal and informal care for all children 
below the age of three, EU27 
 
Data source: EU-SILC 2009, calculated by Van Lancker (2013). 
The underdevelopment of formal institutional care implies that if 
parental care is not available (or not desirable) to households, then informal 
care becomes the dominant option. This provides an indirect incentive for 
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recruitment of migrant domestic care workers in post-socialist member 
states. At the same time, the traditionally familialist Mediterranean 
childcare policy shifted in the opposite direction, and public care provision 
in the early childhood period significantly improved in southern Europe. 
Although we know of some cases of childcare and elderly care policy 
development following different paths,30 at the country level the two care 
policy fields typically show similar patterns concerning generosity of 
public financing and the role of formal versus informal care provisions. 
Concerning preferences for informal provision of elderly care, at the 
welfare regime level, Figure 12.3 indicates that informal care is 
unambiguously the preferred option in post-socialist countries, while 
formal care is preferred in north-western Europe. 
Figure 12.3 Preference for informal provision of elderly care in EU member states, 
2007 (%) 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey on health and long-term care (European Commission, 2007).  
The following three country cases illustrate the care-migration policy 
nexus: the liberal regime is represented by the UK, the southern regime by 
Italy and the post-socialist countries by Poland.31 
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i) Migrants on the market: Publicly funded and privately 
provided care in the UK 
Affordability of care provision in the UK is means-tested and sustained 
through a wide range of monetary allowances, cash provisions, direct 
payments, tax reductions and insurance schemes. This allows the purchase 
of informal home care for children, the elderly and those in need of other 
forms of long-term care. The financing is decentralised through a mix of 
government grants to local councils, local taxation in the form of the 
council tax and individuals’ own resources. Care services in this system are 
publicly funded but privately provided; the care-providers’ sector features 
both national and multinational chains as well as smaller agencies and 
businesses. An emphasis on monetary payments instead of institutional 
care makes non-parental informal care as important as formal care and 
significantly reduces state expenditure on care.  
This care model gave rise to a particular form of opening for migrant 
labour in the sector – the ‘migrant in the market’ model.32 Most migrants 
are employed by private care providers, elderly care and childcare 
agencies, or through au pair programmes, and their share has been steadily 
increasing in the UK care sector. Migrants are more likely to find agency-
based employment in elderly care, while in childcare they are less likely to 
enter jobs in nurseries and day care centres, tending to find employment 
instead as private childminders or nannies. This care market often pushes 
migrants who are ready to provide care services into very flexible, informal 
or even abusive working conditions.33 
ii) Migrant in the family: The legacies of familialism and 
informality in the Italian care regime 
Italian labour and care policies have traditionally favoured the ‘male 
breadwinner/female carer’ model, relying on family – and particularly 
female family members – as the main source of care for children, the 
elderly and the sick. Thanks to some recent policy changes, the use of 
formal childcare is now high for children above the age of three, and in 
comparison with Europe as a whole, it is not low for children under three 
either. The expansion of institutional childcare is linked to increasing 
labour participation of Italian women and the absence of men from caring 
responsibilities. 
Due to the rapidly ageing population and low fertility rates, a 
particular place in Italian care demand is occupied by geriatric care. The 
availability of an inexpensive migrant labour force and state cash support 
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has made it possible for families, even those from lower social strata, to 
employ home carers. For the last 15 years, care for the elderly living at 
home has been increasingly provided by immigrants, generating a new 
carer profile of the badante: a migrant woman typically working irregularly 
in the grey care market.34 It is estimated that by the end of the 2000s, 
foreign workers constituted 70-90% of all workers in the Italian domestic 
care sector.35 
On the part of the migrants, providing illegal work in the privacy of 
Italian homes makes them more competitive with other migrants and 
reduces their own efforts and expenditure on the lengthy and complicated 
process of regularisation. On the part of Italian households as employers, 
recruiting an illegal immigrant can cost as little as half the cost of a native 
domestic care worker, while the negotiation of work conditions and tasks is 
much easier with a migrant who fears being caught. Considering the high 
demand in Italian domestic care, migrant workers often become ‘invisible’ 
through engaging in live-in informal contracts; they live in their employer’s 
house, have only one free day per week, and sometimes do not leave the 
house for weeks at a time. This form of work is preferred by first-time and 
irregular migrants, as it minimises their risk of running into the police and 
the need to arrange other aspects of their lives, such as accommodation or 
food. However, it leads to severe cases of exploitation, when their work 
spills into any hour of the day and night, and their food, freedom of 
movement, sleeping patterns and daily routines are closely controlled by 
their employers. 
iii) Poland: Repositioning in the global care chain – the return 
of familialism and employment of a migrant domestic 
worker as a status symbol 
The transformation of the Polish labour market in the last two decades has 
favoured sectors in which women were overrepresented, which has 
boosted female participation in the labour market. The country has 
experienced, however, a return of familialism – supported by the Polish 
state and the Catholic Church – which has reinstated women’s main roles 
as mother and carer.36 There are no guarantees for formal care for children 
under the age of three, making Polish parents and other relatives 
responsible for some 90% of care for this age cohort. The lack of 
institutional childcare prompts women to join the lines of the unemployed 
more often than their male colleagues, and makes their return to the labour 
market after parental leave more difficult.  
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Alongside population ageing and the re-emergence of familialism as 
an ideological guideline for family and care policy, privatisation and the 
collapse of state-provided institutions of care (particularly homes for the 
elderly) have also shaped the development of the Polish care system. In 
addition, the employment of a domestic worker has become a status 
symbol that also plays an important role in boosting care demand,37 
allowing middle- and upper-middle-class women not only to engage in 
more lucrative occupations, but also to maintain a certain lifestyle and 
spend time away from work in more pleasant and personally rewarding 
endeavours. Thus, structural features of Polish care have become similar to 
the familialist Italian care regime of the past. 
The migration aspects of the Polish care sector should be considered 
in relation to Poland’s repositioning in the global care chain: the country 
has recently become both an emigration and an immigration country. 
While migrating Polish women still often use opportunities for informal 
employment in the domestic sectors of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal,38 the improving prospects of material wellbeing (partly from 
migration-generated income) have significantly increased demand for care 
and domestic services in Poland itself. Household services comprised 11% 
of all valid work permits to Poland in 2011, thus constituting the third-
largest occupational sector for migrants. The dual migratory status of 
Poland in the global care chain is clearly demonstrated by the increasing 
presence of Ukrainian domestic care workers: Ukrainians constitute by far 
the largest group among all immigrants in Poland, and 21% of them are 
engaged in domestic work.39 Indeed, while Poland is at the centre of global 
care chains, Ukraine is experiencing increasing pressure on its care 
resources. The massive outflow of Ukrainian women to meet the needs of 
European care demand leads to their separation from their own families, 
including children and elderly people who will, in turn, depend on female 
domestic care within Ukrainian families.40 
12.5 Decent employment of migrant and native domestic care 
workers requires strong state regulatory and monitoring 
capacities and developed gender equality policy 
As cash-for-care schemes seem to provide a cheaper and more flexible 
alternative to formal and institutional care, we can count on the future 
expansion of these schemes, not only in liberal but also in other welfare 
regimes. This market-oriented policy, however, can only provide the 
desired positive aspects (freedom of choice, good quality of care-service 
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As pull factors of migration 
dominate, restrictive immigration 
policies in themselves will not 
block irregular migration into the 
domestic care sector. 
Market-oriented care policy 
reforms can be risky in countries 
with moderate regulatory and 
monitoring capacities and less-
developed gender equality policies. 
provisions and decent employment for care workers) together with 
decreasing gender inequalities if it ensures quality control, standard basic 
employment guarantees and a well-established legal institutional context to 
prevent either ethnic or gender discrimination. Thus, a particular focus on 
strong human resource policies and good quality employment 
relationships is crucial to provide decent jobs for (mainly female) care 
workers, including the large numbers of migrants but also for potential 
native employees. 
The country cases presented above allow us to conclude that 
migration has been incorporated into national care regimes, giving rise to 
new care models such as ‘migrant in the family’ and ‘migrant in the 
market’. The massive inflow of migrant female care workers (typically 
employed under sub-standard employment conditions and often employed 
informally) may apparently ’solve’ the 
fiscally sustainable care regime puzzle 
in the short run. However, the smooth 
functioning of these market-oriented 
and migration-induced ‘least resistance’ 
policies implicitly assumes strong 
regulatory and monitoring capacities of 
states and developed gender-equality policies.41 Otherwise, they generate 
new forms of inequalities undermining the success of the socio-ecological 
transition.42 Thus, specific policies have to be developed to guarantee not 
only the quality of privately provided services, but also the employment 
standards for the care providers themselves. A legal institutional context to 
prevent discrimination against and unfair treatment of care workers forms 
part of the fundamental condition of a fair market environment in the field 
of care. 
Restrictive immigration policies in response to market-driven care 
demand are unlikely to support sustainable care regimes in receiving 
countries of care chains. If informality 
dominates labour transactions in the 
care sector and the state regulatory and 
monitoring capacities are weak, while 
structural pull factors of immigration 
remain, strict migration regimes in 
themselves will not block irregular 
migration into the domestic care sector, but will rather reinforce the 
vulnerability of migrant care workers.  
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The issue of immigrant care labour should be addressed in a complex 
and multi-layered way. The costs and benefits for the sending countries in 
transnational care chains should also be taken into consideration when the 
withdrawal of care increases the care burden on households without 
mothers. Therefore, cross-national welfare and social security provisions 
should be a priority in establishing legal and fair working conditions for 
both native and immigrant care workers. The issue clearly calls for the 
consideration of supranational management of the problem, and in this 
context the migration policy focus should be complemented by a broader 
approach of working rights for all (both native and immigrant) workers. 
Finally, decision-makers should be aware that transformative gender 
equality policy could modify (i.e. either enhance or countervail) the gender-
specific impacts of care policies. Gender equality measures, such as political 
empowerment of women and enhanced work-life balance, can only drive 
sustainable care-regime development and general gender equality if they 
address migrant women in the sector.  
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Notes  
1 See Pascouau (2013) and Carrera and Eisele (2015). 
2 Most studies of the care sector assume that care work consists of low-skilled jobs. 
Although we do not break with this tradition of wording here, we are aware that 
the distinctive feature of care jobs are sometimes less related to the skill level than 
to the low prestige and unpleasant working conditions of these jobs; see Ruhs and 
Anderson (2010) and Van Hooren (2012). Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2010, p. 
425) underline the high ratio of educated women among migrant care workers in 
Germany; in addition, they mention various specific skills required of care workers 
such as empathy, emotional intelligence, patience and high tolerance of frustration. 
This issue is implicitly explored by Kureková et al. (2012) as well as Beblavý and 
Veselková (2014, p. 144), who describe “the surprisingly demanding nature of 
‘low-skilled’ jobs”. 
3 See OECD (2013). 
4 On the dynamics of changes in the EU population and labour force, see Veselková 
et al. (2014). 
5 ‘Decent work’ is certainly a normative concept (such as ‘decent job’ and ‘decent 
employment’ as well). However, we believe that it fits into the approach of the 
socio-ecological transition (SET) well. The concept was elaborated on by Amartya 
Sen, among others, and an important motive behind it was the refusal to dissociate 
economics from ethics (Sen, 2013). The issue of decent work has been on the global 
policy agenda since the ILO initiative of 1999 (see ILO, 1999).  
6 EU15 refers to those EU member states that joined the EU before 2004 – namely 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
7 Abrantes (2014). 
8 ILO (2010). 
9 OECD (2013, p. 82). 
10 In the NEUJOBS project, the NEMESIS model (New Econometric Model of 
Evaluation by Sectoral Interdependency and Supply), constructed by the ERASME 
team, is used to quantitatively explore the main socio-economic and environmental 
challenges for the EU in the framework of the socio-ecological transition (SET) 
without policy intervention and according to the global context. 
11 Schulz and Geyer (2013, p. 40); see also and Gstrein (2015). 
12 Particular childcare and elderly care policy measures in individual countries may 
have different impacts on migrant populations being attracted to these two 
segments of domestic care. Our study, however, concentrates on the structural and 
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16 Da Roit et al. (2007). 
17 Ruhs and Anderson (2010). 
18 Triandafyllidou and Marchetti (2014). 
19 Cangiano and Shutes (2010). 
20 Van Hooren (2012). 
21 Esping-Andersen (1990). 
22 Ferrera (1996); see also Sapir (2006) and Hemerijck (2013). 
23 Tomka (2006). 
24 In order to avoid confusion, we have included variants of the welfare regime 
type names in the table. 
25 Recent empirical studies (e.g. Jegermalm and Sundström, 2014) suggest that 
voluntary informal care can play a significant role even in the Nordic countries, 
but there it occurs in a way that is complementary to public care provision (and not 
as a substitution of formal care). 
26 See Williams and Gavanas (2008) and Van Hooren (2010). 
27 Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership initiative was launched by the EU 
in May 2009, as an enhanced regional cooperation policy developed for eastern 
European and southern Caucasus states. 
28 Kahanec et al. (2013). 
29 Szelewa and Polakowski (2008). 
30 For instance, for the Netherlands, see Van Hooren and Becker (2012). 
31 For a more detailed discussion of the country cases, see Fedyuk et al. (2014). 
32 Van Hooren (2012). 
33 Williams (2012). 
34 Da Roit et al. (2007, p. 658). 
35 See Van Hooren (2010) and Genet et al. (2013). 
36 Heinen and Wator (2006). 
37 Kindler (2012). 
38 Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012). 
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39 Duszczyk et al. (2013). 
40 Tolstokorova (2009); Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012). 
41 Bartha et al. (2014). 
42 Weak monitoring capacities of the state imply that market-based policies in the 
care sector encourage the discussed specific demand features, thus boosting a 
secondary, informal and underpaid labour market segment with long working 
hours and substandard employment conditions. This type of development 
obviously contradicts the desired sustainability transformation strategy of the SET, 
where productivity gains are translated into a reduction of working hours; see 
Veselková and Beblavý (2014).  
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13. THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: 
KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
IAIN BEGG* 
any recent analyses have shown that the EU is struggling to 
escape the grip of the most severe economic crisis in its history. 
Forecasts for 2015 and 2016 from bodies such as the European 
Commission and the IMF suggest, at best, anaemic growth with little 
prospect of making inroads into the high level of unemployment that has 
become the norm since 2008 in a majority of (although, tellingly, not all) EU 
member states. New political parties with agendas that are highly critical of 
their established peers have proliferated, yet comprehensive and credible 
solutions seem to elude decision-makers, notwithstanding a parallel 
proliferation of pacts and policy packages. As the renowned Italian thinker 
Antonio Gramsci put it, “the old is dying and the new cannot be born… in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”. 
This chapter builds on the findings and policy analyses presented in 
Chapters 1 to 12 with the aim of drawing out their implications for policy-
makers at the EU and national levels. It loosely follows the structure of the 
book by concentrating, first, on the likely consequences of the evolution of 
labour demand in key sectors of activity, then turning to the influences on 
labour supply discussed in Chapters 6 to 8. In each of these sections, key 
messages for both EU and national policy-makers are summarised. The 
concluding part of the chapter considers how EU policies and strategic 
initiatives might be adapted to reflect the long-run policy challenges on 
both the supply and demand sides of the labour market.  
                                                   
* Iain Begg: London School of Economics and Political Science. 
M
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13.1 The demand for labour 
That the demand for labour in the EU has been insufficient to provide 
enough jobs is evident from the unemployment data. However, the depth 
and duration of the recession mask underlying trends in labour demand 
that, in turn, will affect the longer-term shifts among sectors and types of 
work that will determine aggregate employment. These include the direct 
and indirect effects of policy changes such as decarbonisation, with their 
varied implications for sub-sectors.  
What is abundantly clear is that policy choices and the availability of 
funding will have a pronounced impact on a number of key sectors, and 
that there will be multiple channels through which policy decisions 
influence the net creation of new jobs. This section considers jobs in health 
and long-term care, the demand from older consumers and the outlook for 
demand for labour derived from energy policies.  
Apart from any moral imperatives, the likelihood of a more extensive 
collective effort to reduce the energy consumption of households will 
depend on a range of incentives. The rising cost of energy expected as fossil 
fuels become scarcer would be expected to act as an incentive to curb 
energy use, although one with distributive consequences associated with 
fuel poverty.1 Public investment and/or tax breaks may therefore also be 
needed to make a significant difference.  
A transition away from primary production in agriculture, extractive 
industries and more traditional industrial jobs has been underway for 
several decades, with various consequences.2 It is argued, for example, that 
the much more limited scope for productivity increases in service activities 
– often referred to as Baumol’s disease – will mean that demand for labour 
will stagnate if the result is a secular downturn in growth potential. 
However, the sheer scale and diversity of the service sector jobs across the 
EU mean that they cannot reasonably be thought of as a single category. 
Some rely primarily on funding from the public purse, while others depend 
on either consumer or business demand. Some entail face-to-face delivery, 
but a sizeable proportion of services can be delivered remotely.  
i) Decarbonisation, growth and jobs 
As Bert Colijn and Arno Behrens point out in Chapter 2, the net effect of 
implementation of low-carbon technologies will be the result of a complex 
process of job destruction and creation. It will also depend crucially on the 
interactions between technology and energy, and the authors cite evidence 
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Changes in the energy mix 
will have only a marginal 
effect on total employment. 
for a positive correlation between gains in energy efficiency and 
technological change. This finding is at least a partial retort to the 
widespread assumption that European 
producers may be at a disadvantage from 
having to bear the costs of decarbonisation. 
A key policy message from Chapter 1 is that 
when all the effects are taken into account, 
the overall impact of decarbonisation on jobs is difficult to estimate 
unambiguously, but it is also likely to be marginal at most. Increased 
innovation is, however, a means of tipping the balance towards a positive 
outcome. 
The chapter finds that energy-efficiency gains will be crucial in 
decoupling economic growth from energy consumption, but also that the 
scope for achieving targets is considerable. The greatest reductions in 
carbon emissions will arise in the power sector, but there will need to be 
provision for increased as well as climate-friendly generating capacity. A 
consequence is that productivity in electricity generation will fall, 
accentuating fears about the effect on the competitiveness in global markets 
of EU exporters. A reduction in energy use per unit of output may, 
however, offset this risk and policy-makers will have to reflect on how the 
overall impact of policy (regulation, taxation, incentives for energy-saving 
innovation) affects these costs. This will be important to counter the 
impression that rising unit costs of electricity production in itself is 
damaging. 
Because the total employment in energy industries is under 1% of the 
employed labour force, changes in the energy mix will not have a marked 
effect on total employment in the economy. The more likely scenario is that 
relatively low-skilled jobs in mining will be replaced by higher-skill jobs in 
renewable production. To this extent, policy-makers should recognise that 
there will be different human-capital demands as a result of 
decarbonisation. 
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Key messages for policy-makers: Decarbonisation, growth and jobs 
At the EU level 
 There are credible and convincing scenarios under which the EU can 
fulfil its decarbonisation commitments using known technologies. 
 The global impact of decarbonisation in Europe risks being undermined 
by energy-intensive activities relocating to other parts of the world, and 
this should be taken into account in assessments of structural change. 
 The effects of energy policies on jobs should be central to policy analysis 
and not relegated to a second-order question. 
At the national level 
 Each country has to find a national pathway for decarbonisation that 
reconciles the achievement of targets with a strategy for jobs. 
 In electricity generation from renewables, there is a need for redundant 
capacity to reflect the unreliability of sources such as wind and solar. 
While unavoidably adding to costs, there are likely to be benefits in 
generating more jobs. 
 Measures to enhance energy efficiency have to be implemented 
alongside a shift to alternatives to fossil fuels to mitigate the rise in unit 
costs of electricity. 
 
ii) Transport 
Since transport accounts for fully one-third of EU energy consumption, 
how the sector evolves will have a significant impact on overall energy 
demand. The sector has had a poor record since 1990 in curbing emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHG) and therefore must find ways of reducing these 
emissions rapidly if it is to conform to the latest EU ambitions, as agreed at 
the October 2014 European Council (see Box 13.1). As Chapter 3 explains, 
there are two main options. The first is to change the dominant propulsion 
technology so as to emit less carbon, either by electrification or by a switch 
to bio-fuels on the premise that these can be carbon neutral. Design changes 
in vehicles to facilitate greater fuel efficiency would add to this effect, but 
the likely impact on jobs is hard to accurately predict. 
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Box 13.1 Long-term energy policy 
Some shifts in the EU’s long-term energy policy were agreed at the European 
Council meeting on 24 October 2014. A target of reducing GHG emissions by 
at least 40% by 2030, compared with the 1990 level, substantially extends the 
target of 20% set for 2020, but with the difference that it will be a collective 
EU target rather than one towards which each member state aspires. The 
sensitivity of the target for some member states is visible in paragraph 2.2 of 
the Conclusions, which ambiguously states that “all Member States will 
participate in this effort, balancing considerations of fairness and solidarity”. 
For a different benchmark – change by 2030 relative to 2005 – the range will 
be from 0% to -40%. There will be a similar approach to renewables and 
energy efficiency gains, with an aggregate 27% reduction foreseen in both 
areas, again to be delivered by various national commitments. It is striking 
that paragraph 3 of the Conclusions states that “targets will not be translated 
into nationally binding targets”, albeit with the counter-point that member 
states are free to set higher national targets. 
There was also agreement on the next stages of the EU emissions 
trading system (ETS) after 2020, when the cap on emissions will be tightened 
at a higher annual rate than in the run up to 2020. However, free permits will 
continue to be issued so as to avoid impairing international competitiveness. 
In addition, the ETS terms for member states with low GDP will be much 
more generous. A clear policy message is that threats to economic activity 
and jobs have been taken into account in energy targets. The agreement 
nevertheless provides for innovation that may be transformative and thus 
affect future jobs, and singles out the transport sector as one where special 
effort is needed. 
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The alternative is behavioural change aimed at curbing demand for 
mechanised transport using regulatory and fiscal instruments, while also 
enhancing collective solutions. Some results are surprising from a policy 
perspective. For example, the extent of congestion in cities means that 
cycling is often the fastest intra-urban mode of transport. Comparative data 
collated by the European Cycling Federation show the huge gap between 
cycling rates in countries where travel to work is dominated by cycling, 
such as the Netherlands (a third), Denmark and Hungary (around 20%), 
and those where fewer than 5% consider it their main mode of travel. This 
disparity signals the potential for energy savings and for job creation 
associated with constructing cycling infrastructures. 
Figure 13.1 Decarbonisation and jobs in transport 
 
Source: Elaborated from Heyndrickx et al. (2013). 
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Key messages for policy-makers: Transport 
At the EU level 
 Transport reform policy involves a number of trade-offs that are not 
always made explicit when difficult policy choices have to be taken. 
o Increasing jobs, for instance, may be associated with more limited 
reductions in emissions. 
o Similarly, if there are energy-efficiency gains in transport, any 
resulting cost savings may induce higher demand, although the net 
effect would still be expected to be a cut in emissions.  
 To the extent that the interplay between regulation and transport (or 
housing) investment affects the pace of energy-saving investments, a 
test of the potential for job creation should be introduced in parallel 
with attaining decarbonisation objectives. 
 A switch from manufacturing of transport equipment to services is 
likely, with ramifications for the types of jobs the sector offers. 
At the national level 
 Strategies to promote cycling – extensive in some countries and cities, 
but limited in others – can have the ‘win-win’ outcome of reducing 
emissions and improving public health.  
o Both national and municipal tiers of government can contribute to 
the realisation of these goals through infrastructure investment to 
provide dedicated road space and cycle parking/storage, and 
through publicity campaigns.  
o This is an area where multi-level governance can come into its own. 
 
iii) Housing 
As one of the largest components of consumer demand, what happens in 
housing is bound to affect jobs. A transition towards lower energy 
consumption will have a number of effects on jobs, depending on the 
combination of subsidies, regulatory and other microeconomic influences, 
and macroeconomic trends. Optimising the mix of regulatory interventions 
and price signals will not be easy. While technologies exist that allow 
houses to come close to having net zero energy demand, they require social 
and user acceptability to boost their application.3 Equally, there are 
challenges around how best to finance the costs of investment in curbing 
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energy in housing, linked to the fact that so much personal-sector wealth is 
tied up in housing. A policy issue here is whether existing financial 
mechanisms such as mortgages could be used more imaginatively to 
release capital.4 
One of the main means by which housing is expected to lead to net 
job creation is in renovation of property to reduce energy consumption. As 
the chapter by Kees Dol et al. makes clear, the resulting jobs will mainly be 
in construction and related activities. Experts find that, although there are 
considerable uncertainties, the potential can be measured in hundreds of 
thousands of new jobs.5 Although it is projected that there will be net job 
creation, there is considerable uncertainty about how substantial the effect 
will be, not least because the parameters used and the assumptions the 
authors of the projections make are vague. A policy message is nevertheless 
that there is potential in this sector, some of it contingent on policy choices 
not yet made. The jobs would be in the production of materials, the 
installation of energy-saving equipment or insulation, services associated 
with planning and certification and, possibly, around the financing of 
investments in renovation. Many of these may draw on existing skills, but 
there will also be a need for adaptation and upgrading of skills to meet new 
standards. 
Compared with large-scale infrastructure, low-key renovation and 
greening projects in housing can be undertaken quickly and could therefore 
offer the prospect of the win-win outcome of reducing unemployment and 
making progress towards energy targets, all without a heavy burden on 
public funds. However, specific social and financial impediments to greater 
renovation need to be addressed, including the reluctance of older 
homeowners to undertake such investments and the creation of suitable 
financial instruments. 
In the changed post-crisis economic environment, the effects of 
housing on labour mobility warrant fresh thinking. For many households, 
housing is a major financial asset, but one that is both illiquid and prone to 
loss of capital value in a downturn, with asymmetric effects. Regions that 
prosper will tend to have rising property prices and vice versa, with the 
result that unemployed owner-occupiers in recession-hit regions will be 
unable to move easily to regions of buoyant labour demand without 
suffering a sizeable capital loss. Private rented accommodation may offer 
some help, but will also be subject to rising prices in prosperous areas. 
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Key messages for policy-makers: Housing 
At the EU level 
 Given its high share in consumer demand, housing should be central to 
an energy-efficiency strategy. 
o Housing targets should be introduced into a revised Europe 2020 
strategy. 
 A rapid boost to investment could be achieved by an EU-wide scheme, 
with some co-financing from the EU budget, to improve insulation in 
housing, with the potential for a triple dividend from higher 
investment, progress towards energy-efficiency targets and the 
provision of jobs for construction workers. 
o Innovation in the regulation of mortgage finance could help to 
mobilise locked-in equity in housing as a means of funding such 
investments. 
At the national level 
 From a labour market perspective, assisting very small businesses to 
contribute to green job creation raises distinctive policy questions. 
Specific skills in construction and the use of insulation materials will 
need to be nurtured, including training linked to compliance with 
regulations. 
 Training to facilitate a sufficient supply of the skills required to 
accelerate energy-saving investments in housing and transport should 
be enhanced, particularly for small-scale projects. 
 From the perspective of labour mobility, the mix in the supply of 
housing is critical. A sufficient stock of rented accommodation in areas 
of high-labour demand should be encouraged. 
 Information campaigns should be developed, particularly targeted at 
older homeowners, to explain the benefits in terms of personal comfort 
and wellbeing, as well as the financial gains of investing in energy-
saving renovations. 
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iv) Health and long-term care services 
An inevitable consequence of an ageing population is that an increasing 
share of demand, and thus jobs, will be associated with servicing the needs 
of older people. Progressively, EU countries are adapting to the fact that 
older citizens represent not only a larger share of the population, but also 
an increasingly affluent group. To the extent that the consumption patterns 
of older citizens diverge from those of younger cohorts, there will be shifts 
in demand affecting different sectors. As Chapter 6 shows, one of the 
sectors most affected by this key demographic trend is health and social 
care, a sector which in the EU increased in terms of jobs by over 25% 
during the 2000s and is expected to grow further over the next 10 to 15 
years. 
The share of health and social services in total employment varies 
widely, with more than double the EU average of 6% (2010) in Denmark 
and the Netherlands, but barely half the average in the countries of central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe (according to the data presented in 
Chapter 11). This suggests considerable scope for expansion in this latter 
group, provided that funding difficulties can be overcome. The high 
proportion of female workers is striking, reaching 80% in several market 
segments and occasionally over 90%. It follows that employment in care is 
also crucial for women, even if the notion of ‘women’s occupations’ is 
anathema to many in today’s EU. The existing workforce in these services 
is ageing rapidly.  
Who provides the services for the elderly is a core policy question. In 
Denmark, as documented in the chapter by Erika Schulz and Johannes 
Geyer, one in five employees works in the health and care sectors. 
Elsewhere, the proportion is much lower (6-7% in Poland, Italy and 
Slovakia), either because provision is lacking or because more of the 
burden is assumed by unpaid family members. Much of the difference is 
the result of the very high provision (and associated employment) of 
residential care and social work in Denmark, in contrast to its limited 
availability in Poland and Italy (barely 1% of employment). With welfare 
reform on the political agenda everywhere, these sorts of disparities both 
offer competing models for the future and prompt awkward questions 
about public spending priorities and the regulatory oversight of privately 
provided services. 
In NEUJOBS research on low-wage occupations, Moira Nelson finds 
that the highest shares of employment in the care sector are in the Nordic 
countries and the UK, but that the latter also had the highest growth in the 
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two decades up to 2010. Her research suggests that these countries (and the 
Netherlands) are similar in three respects. First, they are more likely to 
provide training for low-wage workers. Second, the incidence of poverty 
(measured relative to the median wage) is highest among low-wage service 
workers. And third, their proportions of jobs in cleaning are quite closely 
clustered.6 
Workers in the sector are typically female, part-time and, perhaps 
most significantly, older, presaging a potential labour supply shortfall as 
these older workers exit the labour market. Depending on demand for 
these services (or, perhaps more accurately, the policy choice on funding 
the sector), there could therefore be a shortfall of labour supply. The 
prospect of exit is especially pronounced for professionals, notably 
physicians, while the expectation is that the rise in demand will be for the 
relatively more qualified, such as those working in hospitals rather than in 
community healthcare. The resulting policy dilemma is how to ensure that 
future demand can be met, and this will require rapid decisions where the 
training is lengthy, as is the case for medical professionals. The alternative 
of attracting highly qualified immigrants is contentious for other reasons. 
Health and care demand is also subject to a range of uncertainties. 
New treatments and expectations of rising quality raise expected demand, 
but there may also be trends associated with a cleaner environment or a 
shift away from fossil fuels that improve the general health of the 
population. Shifts in household composition towards more single-person 
households in the middle of the age distribution and geographical mobility 
affect the scope for informal care, the bulk of which is undertaken by 
women. This leads to a tension between informal care and the aspiration to 
boost female-employment rates, although the long-standing assertion that 
care commitments deter participation is questioned in the research 
findings. Of the five countries studied, it only clearly does so in Italy. 
Projections of increases in the dependent population expected to 
require care vary hugely. In two of the cases studied in Chapter 5 
(Denmark and Germany), the overall increase is relatively small compared 
with Italy, Slovakia and Poland, although greater in all cases in the friendly 
scenario. However, differences in life expectancy and the demographic mix 
mean that Denmark faces by far the greatest increase in people over the age 
of 75 requiring care. 
A policy message here is that distinctive national approaches will be 
adopted, offering a diversity of policy experience. However, the analysis 
also reveals the uncertainty about how the risks associated with different 
THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IN EUROPE: KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS  269 
 
forms of morbidity affect impairment that might necessitate policy 
intervention. Decisions will, however, be needed on how to deal with the 
increased incidence of mental illness among older people. 
Care workers are projected to increase in four of the five countries 
studied, but not by enough to keep pace with projected care demand, while 
in the fifth (Italy) the workforce will decline, accentuating the gap between 
the workforce and demand. The findings also note that resort to illegal 
workers is widespread in Italy. The sorts of policy innovations that might 
bridge these gaps include enhancing informal care, immigrants as carers 
and improved conditions in the sector to make the activity more attractive. 
All these are problematic, whether for reasons of cost and uncertainty 
about future willingness to allocate sufficient funding (especially from the 
public purse), social acceptability or conflict with other socio-economic 
objectives. But the arithmetic is such that it will rapidly become a pressing 
policy issue.  
 
Key messages for policy-makers: Health and long-term care services 
At the EU level 
 Employment in care services is substantial across the EU, but faces a 
range of hard political choices. 
 It is a sector requiring a range of skills, but some of the lower-skill jobs 
are likely to prove increasingly unattractive to those now obtaining 
better qualifications. 
 Activating older workers is recognised as essential to maintain a 
suitable balance between the economically active and inactive segments 
of the population. 
At the national level 
 Among the various forms of organisation of care services, what works 
best in the national institutional context should take into account the 
impact on jobs. 
 New models of caregiving or of provision of residential facilities are 
needed to reflect the changing age and impairment mix of recipients of 
care.  
 The official retirement age has to be re-examined in the light of 
increasing life expectancy. 
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Greater labour market 
participation and /or immigration 
could mitigate the negative aspects 
of workforce ageing. 
13.2 Labour supply 
Under any credible scenario, the EU labour supply will shrink over the 
coming decades as ageing affects more countries, although the different 
incidence among member states of this phenomenon is in itself a challenge 
to EU policy-makers. As NEUJOBS 
projections have shown, large 
differences are anticipated in the rate at 
which these changes occur, with some 
countries already seeing an impact 
while for others it will only arise after 
2030.7 An ageing society has two principal solutions to ensuring a sufficient 
labour supply: activating a higher proportion of the population (including 
those outside standard working-age groups) or boosting the labour supply 
with immigrants. Further increases in the employment rate of women and 
activating other specific groups excluded from the mainstream labour are 
key policy orientations. 
i) Employment of women 
The sustained increase in the number of women working has been one of 
the most significant societal developments since the 1980s. As explained in 
Chapter 6 by Iga Magda and Agnieszka Kamińska, it has been encouraged 
by a steady enhancement of women’s educational qualifications, but 
women continue to face obstacles in the labour market. In view of the 
looming decline in the size of the working-age population in most EU 
countries, there is a compelling policy interest in ensuring that barriers to 
female employment – whatever their origin – are dismantled.  
The research summarised in the chapter shows that although women, 
on average, have higher educational qualifications than men, they find it 
harder to secure a first job. The main explanation put forward is that it is 
mothers rather than childless women who have most difficulty in making 
the transition into (or back into) employment. However, the evidence 
suggests that women also find it harder generally to make other labour 
market transitions. These are, manifestly, empirical results derived from 
highly aggregated analyses and it is important to recognise that in several 
member states the picture is much more positive. Equally, the low 
employment rates for women in certain areas point to more specific 
institutional blockages that need to be overcome. 
One is that in most EU member states, relatively more women than 
men are not in education, employment or training (NEET). This is a 
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Affordable childcare facilities and 
shorter parental leave are 
associated with greater female 
labour market participation. 
phenomenon with a cumulatively adverse impact, because the initial 
detachment from the labour market can be self-reinforcing if it means that 
future employers regard the NEET period as a stain on the potential 
worker’s record. The key policy question that arises is whether the number 
of NEETs overall, and specifically female NEETs, can be significantly 
reduced by appropriate reconfiguration of labour market institutions and 
their interactions with the educational system. Magda and Kamińska 
suggest that one answer is to combine apprenticeships and tertiary 
education – perhaps along the lines of the German VET system, although a 
counter-argument is that overly early stratification reduces opportunities 
later in the working life. 
The comparatively low employment rate of mothers of prime 
working age (25-54) is well below the EU average in much of southern 
Europe (Portugal is an exception), although also in the UK. As might be 
expected, the employment rate of mothers is highest in the Nordic 
countries (and in the Netherlands) and in Slovenia, where the data for 2011 
show that it was higher for mothers than for the 25-54 age group as a 
whole. France, as well as Austria and Belgium, also employ relatively more 
mothers, suggesting that well-developed and affordable childcare facilities 
are influential. A policy implication is that it is the detail of the welfare 
system rather than the over-arching regime that most influences the job 
opportunities for mothers. A further consideration is the generosity of 
parental leave, which, while often seen as desirable from a societal 
perspective, can lead to an erosion of human capital that reduces the 
employability of women. 
Mothers are somewhat less likely to access lifelong learning (LLL), 
suggesting that work-life balance is a dimension of training provision that 
requires more effort by policy-makers. Being employed in the first place is 
associated with obtaining LLL, but those working in agriculture and 
industry are less likely to be offered LLL. For public employment services, 
a policy message is that they may need to be more pro-active. In a context 
of more frequent changes of jobs and 
more rapid obsolescence of skills, the 
scope for those who withdraw 
temporarily from the labour market – 
especially for maternity – to retain or 
enhance their skills will increasingly 
matter. A possible answer would be to widen the scope of lifelong learning 
provision to include the temporarily inactive, thereby supporting post-
maternity transitions back to work.  
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There are big gaps between the duration of working-life, with women 
in southern Europe working for fewer than 25 years, more than 10 years 
less than the average for their Nordic counterparts. Fairness in pension 
entitlements presents many thorny issues. A contributions-based model 
discriminates against women who withdraw from the labour force, but the 
opposite implies higher costs for men for the same benefits.  
The arithmetic of the length of working life-times matters, as well as 
the employment rates of different age groups. A policy initiative to increase 
the number of years women spend in employment would make a 
substantial difference, and might therefore be an additional basis for 
targets, complementing those for age cohorts. Given the low rates of 
employment of older women in many member states and the limited 
opportunities for reversing this in the short term, a medium- to long-term 
policy question is how subsequent generations of older women can be 
retained in the labour market. Once again, the very large disparities in 
national rates can be a basis for change. A crucial factor is access to, and 
take-up of, training by older workers. 
Another quandary around retirement ages is how to go about 
equalising male and female statutory ages for pensions and other age-
related social benefits. On the one hand, the sustainability of pension 
systems calls for a gradual edging-up of the pension age, necessarily 
meaning that the threshold for women has to rise more rapidly. But as the 
gap between male and female statutory retirement ages narrows, there is a 
risk that certain age cohorts will be disproportionately punished. It is 
important, however, to take account of the incidence of benefits other than 
pensions and of levels of public pensions in relation to other assured 
sources of income. Systematic collection and diffusion of national 
experiences can provide insights for those countries still to act.  
Magda and Kaminska raise the further point that there are long-run 
interactions, such as between the inducement provided by generous 
maternity arrangements (for example, in systems as disparate as those of 
Hungary and the UK) to remain economically inactive and the scope for 
accruing pension and other old-age benefits. While their conclusion is, not 
unreasonably, that there are no easy solutions, it is also incumbent on 
policy-makers to explore the scope for marginal changes to make a tangible 
difference to any inequities. 
The employability of women has been an enduring priority in EU 
policy. As Chapter 7 shows, there have been significant shifts in 
employment rates among different segments of the female workforce: with 
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more women entering tertiary education, younger cohorts have seen a 
decline in employment rates, whereas older women are now much more 
likely to be employed than in previous generations. There are both stock 
and flow explanations for these transitions. Overall, women are better 
educated and because there is a positive association between education and 
employment, the outcome is a better employment rate.   
There are still huge differences across countries in employment rates 
of mothers. An obvious explanatory variable is the provision of publicly 
funded childcare, but there is also a socio-cultural dimension at play. For 
example, as NEUJOBS national policy reports on Hungary and Germany 
explain, it has long been the norm for mothers to look after small children 
at home, and this is reinforced by the incentives in the welfare system.8 It 
follows that an over-arching policy goal of increasing the employment rate 
of mothers has to recognise that there are wider societal factors to take into 
account. 
A possible answer is to explore the scope for different forms of 
working. Teleworking, flexible hours or part-time working are types of 
arrangements that can enable mothers (and even, in the relatively small 
number of member states such as Sweden where parental leave is shared, 
fathers) to remain connected to the labour market. The attractions are clear. 
Given that the median worker with young children is increasingly well-
educated, extended periods of inactivity not only risk the ‘hysteresis’ effect 
of increasing detachment from the labour market and a more demanding 
transition back to work, but also lead to a societal loss in the form of a 
reduced return on human-capital investment.   
It is the more highly educated women in a number of member states 
who experience the largest pay gaps relative to men. There appears to be a 
link between work-life balance policies and the gender pay gap. However, 
the care model can make a difference: formal provision seems to be better 
for gender equality than private cash-based arrangements, but there is a 
trade-off with costs, with formal care costing more. The conditions for care 
workers may be part of the story in fostering greater gender equality. 
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Key messages for policy-makers: Employment of women 
At the EU level 
 In rethinking the flexicurity model, the distinctive needs of older 
women and working mothers should be identified and appropriate 
solutions found. 
o The tools of the open method of coordination can be helpful in this 
regard. 
 Although many of the required policy responses are well understood 
and many helpful policies have indeed been devised, NEUJOBS 
research suggests that an implementation problem has still to be 
overcome. 
 Job quality and equal pay for women continue to be labour market 
problems and will require further initiatives. 
At the national level 
 Increasing the employment rate of women, especially returning 
mothers, by identifying obstacles and customising support should be 
accorded urgent priority. 
 Given the prospect of extension of working life by changing jobs, the 
provision of LLL should be extended or strengthened for sectors or 
groups, including those not currently economically active, in which it is 
less common. 
 The interaction between the statutory retirement age and activation 
should be re-examined. 
 
ii) Inclusion of Roma 
The Roma minority is, according to Chapter 9 by Vera Messing, by far the 
largest in the EU, at some nine or more million, although given that it 
comprises groups with different traditions in different member states, it 
can be misleading to think of Roma as a homogeneous group. What is 
abundantly clear, however, is that there is widespread discrimination 
against Roma and that policy efforts to overcome their social exclusion 
have proved to be ineffective. There are many reasons for this state of 
affairs. Discrimination manifests itself in poor access to housing, sub-
standard educational provision and very low employment rates compared 
with other groups, with especially low skills. 
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Messing finds that there is a cumulative disadvantage resulting from 
the high levels of illiteracy in some countries (although mainly among 
older-age cohorts in Hungary and Slovakia), a lack of basic numeracy and 
associated workplace skills, and generally low educational qualifications 
for those that reach secondary education. Even in Slovakia and Hungary, 
where Roma educational attainment is higher than in neighbouring 
Romania and Bulgaria, fewer than one in five achieves a higher secondary 
qualification, and tertiary education is a rarity. There is overt racial 
discrimination against Roma in Bulgaria and Romania, even in the way 
jobs are advertised, while elsewhere it may be more hidden but nonetheless 
equally potent in excluding candidates from interviews, for example on the 
basis of names. The NEUJOBS research reveals that even the public sector 
engages in such discrimination. 
Countries offering relatively more low-skilled jobs – particularly in 
sectors such as agriculture, tourism and construction – employ relatively 
more Roma, and the decline of manual jobs in industry after 1989 in 
Slovakia and Hungary was associated with substantial job losses. Even in 
Hungary, the relatively higher employment rate of Roma is inflated by 
counting those on public-works programmes. 
A policy dilemma emphasised in the chapter by Messing is whether 
key employment policy instruments, such as active labour market policies, 
should be specifically targeted at groups such as the Roma, or should 
instead have their eligibility determined by the main labour market 
attributes associated with low employment rates, including locality, level of 
education and age. To the extent that racial (in the case of the Roma) or any 
other form of discrimination is itself the main impediment to employment, 
specific targeting can be justified, although there can be risks of a backlash 
if other relatively deprived groups perceive (rightly or wrongly) that the 
targeted group is obtaining special treatment. Messing notes that the 2011 
EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies tries to reconcile 
the two options by advocating “explicit but not exclusive targeting”. 
Careful evaluation will be needed to see whether this compromise 
approach achieves the desired results, not least because the indications 
from the work of Messing and colleagues is that implementation in the four 
countries they study shows little sign of change. 
The functioning of public employment services is another area of 
concern for policy-makers. The NEUJOBS research in chapter 8 reveals that 
Roma are deterred from using these services by the attitudes of officials, 
thereby creating a catch-22 in which the lack of support means the services 
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are not used, adding to the likelihood of Roma being confined to the 
informal economy. There is some risk of employment traps in a circle of 
public works and welfare schemes. This is a problem that other countries, 
including the Scandinavian pioneers of ALMP, have struggled to resolve 
over the years, but one in which there are lessons in relation to the Roma 
that can be learned, for example in the ways that Sweden has recently tried 
to thwart the ‘carousel’ through which the same individuals go from one 
public programme to another without truly re-entering the labour market. 
 
Key messages for policy-makers: Inclusion of Roma 
At the EU level 
 Social inclusion strategies face a profound test of credibility in dealing 
with the Roma populations and have to be sensitive to the diverse 
circumstances of this group in different member states. 
 In instances where there is documented discrimination against Roma, 
there is a prima facie breach of EU law and norms; naming and shaming 
should be a first level of response, but the Commission should consider 
formal proceedings against member states that fail to enforce the 
relevant legislation, especially in public employment. 
 The mutual learning around how to prevent jobs traps should be 
intensified, so as to draw out implications for the employment of Roma 
across the EU. 
At the national level 
 Dealing with the multi-faceted nature of exclusion confronting Roma 
has to be at the core of the policy response. 
 Public policies, including writing-in to contracts for public procurement 
that any discrimination will lead to penalties or cancellation of the 
contract, should be used to give a lead to the labour market in 
preventing discrimination. 
 The effectiveness of public employment services in placing excluded 
groups, notably Roma, should be examined and reforms introduced to 
counter hidden discrimination or inadequate provision for such groups. 
 Involving representatives of excluded groups in different stages of 
policy-making – from decision-making to implementation – can help 
make programmes more effective and responsive to needs. 
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iii) Immigration 
Europe is an attractive destination for migrants, but migration leads to 
tensions that policy-makers in many member states have found hard to 
resolve. It is also a policy area in which glib populist myths gain political 
credence, despite the weight of empirical evidence. There is an increasingly 
fraught debate in many EU member states about migrants, whether from 
other member states or from third countries, and an often hypocritical 
reluctance to acknowledge the contribution of migrants to the effective 
functioning of many sectors of activity. Nor is it just the high-level 
occupations that are the issue. Many low-skilled jobs would be very hard to 
fill without migrants, from agriculture through to care services. Moreover, 
recent EU policy initiatives have sought to put in place a long-term, 
strategic approach to recruitment of foreign workers at a time when 
political discourse in several member states has taken a distinctly anti-
immigrant turn. 
There is a wide spectrum of immigration, from Nobel prize-winning 
scientists at one end to the impoverished and totally uneducated refugees 
crossing the Mediterranean in flimsy boats at the other, and it follows that 
policy responses have to be suitably differentiated. As the chapter by 
Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Katharina Eisele recalls, there is a degree 
of consensus around the need for the EU to attract highly qualified 
workers, both to fill skills gaps and to provide a spur to competitiveness. It 
is, therefore, logical that the Europe 2020 strategy should explicitly target 
attracting the most talented third-country nationals. In this context, 
immigration is not just about labour supply, but also about the pursuit of 
the knowledge economy and entrepreneurship. Immigrant workers are, 
however, also crucial for the care services in many member states, 
especially in the light of the relatively high age of current care workers 
discussed above. 
Restrictions such as quotas (for example, on the issuance of social 
security numbers, as recently advocated in the UK) can be in conflict with 
EU law, but are seen within member states as necessary for a plethora of 
reasons, including worries about opportunities for those already resident. 
However, Chapter 8 points out that the criteria adopted are often short-
term and politicised, and stresses that migration has to be seen as a much 
longer-term societal transformation. Restrictions do not, in any case, detract 
from the attractiveness of a destination and may, almost paradoxically, 
make favoured destinations more sought-after. These observations have a 
number of implications for EU policy.  
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Compared with a qualified, single, 
prime-age worker, a family of asylum-
seekers manifestly has very different 
interactions with the fiscal and 
welfare systems of a host country. 
The difficulty is not just 
that of classic ‘brain 
drain’, but also one of 
‘brain squandering’. 
Should there be a points-based system in the EU and, if so, for what 
attributes should points be awarded? A stock answer is that scarce skills 
should be the main test. But in the light of NEUJOBS findings about 
prospective gaps in labour supply for a number of relatively low-skilled 
occupations, including care, a broader answer may be needed. As 
discussed by Carrera et al. in their chapter, there is a time dimension to 
consider. Europe may have a surfeit of low- or unskilled workers at 
present, but once demographic transitions begin to bite, the position could 
change quite rapidly. Under-use of immigrant skills is widespread, yet is 
hard to overcome because of a lack of mutual recognition of qualifications, 
prompting questions such as what constitutes a ‘skill’. Carrera et al. suggest 
that establishing the meaning of ‘medium-skilled’ is especially tricky.  
It may be that the presumed competition with the US, Canada and 
other mature economies for the most talented migrants is not an accurate 
characterisation. If so, it may lead to false policy 
choices and wrong-headed approaches. The 
attractiveness of a migrant for the host country 
may be based on filling an immediate need, but 
this is not necessarily the same as what attracts 
the migrant to a destination. Restrictions that suit 
the host and provide an immediate economic rationale may be contrary to 
the interests of the individual migrant, not least where the latter has longer-
term goals, yet is faced by an asymmetry of power. 
The themes covered in Chapter 8 from a legal perspective can be 
widened to embrace the role of migrants in labour supply in areas that are 
not primarily connected to competitive advantage or the global search for 
talent. Compared with a qualified, single, prime-age worker, a family of 
asylum-seekers manifestly has very different interactions with the fiscal 
and welfare systems of a host country. 
The evidence on the contribution of migrant workers to the provision 
of care, presented in the chapter by Attila Bartha, Olena Fedyuk and 
Violetta Zentai, gives an overview of the extent of the dependence on low-
skilled migrants, predominantly 
women. In the EU15, there was a 
40% increase in this group between 
2000 and 2010. Given the NEUJOBS 
base scenario projection that care 
demand will increase by at least 15% 
and, under certain assumptions, by 
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as much as 40% in the period up to 2025, there are tricky policy issues 
around how to fill the jobs and how to accommodate the migrants who will 
inevitably form a significant proportion of the labour supply. However, it is 
argued by Magda and Kaminska in their chapter that an influx of 
immigrants to bolster care-sector employment may perpetuate, rather than 
solve, gender inequality. 
Because the role of migrants in care differs greatly among the 
member states, the thrust of policy is also bound to differ. Many central 
and eastern European countries are, in effect, providers of the labour 
supply in western Europe, largely because of financial and other incentives 
to work in richer member states. Moreover, immigrant care workers, as 
Bartha et al. emphasise, often take jobs on terms that indigenous workers 
would not be willing to accept. Young Poles, Latvians or Slovaks who 
migrate to work in Sweden, the UK or Germany leave gaps in the labour 
supply in their home countries and, moreover, possess higher 
qualifications than they need for the work they undertake. To this extent, 
the human-capital investment of home countries will have lower returns, 
but the difficulty is not just that of classic ‘brain drain’, but also one of 
‘brain squandering’.  
Tighter controls on migration risk pushing those in the care segment 
of the labour market further into the informal economy. There is, therefore, 
a need for both an EU-level and a national-level policy response. Part-time 
work in care is much more the norm, in contrast to many other 
occupations. A policy question is whether this is to be encouraged, 
amended or resisted. However, there are sizeable differences among the 
member states. 
Interactions between public and private care provision may help to 
explain some of the less-expected patterns of migration, notably the 
apparent attractiveness of Spain and Italy, rather than some of the northern 
member states, for such migrants. Good state provision in the Nordic 
countries substitutes for private demand, whereas there is a relatively more 
limited public provision in Mediterranean countries, together with a more 
receptive approach to informal arrangements. The stronger role of the 
family may also be a factor. Patterns in CEE countries are more 
heterogeneous. 
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Key messages for policy-makers: Immigration 
At the EU level 
 The EU needs a coherent approach to immigration, capable of 
overcoming the problems arising from fragmented national policies. 
 Clarity is needed on the status of immigrants and how their rights and 
the restrictions they face are interpreted in different member states. 
 Hard law is, however, only one dimension of immigration policy; it has 
to be complemented by implementation. 
 An EU system for the recognition of qualifications of third-country 
nationals is needed. 
At the national level 
 Some of the myths that surround immigration need to be confronted 
head-on if discriminatory and disruptive social consequences are to be 
avoided. 
 More rigorous enforcement of existing rules is called for, especially on 
discrimination. 
 Where the skills and qualifications of migrants are under-used, there is 
a mutual advantage for the host and the migrants themselves in finding 
ways to make better use of their human capital. 
 
13.3 Rethinking EU policies: Orientations and governance 
With a new European Commission now in office, intent on a fresh 
approach to growth and jobs, many established norms of policy-making 
deserve to be challenged. The NEUJOBS project provides a wide-ranging 
evidence base and, in this volume, highlights several strategically 
important facets of the evolving EU labour market likely to bear on EU 
policy choices. In the light of NEUJOBS findings, this concluding section 
examines the scope for new thinking on some of the principal mechanisms 
through which the EU level can be influential. In this regard, the Europe 
2020 strategy ought to be pivotal, although as the stocktaking paper on 
Europe 2020 concedes, “the immediacy of the crisis sometimes made it 
challenging to reconcile short-term urgencies with longer-term needs” 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 19). The Commission analysis 
acknowledges that the growth model of previous decades is no longer 
viable, and the paper emphasises “weaknesses in education and training 
systems”. It also alludes to unemployment and “widening social 
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inequalities” as problems that have not been resolved, while employment 
and poverty reduction targets have not been met. 
As the EU edges out of crisis and thoughts turn to what Alan Blinder 
et al. have referred to as the “new normal”,9 there is likely to be renewed 
interest in sustainability as a (or even the) defining norm for the socio-
economic development of the EU, highlighting the importance of the 
NEUJOBS transitions. It may be most obvious in relation to resource use 
and carbon emissions, but it is also highly pertinent in social policy. Quite 
apart from normative considerations such as equality or inclusion, an 
ageing Europe cannot ignore the fiscal and macroeconomic imperatives 
pushing it towards societal changes that will ensure an adequate labour 
supply and contain the costs of the welfare state. In all these respects, a 
sustainable Europe will differ from that of the pre-crisis years. 
Examination of how well placed EU countries are to achieve 
successful ‘NEUJOBS transitions’ reveals highly diverse trends. The 
evidence also suggests that a country may do well on some transitions, but 
have shortcomings on others. These differences arise for various reasons, 
with some countries facing much more rapid population ageing (and, in 
some cases, a marked decline), or having to contend with unhelpful 
legacies in skills or in the energy mix. In others, populist reactions to 
immigration or an inability to find effective ways of integrating excluded 
groups – Roma being a prime example – have influenced the policy agenda. 
The tensions that arise and the difficulties in resolving them can best be 
understood through a political economy lens. Some examples are: 
 In energy, the short-term impact of a decarbonisation strategy that, as 
with Germany’s Energiewende, substantially raises the unit costs of 
electricity for industrial as well as domestic consumers, at a time 
when global competitors are seeing energy costs fall. 
 Incompatibilities between established social norms, such as the 
expectation in Hungary that mothers care for children at home, and 
the activation of women. A similar effect occurs in Italy, where care 
for the elderly is expected of female children, also conflicting with 
activation policies. 
 A sense in France that the conjunction of education and social policies 
is increasingly ill-suited to the employment challenges of the coming 
decades, but a lack of clear solutions.10 A specific worry is the large 
inequalities in educational outcomes in France, which systematically 
undermine the chances for children from less-favourable 
backgrounds to obtain jobs.11 
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 Labour mobility in Slovakia being weakened by the nature of tenure 
in housing markets and deficiencies in infrastructure, aggravating 
mismatch problems.12 
 The difficulty of integrating Roma into mainstream society, even 
when (as discussed in Chapter 9) policies are well intentioned, 
because of socio-cultural resistance. 
 The growing hostility in the UK to EU migrants, despite evidence that 
they make a sizeable net contribution to public finances and 
prosperity, which exemplifies the difficulties of resorting to 
immigration as a solution to labour supply.  
 Mortgage commitments, rather than home ownership as such, being 
the biggest obstacle to labour mobility, although the interaction 
between the two varies substantially across the EU because of the 
diverse nature of the systems for housing finance.13 
These differences complicate policy responses at the EU level and the 
evidence suggests that, in spite of a plethora of initiatives – including the 
Europe 2020 strategy, the Compact for Growth and Jobs, Youth Guarantees 
and many more – their aggregate impact has been disappointing. There has 
also been a tendency to think that answers can be found in grands projéts, 
typically infrastructure related, but with not enough focus on other drivers 
of growth and employment. 
i) Defining a new approach 
The case for a fresh approach is, therefore, becoming more compelling. One 
way forward has come in the announcement in December 2014 of the 
European Fund for Strategic Investment, a potentially defining initiative of 
the new Commission, which took office late in 2014. Its premise is that 
there has been inadequate investment across the EU, especially since the 
crisis struck, and hence more investment is necessary to reinvigorate the 
EU economy and to underpin growth and jobs. For many observers this 
will be understood as physical and business capital, some of which can be 
channelled into projects aimed at an energy transition. 
An alternative perspective could come from thinking in terms of 
human capital and its development across a range of policy domains. Social 
investment, as explained by proponents such as Anton Hemerijck, 
encompasses three distinct, but interdependent and complementary, 
welfare policy functions.14 The first is easing the ‘flow’ of contemporary 
labour market and life-course transitions. The second is raising the quality 
of the ‘stock’ of human capital and the capabilities of individuals, affording 
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them greater scope to take advantage of opportunities, particularly for 
employment. A third function is maintaining strong minimum-income 
universal safety nets as social protection and economic stabilisation 
‘buffers’, a function that may require some redefinition in ageing societies.15 
Much of the debate on how the EU can adapt takes place under the 
shadow of heavily constrained public finances, leading to the pessimistic 
view that little can be done. The easy, if erroneous, policy implication is 
that extensive changes, in the energy system or in the social field, are 
unaffordable. While some elements of, for example, a social investment 
approach are costly in the short term, they have longer-term pay-offs, and 
some regulatory reforms affecting energy efficiency only have, at worst, 
indirect costs and may save money. Moreover, as NEUJOBS projections 
show, there are viable solutions to pensions and other ageing costs.16 After 
examining different approaches to retirement ages, they come to the 
general conclusion that a relatively moderate increase in the official 
retirement age, for example raising it in line with the increase in life 
expectancy, can transform the public finances of ageing. 
 
Key messages for policy-makers: Defining a new approach 
At the EU level 
 Social investment, while acknowledged to have its critics, can become a 
core policy narrative for the EU as it recasts its policies towards growth 
and jobs. 
 Opportunities for policy learning and sharing of experience in dealing 
with labour market blockages should be reinforced in EU-mediated 
processes and policy strategies. 
 A successful welfare state is one that, as John Hills explains,17 offers 
opportunities for all strata of society, not just those who claim benefits. 
At the national level 
 Finding a national pathway towards sustainable pensions may be 
politically difficult, but there are viable examples that can be adapted. 
 In reaction to the crisis of recent years, a tough approach to public 
expenditure has been adopted, but progress on the transitions identified 
by NEUJOBS can also be made by other forms of policy intervention, 
calling for a judicious mix of regulatory and budgetary policies. 
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It is the sheer numbers of older 
people rather than increased 
care needs on average that 
make the difference. 
ii) Social services of general interest 
The interactions between labour supply and demand in social services of 
general interest, especially health and long-term care, highlight some of the 
long-term policy dilemmas associated with the NEUJOBS transitions. 
Logically, as the population ages, the demand for care for the elderly will 
rise, although not necessarily in a linear fashion if advances in preventative 
healthcare, or new forms of organisation such as those relying on 
information and communications technology (ICT), reduce the need for 
direct inter-personal service delivery. As 
discussed in Chapter 10, there is a range of 
policy options around both the funding of 
social services of general interest (SSGI) 
through the public sector and the 
possibility of substitution of private 
provision. There can be little doubt that the demand will remain and that 
some societal trends, such as increased female economic activity, are 
closely linked to choices on SSGI. 
In care services, the jobs for the least skilled tend to be ancillary 
occupations such as cleaning or similar in-home tasks. Such jobs are less 
prevalent in poorer countries. All this suggests that there is a ‘trilemma’ 
around care jobs of: first, constraints on funding that will squeeze the 
resources available; second, labour supply in terms of both headcount and 
mix of qualifications, accentuated by the projections of exit into inactivity of 
older cohorts in the current workforce; and third, rising demand. Each leg 
of this trilemma is open to a variety of policy solutions. 
The complex political economy of care services is likely to affect the 
future provision of such jobs. Fiscal policies matter for the scale of service 
provision, but electoral politics also play a part and are likely to make a 
difference as populations age, empowering the grey voter as well as the 
grey consumer. In a period of public finance consolidation, the types of 
innovations in SSGI that are feasible in the context of welfare-state 
expansion are harder to agree upon. One consequence may be to accentuate 
the differences between welfare states. The skills profile of SSGI is quite 
polarised, but there is evidence that in countries where SSGI are more 
extensive, it is a sector that generates a high number of jobs for the 
unskilled. If funding constraints are binding, one policy implication is that 
a significant source of jobs for the unskilled will be jeopardised. 
A difficult challenge is that healthcare costs tend to rise at a faster rate 
than consumer price inflation, with the result that public budgets face 
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continuing stresses. An ageing population, living longer, is part of the 
explanation, even if the next cohorts of pensioners are, as a result of better 
health prevention (the decline of smoking is an illustration), typically 
healthier than their predecessors. It is the sheer numbers of older people 
rather than increased care needs on average that make the difference. 
Health costs have, however, been increased by the upskilling of health 
professions; a growing proportion of nurses, for example, are expected to 
have university degrees.18  
 
Key messages for policy-makers: Social services of general interest 
At the EU level 
 A wide-ranging debate should be launched on the role of social services 
of general interest as a source of jobs and on what the future labour 
market in this area will be. 
 Social services can be a test case for new, more flexible forms of 
employment attuned to the preferences of workers, not just employers. 
 The consequences of cross-border flows of workers in SSGI for the 
capacity to meet growing demands in lower-income countries and the 
implications for the stock of human capital need to be monitored. 
At the national level 
 Although there are unavoidable difficulties in funding SSGI, 
organisational solutions to the provision of services should be sought 
and not hidden or rejected for ideological reasons. 
 The balance between private and public provision of services should be 
carefully examined, including assessing the implications for skills and 
recruitment. 
 In countries where social services are relatively under-developed, there 
is scope for boosting them as a source of jobs, especially for those with 
low qualifications. 
 
iii) Governance of transitions 
A long-run transition will, unavoidably, be disruptive and must be 
expected to elicit opposition, mainly (although not only) from those 
adversely affected by changes affecting their standing, wellbeing or 
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prosperity. Only some of the winners and losers will be easily or 
unambiguously identifiable ex ante. At one end of the spectrum, there 
might be a Polish coal miner losing his job because the brown coal he digs 
out of the ground is no longer environmentally acceptable; at the other, a 
single mother could find her disposable income squeezed because a 
renewable levy has pushed up the cost of electricity that she cannot do 
without, while a lack of affordable childcare limits her employment 
opportunities. The remedies in these two cases may be self-evident, but in 
others they are less so.  
Concern about jobs is pervasive in policy-making and is at the heart 
of the NEUJOBS research, but it is not necessarily the first priority of most 
of the policy areas examined in this volume. There are several explanations 
for this. Most policy interventions are organised around sectors; there is an 
energy policy, a social inclusion policy, a transport policy, a housing policy, 
a climate change policy, and so on. In each sector there will be primary 
objectives that constitute the raison d’être of the directorate-general, 
ministry or agency responsible, and the actors involved will be judged 
principally on how effective they are in achieving these objectives. While 
there might be credit to be gained from generating jobs as well, there would 
not be if it were a case of instead. In these circumstances, jobs are bound to 
come lower in a hierarchy of policy goals. Given the verdict from the 
analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that, under most plausible scenarios, there 
are opportunities for substantial reductions in emissions to be accompanied 
by net job creation, the value of a focus on jobs ought to be stressed. 
A response to the crisis has been to seek greater flexibility in the 
labour market, but with different approaches. In Germany and the UK, for 
example, both hours and wages have been adjusted but on the whole 
employment headcounts have held up well. Some of the measures, such as 
the zero-hour contracts (ZHC) in the UK, lead to tensions where multiple 
goals are pursued.19 There is especially high use of ZHCs in the hospitality 
industry, and a fairly high incidence in some public services. The evidence 
is unclear, however, on whether workers accept ZHCs under duress 
because of a lack of alternatives, although there are some signs that these 
contracts apply more to less-qualified workers (although their use in 
knowledge industries is far from negligible). Elsewhere, job losses have 
been dramatic, with Italy having seen a sharp recent rise in unemployment, 
especially pronounced among youth.20 Among those subject to a bailout 
and the consequent adjustment programme overseen by the ‘Troika’ (made 
up of the IMF, the Commission and the ECB), the most acute labour market 
effects have been in Greece. It is nevertheless clear that behind the headline 
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data, there have been revealing differences in how labour market 
institutions in member states have coped. Some of the precepts of the 
flexicurity model can, arguably, be brought to bear in this context, if 
suitably updated. Much reduced poverty rates and the concentration of 
wealth among pensioners pose policy questions around how income is 
distributed among age cohorts and bear on the sustainability of current 
pension systems. Starting points differ hugely across the EU, with some 
member states already having undertaken reforms that keep older people 
economically active, while in others the employment rates of older workers 
are markedly lower than for prime-age workers. This diversity is, again, 
partly a result of institutional differences, but also reflects past policy 
measures affecting the health, wellbeing and expectations of older people, 
not least their propensity to be economically active. An underlying 
question is what sort of work is appealing for older workers; physical 
work, including several categories of green jobs, may not be.  
There is also a broader question of whether the governance system is 
attuned to offering the right sorts of working conditions or job 
opportunities. Extending the working-life need not mean either staying in 
the same job or continuing to work full-time. But unless incentives are 
reconfigured in the interplay between work and pensions, imaginative 
options may be hard to sell. Clearly, too, training provision will have to 
adapt, for example by targeting older workers seeking new types of job. 
In developing such ideas for new policy initiatives, strategic choices 
will need to take account of long pay-off periods transcending customary 
electoral cycles, as well as sequencing difficulties, including the likelihood 
that costs are front-loaded while benefits take longer. Attention will also 
have to be paid to the balance within policy packages. Thus, while 
welcoming the Commission’s Social Investment Package, the European 
Anti-Poverty Network has expressed its deep worries about viewing social 
investment as almost exclusively about economic efficiency, with the 
implication that less attention will be paid to combating poverty and 
exclusion.21 
One of the undeniable strengths of the EU is that core elements of the 
European social model are part of the glue that binds member states 
together. Social Europe is an idea that, despite many setbacks, will neither 
go away nor cease to be a component of European integration championed 
by many stakeholders.22 Similarly, although there is not much lingering 
disagreement about either the science of climate change or the need for the 
EU to act to curb greenhouse gas emissions, it is equally clear that there are 
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widely differing views among policy-makers on what should be done, 
when and in what sequence. In both cases a crucial, if often unspoken, 
question is who should pick up the bill, allied to the question of whether 
action should be taken mainly by national and sub-national policy actors, 
or whether a more extensive EU role should be contemplated. 
A crucial dimension of the political economy of EU policy-making is 
national preferences, and there are many instances of timid decisions being 
taken (or, not infrequently, being put off) because finding consensus is just 
too difficult. For much the same reason, initiatives that might make a 
significant difference are prone to being watered down. A policy 
implication is that more effort is required to reconcile such clashes of 
interests. 
 
Key messages for policy-makers: Governance of transitions 
At the EU level 
 The common ground in the social models of EU countries continues to 
be crucial to what the EU stands for and does; while in need of some 
reinvention, its underlying virtues should be stressed. 
 A concerted effort is needed to convince member states to support 
measures with longer-term pay-offs that also advance the common 
European interest, even if they are at odds with certain short-term 
national preferences. 
o Ambiguity about how burdens should be shared should be avoided. 
At the national level 
 The mix of policy has to be coherent, comprehensive and equitable.  
o An energy policy that seeks to decarbonise yet continues to 
subsidise fossil fuels is manifestly not coherent. 
o Similarly, an approach that motivates companies to invest in 
carbon-intensive production abroad rather than adopting alternative 
technologies does not, ultimately, reduce emissions. 
 In an era of fiscal consolidation, policy measures that offer gains in jobs 
as well as fulfilling other objectives should be given priority. 
 Country-specific institutional obstacles to transitions should be 
identified and dismantled. 
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iv) A last word… 
Many of the specific themes discussed in this volume are already 
challenging for policy-makers in the EU, and are even harder to deal with 
when long-term transitions have to be undertaken. At a superficial level, 
the stark message from Mario Draghi about the demise of the European 
social model and Angela Merkel’s so-called ‘7:25:50’ critique of Europe’s 
commitment to social protection23 have some resonance, but they overlook 
the more fundamental point that social risks have to be borne somewhere 
in a modern capitalist economy. Instead, the question should be whether 
the means by which European states deal with these risks and the values 
that underpin them remain attractive. Many of the diverse findings from 
the NEUJOBS project make clear that socio-ecological transition is not only 
a long-term challenge, but also one that is being met by significant 
evolution and policy innovation in all member states.  
As Anton Hemerijck, taking issue with some of the more negative 
assessments, asserts: “both the welfare state and the EU, two major feats of 
mid-twentieth century institutional engineering, have at critical times been 
able to reinvent themselves.”24 In the wake of a crisis as severe as that of 
recent years, an emphatic conclusion of this book is that they not only need 
to do so again, but will have to do so comprehensively and repeatedly in 
dealing with long-term socio-ecological challenges. 
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AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
ALMPs active labour market policies 
CCS carbon capture and storage 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CIM construction, installation and manufacturing  
CSP concentrated solar power  
DST diversified supply technologies 
EaP Eastern Partnership 
EEA European Economic Area 
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EO employment office 
ETS EU Emissions Trading System 
EU European Union 
FTE full-time equivalent 
GDP gross domestic product 
GHG greenhouse gas 
GVA gross value added 
HSW health and social work 
ICT information and communications technology 
ILO International Labour Organization 
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LEZ Low Emissions Zone 
LFS Eurostat Labour Force Survey 
LLL lifelong learning 
LTC long-term care 
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